



WALDO CANYON FIRE

23 JUNE 2012 TO 10 JULY 2012

FINAL AFTER ACTION REPORT

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Meaning
AAR	After Action Report
AFN	Access and Functional Needs
AMR	American Medical Response
ARC	American Red Cross
AREP	Agency Representative
CAPS	Community Advancing Public Safety
CART	Community Animal Response Team
CDOC	Colorado Department of Corrections
CERT	Community Emergency Response Training
CMHS	Cheyenne Mountain High School
COEM	Colorado Office of Emergency Management
COML	Communications Unit Leader
CSFD	Colorado Springs Fire Department
CSOEM	Colorado Springs Office of Emergency Management
CSP	Colorado State Patrol
CSPD	Colorado Springs Police Department
CSU	Colorado Springs Utilities
COW	Cellular on Wheels
DFM	Division of the Fire Marshal
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DTRS	Digital Trunked Radio System
ENS	Emergency Notification System
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOP	Emergency Operations Plan
EPC	El Paso County
EPCPH	El Paso County Public Health
EPSO	El Paso Sheriff's Office
FD	Fire Department
FDOC	Fire Department Operations Center

Abbreviation	Meaning
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMAG	Fire Management Assistance Grant
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
HSPPR	Humane Society of the Pikes Peak Region
IAP	Incident Action Plan
IC	Incident Command
ICP	Incident Command Post
ICS	Incident Command System
IDLH	Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
IMT	Incident Management Team
JIC	Joint Information Center
JIS	Joint Information System
MAC	Multi-agency Coordination
MAPs	Management Access Points
MCP	Mobile Command Post
MHz	Megahertz
MPH	Miles Per Hour
MRCEPC	Medical Reserve Corps of El Paso County
NIMS	National Incident Management System
OEM	Office of Emergency Management
PD	Police Department
PIO	Public Information Officer
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PPRCN	Pikes Peak Regional Communications Network
SME	Subject Matter Expert
TCP	Traffic Control Point
TOC	Traffic Operations Center
UCCS	University of Colorado at Colorado Springs
USAFA	United States Air Force Academy
VPN	Virtual Private Network
WUI	Wildland Urban Interface

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

At approximately noon on Saturday, 23 June 2012, it was reported that a fire had begun in the Pike National Forest, approximately three miles west of the City of Colorado Springs (City), and to the north of Highway 24 in El Paso County. The fire burned 18,247 acres¹ over 18 days and was reported as fully contained on 10 July 2012. The Waldo Canyon Fire was the most destructive wildfire in Colorado history, destroying 347² homes and damaging many others. Tragically, two individuals lost their lives as a result of the Fire.

The Waldo Canyon Fire was a complex, Type 1 Incident that spanned two counties and multiple municipalities. This After Action Report (AAR) focuses on the actions directly related to the response to the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) within, and by, the City of Colorado Springs.

The After Action Review process was first used by the United States Army after the Vietnam War to capture lessons learned from simulated battles³. These Reviews are now routinely conducted at all levels within organizations. After Action Reviews are a structured approach for reviewing the work of a group (in this case, the City of Colorado Springs) and identifying strengths, weaknesses and areas for improvement. After Action Reviews focus internally on answering questions to describe: 1) What happened; 2) What went well and why; and 3) What can be improved and how. At the conclusion of the review, the *After Action Report* is completed to share the results of the review with the entire work group to assist in learning. Sharing an AAR outside of the immediate work group can assist similar organizations in learning and preparing for future events.

This AAR focuses on the responses of all City departments and divisions that supported the City's response to this extremely complex incident. These findings were gleaned from several after-action meetings held with City departments, state and local government, private and non-profit agencies during August, 2012. Additionally, detailed reviews of related incident documentation and first responder radio transmissions were conducted. Although this report focuses solely on the response of the City, it does not discount the invaluable contributions of many local partner agencies and the efforts of first responders working in contiguous municipalities and counties. The City is focusing on internal policies and procedures in a dedicated attempt to determine actionable items that can be identified and corrected in advance of a subsequent event.

¹ <http://inciweb.org/incident/2929/>

² Determining the accurate count of the number of homes that were lost in the Waldo Canyon Fire is an on-going process that has many intricacies involved. On Thursday, 28 June 2012, City authorities announced that 346 homes were destroyed. When announced, this number was reported as preliminary and it was noted that the figure may rise. Since then, the Pikes Peak Regional Building Department (PPRBD) has embarked on an in-depth analysis of the homes in the area. This analysis is complete and the final number of destroyed homes is 347.

³ wildfirelessons.net/documents/AAR_PPT_Final.pptx

This document encompasses all City-specific information that was included in the City's Initial AAR that provided a high-level summary, by capability area, of strengths and recommendations. This document takes the Initial AAR information a step further by reviewing and providing commentary on the City response in greater detail. The major strengths and recommendations remain unchanged from those reported in the Initial AAR.

MAJOR STRENGTHS

The major strengths identified during the City's response to the Waldo Canyon Fire are as follows:

- **Public Safety Collaboration:** Post 9/11, public safety agencies in Colorado Springs began a concerted effort to build collaboration among and between the City's public safety agencies. Colorado Springs Fire Department (CSFD) and Colorado Springs Police Department (CSPD) have since developed a strong working relationship through planning, training, and exercises as demonstrated on real-world events. This strength in collaboration was instrumental in the response to the complex Waldo Canyon Fire.
- **Personnel:** Personnel from the City of Colorado Springs, governmental partners, and local non-profit agencies demonstrated unprecedented dedication to the incident response, as well as to the residents of Colorado Springs.
- **Training and Exercise:** CSFD, CSPD, and the Colorado Springs Office of Emergency Management (CSOEM) have a demonstrated history of coordinating and conducting multi-agency, complex emergency response training and exercises. Additionally, CSFD and CSPD have completed comprehensive tactical training and exercises that directly relate to this type of a response. The City has also participated in the South Central All-Hazards Region⁴ training and exercise program for the past nine years. This extensive training and exercise experience played an important role in the successful response by the City's first responders and support personnel. Exercises, such as the "Up in Smoke" WUI exercise series, included emergency evacuation drills with residents and first responders, as well as components of a larger, full-scale exercise with emergency response agencies.
- **Relationships:** Pre-existing relationships among local government and non-profit agencies were instrumental in ensuring a well-coordinated response. Leadership personnel from local agencies have met face to face, engaged in training, and worked to solidify partnerships over the past several years. These relationships provided the structure for an effective response to all aspects of the Waldo Canyon Fire.
- **Public Safety Response:** CSFD and CSPD safely evacuated approximately 26,000 residents on 26 June 2012, while effectively fighting a fast-moving conflagration fire in the WUI, protecting

⁴ The South Central All-Hazards Region is a multi-county emergency management and homeland security region that consists of the City, El Paso, Teller, Lake, Chaffee, and Park counties.

and saving 82% of the homes in the direct impact area.

- **Planning:** CSFD, CSPD, and CSOEM have worked collaboratively with all City Departments for several years to develop policies, plans and procedures for a WUI fire. These plans have been used in training and tested during emergency response exercises.
- **Wildfire Mitigation Plan:** In 2001, the CSFD developed a comprehensive Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP). This plan included an extensive, interactive risk assessment of the WUI and establishment of a strong community education program. In 2011, the Colorado Springs Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP) was finalized as an update to the WMP with detailed emphasis on future planning and program features.
- **WUI Fire Evacuation Appendix to the Colorado Springs Emergency Operations Plan:** A WUI Fire Evacuation Appendix was initially created in 2008, and updated in early 2012. It provides detailed information for the City on the wildfire risk in the WUI as well as resources and plans for first responders to use during a WUI evacuation (including traffic models). This appendix was further tested during the “Up in Smoke” WUI exercise series.

PRIMARY RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary recommendations are as follows:

- **Internal/Partner Agency Communications:** Decisions were made rapidly at key points in time throughout the incident. A system/process needs to be designed and implemented to provide notification to first responders and key agency representatives as command decisions are made throughout the event. Existing technologies should be reviewed and modified to accomplish this.
- **Real-Time Documentation:** Documenting dates, times, and decisions during each day of the incident was an overwhelming task. Moving forward, a process should be developed to train existing staff and/or public safety volunteers to work as “scribes” throughout the various geographically-dispersed locations affected by the incident. Scribes will track real-time information for record-keeping and can serve as a communications link between locations when primary staff is busy with their duties.
- **Logistics:** The nature of the Waldo Canyon Fire incident (i.e., duration, number of personnel assigned, multiple geographic incident locations) created an unprecedented need for logistics support. Training should occur for staff and volunteers who can immediately be placed in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to form a more robust Logistics Section to assist with providing support to all aspects of the incident. The goal is to have three individuals trained to perform each role in the EOC.
- **Incident Management:** The Incident Command System (ICS) is a standardized, on-scene, all-hazard incident management system that allows its users to adopt an integrated

organizational structure that matches the complexities of the incident. While ICS training has been delivered over the past several years to first responders, a need has been identified to practice (i.e., exercise) advanced ICS skills. Additional training and exercise on ICS job aides, organization charts, and checklists that have previously been developed should be provided.

CONCLUSIONS

The Waldo Canyon Fire was an historic incident that demanded the best from the City of Colorado Springs. Personnel from within the City, along with the hundreds of individuals from assisting agencies, reacted in an incredibly professional and heroic manner throughout the duration of this incident.

Numerous strengths and lessons learned were demonstrated during this incident. It is imperative that these strengths and lessons are captured so that City personnel build upon them for future similar responses. This document is the first step in a lengthy process to ensure that the City embraces the strengths identified in the response and builds upon them. Additionally, the City of Colorado Springs is committed to work toward implementing, to the swiftest and fullest extent possible, the recommendations contained in this AAR.

Although this report does not address recovery efforts related to the Waldo Canyon Fire, several initiatives are in place. Colorado Springs Together, a 501(c)3, was immediately established and has been successful in working with residents on recovery needs. In addition, much work is underway to address the aftermath related to potential flood risks following the Fire.

While not covered in this report, the City of Colorado Springs would like to acknowledge the significant outpouring of support received during this incident. Individuals and agencies throughout the Pikes Peak Region – and beyond - provided personnel and goods to support fire and law enforcement response efforts. Agencies from the local area did not hesitate to make their personnel available at all times. Additionally, an outpouring of support came from local business that provided food, supplies, and equipment to all aspects of the City's response.

The Waldo Canyon Fire was an incident of epic proportions for not only the City of Colorado Springs, but also for numerous neighboring municipalities and counties that were directly impacted. This AAR covers the response of only one of many agencies involved in fighting this historic fire. The City of Colorado Springs stands by these AAR findings and the response by the public safety agencies.

Post fire studies have been conducted by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Forest Service on many Type 1 wildland fires, such as the Boulder Fourmile Canyon Fire. A contract was recently granted to a team to conduct a comprehensive, holistic study of the Lower North Fork Fire. These studies differ from this AAR in that all agencies and aspects of the fire can be examined, such as fire pre-mitigation efforts, in a scientific manner to determine the social, economic, organizational and ecological impacts.

In October, 2012, Senators Udall and Bennet sent a letter to USDA Secretary Vilsak requesting a comprehensive and scientific review of the Waldo Canyon and High Park Fires (see Appendix J). This type of study will provide insight into the interdependencies that existed among the various local, state and federal response agencies throughout the duration of the fire and how the environment influenced the fire behavior. The City of Colorado Springs fully supports this request and is prepared to actively participate in a further holistic review of the Waldo Canyon Fire, understanding that the USDA study would complement this AAR.

SECTION 1: COLORADO SPRINGS DAILY RESPONSE

This section of the AAR provides a day-to-day review of the overall incident, to include fire behavior, fire progression, weather conditions, and general information regarding significant activities that occurred in areas adjacent to Colorado Springs.

A narrative overview of the City of Colorado Springs' response is provided for each day. This narrative captures the highlights of the City's response to various, key aspects of the Waldo Canyon Fire. It is impossible to fully document all the events occurring during the City's response and, therefore, this overview provides a snapshot of what the various City departments and divisions were responsible for. This document does not address interactions with partner agencies and neighboring governments in any detail. It is not the intention of the City to diminish the importance of these interactions; instead this document reviews the strengths and recommendations that the City has the direct ability to impact and authority to change.

Strengths and recommendations are tied to the capabilities that were first cited in the City's Initial AAR. The compilation of capabilities is found in Section 2.

FIRE OUTLOOK AND BACKGROUND

On 14 June 2012, the Pike and San Isabel National Forests issued Stage 1 fire and smoking restrictions on all national forest system lands. This ban prohibited the building, maintaining, attending of or using a fire, campfire, or stove fire, as well as smoking, except in designated locations.

On the same day, Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper issued Executive Order D2012-015, a ban on open burning in the State. At that time, Colorado had already experienced 344 wildfires⁵ in 2012. The Executive Order defined "open burning" as "any outdoor fire, including but not limited to, campfires, warming fires, charcoal grill fires, fused explosives, fireworks, and any other activity that poses a significant risk of starting a fire."

Eight days later, on 22 June 2012, initial calls were made to the Manitou Springs Fire Department reporting smoke in the area of Pyramid Mountain and Waldo Canyon. The United States Forest Service (USFS) and local departments received calls and/or dispatched units to the area. First responders looked for the source of the smoke until dark, but were unable to locate any fire. The USFS took command of the incident in the evening and called it "Pyramid Command".

⁵Colorado Governor's Executive Order D2012-015

23 JUNE 2012 (SATURDAY)

OVERVIEW

A Red Flag Warning was in effect. Firefighters from the USFS and the Cascade Volunteer Fire Department began looking for the source of smoke again, on foot, at approximately 0700 on 23 June 2012. At approximately 1230, numerous residents throughout the Pikes Peak Region reported seeing smoke in the area of Waldo Canyon. This was about the same time that on-scene fire crews verified a quick-burning fire in the Pike National Forest. First responders from Colorado Springs mobilized mid-day in the Cedar Heights neighborhood.

As response efforts were underway, the Colorado Springs EOC was activated and a mandatory evacuation order was issued for the Cedar Heights neighborhood. Further voluntary evacuations were ordered for neighborhoods along the westernmost edge of Colorado Springs and by EPSO for the towns along Highway 24. CSFD and CSPD, along with CSOEM, developed evacuation zones and Management Action Points (MAPs), based on the current and predicted fire behavior.

The first American Red Cross (ARC) shelter opened at Cheyenne Mountain High School, in coordination with the Medical Reserve Corps of El Paso County (MRCEPC). This collaboration resulted in a fully functioning all-population shelter accommodating individuals with Access and Functional Needs (AFN). Penrose Equestrian Center was established as the large animal shelter and was managed by the El Paso County Animal Response Team (EPC CART). Both companion and large animals were accepted for sheltering at the Humane Society of the Pikes Peak Region (HSPPR).

The weather conditions were hot and dry with erratic winds causing the fire to spread rapidly to the northwest and south. The initial ICS structure made the decision to delegate the authority of this fire to a Federal Type 1 IMT. During mid-afternoon, a mandatory evacuation order was issued for southern Mountain Shadows.

The high temperature in Colorado Springs was 100 degrees.

COLORADO SPRINGS RESPONSE**NOON TO 1400**

The Colorado Springs Public Safety Dispatch Center (Dispatch) became aware of the quickly growing fire west of Colorado Springs at approximately noon. A resident near Bear Creek Park called 9-1-1 at 1210 to report seeing smoke west of the quarry above the Cedar Heights neighborhood. At the same time, CSFD Battalion Chief (BC) Royal was in the vicinity of Highway 24 and 26th Street when he heard a CSFD officer contact Dispatch inquiring about the smoke on the mountainside. BC Royal saw the growing plume of smoke and called for an Engine/Brush Truck response to Cedar Heights. BC Royal then requested that the CSFD Mobile Command Post (MCP) be deployed to the Safeway parking lot at 31st Street and Colorado Avenue (see Appendix I for a listing and map of key locations). This location was identified as the initial Staging Area. With the plume of smoke rapidly growing, BC Royal

contacted CSOEM Director, Bret Waters and requested the evacuation of Cedar Heights. Director Waters contacted Dispatch, while enroute to the EOC, and requested that the Emergency Notification System (ENS) mandatory evacuation message be developed for Cedar Heights and that an EOC activation notification be sent to on-call EOC personnel.

The CSFD Public Information Officer (PIO) reported the fire on Twitter at 1218, stating that there was a possible wildland fire in Waldo Canyon, and that City units were responding to assist the El Paso County. At this time, BC Royal was also informed that the EPSO and Cascade Volunteer Fire Department were working the fire in Cascade. The City requested air support from EPSO at approximately the same time that EPSO requested a mutual-aid wildland response from the City to the "Pyramid Command." A quick-moving crown fire could be seen moving south and west of Cedar Heights. CSFD established lookouts on the southwest ridge of the eastern slope of Williams Canyon and on Rampart Range Road above the west side of Williams Canyon and Waldo Canyon.

At approximately 1222, numerous 9-1-1 calls reporting smoke inundated Colorado Springs Dispatch. As a result, Dispatch notified the Colorado Springs Traffic Operations Center and the Colorado State Patrol (CSP) to use variable message boards throughout the City and on Highway 24, requesting community members to refrain from contacting 9-1-1 to report the fire. Additionally, at approximately 1243, Twitter became very active with the same message, acknowledging that responders were working the fire.

The EOC and the Fire Department Operations Center (FDOC) were activated at approximately 1230. FDOC and EOC personnel were responsible for developing evacuation zones (see Appendix B for evacuation zone maps). Information on current and possible fire behaviors, as indicated by fire-behavior models, was used to establish the first evacuation Zones 1-3 (Zone 1: Cedar Heights, Zone 2: southern Mountain Shadows, Zone 3: northern Mountain Shadows, Peregrine, north Rockrimmon). Based on predicted fire activity, MAPs were determined for each zone. The Zone 1 (cedar heights) MAP was established as any encroachment on the ridge above Cedar Heights. The Zone 2 (southern Mountain Shadows) MAP was established as any boundary breach of Zone 1 (Cedar Heights), or fire crossing Rampart Range Road. The Zone 3 (northern Mountain Shadows) MAP was any breaching of Zone 2 (southern Mountain Shadows), or any fire activity observed on the eastern ridge of Queens Canyon above the quarry. These points were closely monitored by CSFD personnel working in the FDOC, as well as by personnel out in the field, to include lookouts.

At 1255, CSFD requested CSPD to stop all traffic to Rampart Range Road from Garden of the Gods Park. This information was also immediately released via Twitter. By 1300, evacuation plans for Cedar Heights were initiated.

The USFS took Command of the fire shortly before 1300 and named it the "Waldo Canyon Fire."

At 1303, CSPD was requested by CSFD to respond to Staging at 31st Street and Colorado Avenue to assist with the evacuation of Cedar Heights. Manitou Springs was notified of the impending evacuation efforts. Significant staffing support from CSFD was requested to assist in Cedar Heights

with evacuation, critical infrastructure protection (communications and water towers), and preparing homes for fire. Colorado Springs Utilities (CSU) worked alongside CSFD cutting dozer lines. CSFD District Chiefs conferred and decided to use modified dispatch procedures, diverting several medical calls to American Medical Response (AMR) until 0300 the following day.

At 1305, the CSFD PIO tweeted that evacuation of Cedar Heights had begun and requested that residents leave the area. The official ENS for the Cedar Heights neighborhood evacuation was sent at 1339, while CSFD and CSPD evacuation efforts were already underway.

The CSFD MCP arrived at the Staging Area at 1315. The first media briefing was held at this location at approximately 1345. By this time, numerous City and County leaders were at the Staging Area and provided comments or interviews at the press conference. At this time, the fire was referred to as the “Pyramid Mountain Fire” by local response agencies, and referred to as the “Waldo Canyon Fire” by the USFS.

1401-1700

Twitter notifications began at 1410 noting that Garden of the Gods Park was closed and people in the park were told to leave. This was later confirmed by the EOC in conjunction with the Colorado Springs Parks Manager. The Pikes Peak Highway, and all trails in the area, was also closed at 1440. Numerous hikers and individuals in cars were evacuated from each of these areas with the assistance of City staff.

Staff in the EOC called Colorado Springs Fleet Services at approximately 1400 to ensure that fuel trucks were ready to provide support. Staff responded and ensured the readiness of fuel vehicles. By 1500, two mobile fuel trucks carrying unleaded and diesel fuel were deployed to the Staging Area and to the Mountain Shadows area. Fleet Services employees were also contacted and placed on indefinite 24-hour emergency call-in notice.

CSPD deployed approximately 15 officers to assist with the Cedar Heights evacuation and initiated door-to-door notifications at 1422. In addition to the media coverage and the ENS messages sent out, CSPD officers drove through the neighborhood using vehicle-mounted Public Announcement (PA) systems. Call screen history shows that CSPD responded to numerous calls for service requesting assistance with evacuation. CSPD officers noted the status of each residence to which they responded. Minimal refusals were noted, and the majority of attempted notifications resulted in no contact. CSPD personnel completed the individual notification process of 213 homes and approximately 406 residents.

Based on the fast-moving fire activity, the USFS requested a Type 1 incident declaration. At approximately 1430, Rich Harvey, Incident Commander of the Great Basin Type 1 IMT #2 was notified to begin mobilization to the Waldo Canyon Fire. Holmes Middle School was identified as the Type 1 ICP location. The Type 1 IMT was scheduled to arrive beginning Sunday afternoon. During this same time frame, CSFD completed the necessary paperwork to provide a Delegation of Authority to El Paso

County. CSFD Deputy Chief (DC) Dubay drove the Delegation of Authority to the Type 3 IMT Command Post in Green Mountain Falls, but was unable to execute the document.

At 1458, an ENS and Twitter message were sent simultaneously announcing a voluntary evacuation of southern Mountain Shadows, north of 30th Street from Gateway Road and north to Chuckwagon Road. At 1506, CSPD closed southbound 30th Street at Garden of the Gods Road.

CSFD Station 9 contacted the EOC at 1511 to notify personnel that a large retreat was underway at the Glen Eyrie Conference Center. CSPD suggested voluntary evacuation of the Center. At 1524, two CSPD officers were requested to provide traffic control at the entrance of the Conference Center to facilitate the evacuation of Glen Eyrie. A few minutes later, the Conference Center was included in the mandatory evacuation zone. A CSFD Structure Protection Group was assigned to Glen Eyrie at this time. In total, approximately 200 people were evacuated from the Glen Eyrie Conference Center.

Shortly after 1500, Cheyenne Mountain High School (CMHS) was identified as an ARC shelter. At approximately the same time, the Penrose Equestrian Center was identified as a large animal shelter. The EPC CART managed this large animal shelter. The Colorado Springs Community Animal Response Team (CS CART) was in the process of being activated and would later establish a companion animal shelter at CMHS.

Driven by hot/dry conditions and ever-shifting winds, the fire grew and crossed over Rampart Range Road. Breach of this Zone 2 MAP resulted in the mandatory evacuation order for southern Mountain Shadows. The CSFD PIO first announced the mandatory evacuation of southern Mountain Shadows at 1517 on Twitter. Internal EOC communications noted the evacuation of Zone 2 (southern Mountain Shadows) and Glen Eyrie at 1521, and the ENS message notifying the mandatory evacuation of southern Mountain Shadows was sent at 1531.

CSPD started evacuations of southern Mountain Shadows and established an evacuation Command Post at 2525 Garden of the Gods Road, the Verizon building. CSPD also assisted with the evacuation of personnel from this building. Once again, CSPD deployed approximately 15 officers to conduct notifications using PA systems, as well as going door-to-door. This evacuation took approximately eight hours to complete and included 840 homes and 1,875 residents. The total number of evacuated residents grew to 2,281. CSPD Command remained at the Verizon parking lot throughout the night, managing the evacuations and security detail in the southern Mountain Shadows area.

A media briefing was held at 1615 at the Staging Area. At this time, it was publicly announced that there was a single fire that had been named by two different entities: the "Pyramid Mountain Fire" and the "Waldo Canyon Fire." The name of this single fire was clarified during this press briefing as the "Waldo Canyon Fire."

CSU and the Pikes Peak Regional Communications Network (PPRCN) identified critical infrastructure west of Cedar Heights. Water and communications towers were in the direct path of the fire and, if affected by the fire, could create a disruption in services. CSFD monitored these towers carefully

throughout the incident.

1701-2400

The HSPPR provided shelter for small animals at its facility on Abbott Lane. Local veterinary care facilities also accepted small animals and published this information through official and non-official means during the incident.

Additional media briefings were held at 1730 and 1800. Media briefings continued to include representation from the City, El Paso County, the USFS, and the Type 3 IMT. These agencies began to develop a Joint Information System (JIS) during the evening that would be formalized the next day. CSFD provided additional resources to the Cedar Heights and southern Mountain Shadows neighborhoods, while ensuring that the necessary resources were available to handle the everyday needs of the residents of Colorado Springs. CSFD initiated mutual-aid with Cimarron Hills Fire Department, Stratmoor Hills Fire Department, Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station Fire Department, and Peterson Air Force Base Fire Department to provide coverage within the City limits. Additionally, CSFD reserve apparatus were used to backfill the stations.

During the early evening hours, CSPD EOC staff began to contact residential group living locations within Zone 3 (northern Mountain Shadows, Peregrine, north Rockrimmon). CSPD focused on these locations to ensure that the staff was prepared to evacuate, should the order be given. The two locations that were contacted provided resident numbers and were able to articulate their plans to evacuate their respective locations.

The EOC worked throughout the day ensuring that the appropriate resources and infrastructure were in place at the EOC, and in other locations, to support this incident. A time reporting code category was established for City personnel to make certain that all employees working the incident were coding their time.

CSPD, CSFD, and mutual-aid personnel worked during the night to provide structure protection and security in the evacuated neighborhoods. The fire remained active and CSU built and maintained dozer lines during the night. Fire behavior was continuously monitored and situational awareness reports were provided to the FDOC. CSFD established a staffing and accountability plan for the next day that included using a bus to transport crews to the fire from the Staging Area.

24 JUNE 2012 (SUNDAY)

OVERVIEW

For the second consecutive day, a Red Flag Warning remained in effect. High temperatures and erratic winds continued throughout the day. The fire spread mostly to the north, west, and south. No further evacuations were ordered in the City. The high temperature in Colorado Springs was 100 degrees.

Due to the fire behavior on the southern and western end of the fire, EPSO ordered Highway 24 closed and it remained so until 1 July 2012. Mandatory evacuations were also enacted for the towns along Highway 24 from Colorado Springs to Woodland Park.

City evacuees remained at 2,281 and the total acres involved grew from 2,500 acres to 3,600 acres of USFS and El Paso County land combined.

COLORADO SPRINGS RESPONSE

Shortly after midnight, CSFD and CSPD personnel reported that fire behavior was unpredictable, noting fire flare-ups and spotting west of Cedar Heights. The fire also grew very close to radio towers located in this area. CSFD and CSU worked through the night to complete and maintain existing dozer lines, ensuring that any fire that threatened the radio towers was immediately extinguished.

CSFD used the early morning hours to conduct a full accountability check of personnel. Personnel accountability was managed out of the CSFD MCP, located at the Staging Area. Full personnel accountability was achieved and, a plan was finalized to rotate CSFD staffing in the Cedar Heights neighborhood. This rotation plan would keep the apparatus in the neighborhood and would allow assigned personnel the ability to work the fire without disruption, until rotated.

Shortly after 0230, a CSFD lookout reported that fire had crossed into Cedar Heights. Two engines were assigned and were able to contain the fire. Reports continued throughout the morning of active fire moving close to, and into, the Cedar Heights neighborhood. Dozers continued to work throughout the morning to create and maintain the fire lines.

CSFD leadership reviewed the proposed Delegation of Authority with the City Attorney's Office and signed the document as part of the transition to the Type 1 IMT. At this time, it was decided that DC Dubai would be assigned to the Type 1 IMT and he would be responsible for CSFD resources. DC Dubai responded to Holmes Middle School to assist with coordinating resources for the incoming Type 1 IMT.

A morning press conference was held with individuals representing the many agencies involved with the fire. The morning update noted that the fire had spread at least 500 acres overnight and was a quarter-mile away from structures in Cedar Heights.

The JIS was activated in the morning at the Joint Information Center (JIC), located at the EPSO Law Enforcement Bureau on West Costilla Street. A bank of phone numbers was identified and published for the public to call for information. The JIC location did not have a pre-established bank of telephones and equipment that could be used during this incident. As a result, cellular phones provided by a cell service provider were used for the phone bank. These cellular phones were from Denver and had a long-distance (720) area code. The City established a schedule of eight-hour shifts and began to request volunteers and former staff members to assist with answering phones. The JIC was staffed with personnel from a variety of agencies, to include the City, EPSO, and USFS. The City positioned a PIO at the EOC to ensure that information was relayed to and from the JIC.

Personnel in the EOC and the FDOC continued to define and map the evacuation zones. The evacuation areas for Zone 3 (northern Mountain Shadows, Peregrine, north Rockrimmon) were redefined. The pre-established evacuation Zone 3 was broken into Zones 3 & 4. Zone 3 was re-defined to include northern Mountain Shadows, Peregrine, and Oak Valley and Zone 4 included north Rockrimmon. Zone 5 (Pleasant Valley) was also added. The City EOC Geospatial Information System (GIS) staff produced maps each time that an evacuation zone was created. GIS staff also provided related information to the evacuations zones, such as the number of buildings and the approximate population. GIS relied on a number of databases to develop this information using City GIS data, digital imagery, and the El Paso County Assessor's Office data. Each time a map was created hard copies were printed and distributed to a number of geographically-dispersed locations. These locations included the FDOC, press conference sites, the CSFD and CSPD MCPs, and staging-area locations.

The morning accountability check and staging for CSFD took place at 31st Street and Colorado Avenue. After all personnel and apparatus had been released, the CSFD MCP moved to Holmes Middle School, the assigned location of the incoming Type 1 IMT. The MCP was the identified location for CSFD Incident Command (Command). CSPD also moved its MCP to Holmes Middle School and established a Unified Command with CSFD. As such, the City's ICP, CSFD and CSPD's MCPs, were operational at Holmes Middle School by noon.

CSFD moved staging operations to Coronado High School. The Staging Area was used for CSFD apparatus to check-in/out and became the staging location for other apparatus, such as fuel trucks. Media staging was also moved to Coronado High School. From this point forward, media personnel often referred to this location as the "Command Post."

During mid-morning, a shift in wind direction was noted, blowing the fire to the southwest. This created a new concern for El Paso and Teller counties pushing the fire closer to the communities in Ute Pass and up toward Woodland Park. This prompted the relocation of the Type 3 IMT's ICP from Green Mountain Falls to Holmes Middle School. At this time, Highway 24 was closed from 31st Street to Woodland Park.

At approximately noon, the shifting winds caused the fire to encroach closer to Cedar Heights and

then retreat back again. Due to the fire behavior, lookouts were repositioned back in Cedar Heights and an additional lookout was placed at the water tower at Rampart Range Rd and the Queens Canyon access road. Air tankers worked on establishing a north/south retardant line east of Cedar Heights in order to inhibit east fire movement. At about this same time, an ENS message was reissued for Cedar Heights reminding residents of the mandatory evacuation and providing information on the fire behavior that was threatening the neighborhood. This message also directed residents to watch local media for updates.

The erratic fire behavior continued to threaten the “Cedar Heights” radio communications tower. CSFD personnel monitored the tower and provided situational awareness updates to the Colorado Springs radio shop on any fire in the immediate vicinity. Mitigation efforts continued on this radio tower as retardant was dropped on it and dozer lines were maintained. Additionally, personnel in the area maintained a visual on the Cedar Heights water towers and provided updates, as the fire grew closer.

CSPD maintained security around the evacuated areas. The Cedar Heights neighborhood (Zone 1) is a “gated community” and the contracted security service provided round-the-clock security at the entrance gate, while CSFD provided structure protection against the fire within the neighborhood. The contracted security resulted in a reduced burden on CSPD. In addition to providing Traffic Control Points (TCPs) and security patrols, CSPD sent an evacuation team into southern Mountain Shadows beginning at 1300. This team consisted of 12 personnel - two supervisors and 10 officers - who went door-to-door in attempt to contact any residents who may not have received or adhered to the mandatory evacuation order from the previous day. Refusals were called in to Dispatch noting the address of the location, name of the refusing party, and how many individuals were in the house.

The Colorado Springs CART (CS CART) set up a companion animal shelter at the CMHS shelter around noon. The CS CART shelter was established for companion animals of those individuals who were sheltering at the CMHS. Non-companion animals were directed to the HSPPR. Shortly after the opening of the CS CART shelter, the HSPPR announced that it was at capacity and could no longer accept animals. Numerous private kennels, stables, and veterinary locations announced that they would take in animals.

Additional parks within Colorado Springs were closed during the early afternoon hours, one of which was Palmer Park. CSPD requested the closure, due to the risk of people gathering in a forested area. Garden of the Gods Park, Red Rock Canyon Open Space, Cheyenne Canyon Park, High Drive, and the Pikes Peak Highway remained closed.

The Mayor signed a disaster declaration at the same time as El Paso County. A press release was issued by the JIS at 1358 announcing the disaster declarations. The disaster declaration activated the local Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) and inter-jurisdictional emergency plans and mutual-aid assistance agreements. The disaster declaration made the City eligible for federal and state disaster assistance.

During the day, the City EOC was the hub for activities to support the response to the fire. The need to provide logistics support to the operational personnel working the fire grew, and more resource requests were sent to the EOC for processing. Prior to this time, many resource requests were being handled directly by the departments through internal mechanisms. As the City moved into the second 24-hour period of the incident and agency personnel became more geographically dispersed, resource requests were consolidated in the EOC. EOC staff planned for multiple operational periods and developed staffing plans to accommodate this.

The EOC ICS structure was activated with staffing for the Finance, Logistics, Operations and Planning Sections. While these functions were established during these early stages of the fire, the personnel staffing was not always in place to support all positions that were needed.

EOC personnel tracked City staff who were affected by the evacuations, as well as the closures in the City (i.e. City parks/open space employees) and developed plans for contacting these individuals and providing Human Resource/staffing direction. An estimated 125 employees were directly impacted and living in the evacuated areas of Zones 1 and 2.

Colorado Springs received notification from FEMA that approval had been received to use federal funds to help with firefighting costs. This funding, the Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG) was provided through the President's Disaster Relief Fund and was made available to all jurisdictions fighting the Waldo Canyon Fire.

The Colorado Springs community showed their incredible support by dropping off hundreds of cases of water and non-perishables snacks at the Coronado High School Staging Area. With the extremely hot temperatures and lack of staff to manage the donations, media distributed messages to the public to send all non-perishable food donations to Care and Share. Until processes were fully developed with Care and Share, Coronado High School became the primary location where personnel working on the fire could access hydration and snacks. The Pikes Peak Fire Fighter's Association, Fire Rehab Services was activated and EOC logistics supported their operations. Anyone wishing to volunteer was directed to Pikes Peak United Way.

An afternoon media briefing was held at 1600 at Coronado High School. Members of the Type 3 IMT and local officials provided information related to the fire growth, as it pertained to all of El Paso and Teller Counties. Members of the Type 1 IMT were onsite and worked toward transition of the incident, scheduled to occur later in the evening. Press conferences were now being held at regularly scheduled intervals with a variety of agencies. At the initiation of the press conference, individuals were given an opportunity to express their desire to speak, and a speaking order was subsequently established. After this press conference, and subsequent ones, various officials and agency PIOs remained to conduct individual on-camera interviews with media.

After setting up Command at Holmes Middle School, both CSFD and CSPD experienced numerous problems with cellular and radio service. The lack of cellular connectivity also resulted in a lack of internet/data connections. The two departments were working solely out of their command vehicles

and could not tie into existing landlines and telecommunications infrastructure. The lack of service was unacceptable and resulted in a need to relocate the command vehicles. The CSFD MCP was relocated to the Fire Department Complex (FDC). The CSFD MCP was parked outside and personnel initially set up Command in the Prevention Conference Room, off the front of the FDC lobby. This building was also the physical location of the FDOC, which was coordinating all CSFD efforts within the City that were not assigned to the Waldo Canyon incident (i.e., all regular operations within the City limits).

With the departure of the CSFD MCP and the continued connectivity problems, CSPD moved its MCP to a fixed facility near the southern Mountain Shadows area, CSFD Station 9. Staff at Station 9 indicated that there was adequate space to accommodate the CSPD personnel inside and confirmed that the PD Command could be moved to this location. The MCP was needed elsewhere in the City and was placed back in service when CSPD personnel moved to Station 9. Station 9 became "Command 2" for CSPD and this is the location where security and traffic control officers checked in for assignments. CSPD began to work mandatory 12-hour shifts for incoming personnel the following morning.

Personnel in all locations (EOC, FDOC, CSFD Command, CSPD Command, Staging, and Type 1 IMT) planned for the following day. Fire behavior was closely monitored and security was provided in the evacuated areas.

25 JUNE 2012 (MONDAY)

OVERVIEW:

A Red Flag Warning remained in effect for a third consecutive day and hot temperatures and erratic winds continued. The Type 1 IMT arrived and formally took control of the incident in the morning. The erratic weather continued to cause concern in the Cedar Heights neighborhood and the Highway 24 corridor. The fire made a major run to the north and west toward the area of Woodland Park and Rampart Reservoir. The high temperature for the day in Colorado Springs was 98 degrees.

No additional evacuations were ordered in the City. City evacuees remained at 2,281, and the total acres involved grew from 3,600 acres to 4,500 acres of USFS and El Paso County land combined.

COLORADO SPRINGS RESPONSE

CSFD lookouts reported active fire during the overnight hours, noting that the fire took a large run north toward Eagle Lake Camp and heading toward Rampart Reservoir. Improvements were made overnight to the dozer lines that were previously established around the perimeter of Cedar Heights.

At 0600, the Type 1 IMT assumed formal control of the incident. CSFD resources within the City limits remained under the control of the CSFD, with the exception of the three CSFD task forces that were assigned to the “Zulu Division” of the Type 1 IMT. The Zulu Division, under the direction of the Type 1 IMT, was responsible for structure protection/preparation in the Cedar Heights neighborhood. CSFD BC Schanel was responsible for this Division in Cedar Heights. The Type 1 IMT was very concerned about this area and requested CSFD remain on this assignment due to the availability of CSFD’s structure protection apparatus and equipment. By 0800, the Zulu Division in the Cedar Heights neighborhood reported that there was heavy fire on three sides of the neighborhood and firefighters were aggressively attacking the spot fires.

CSFD established a “Structure Protection Branch” that operated under the Operations Section of the Type 1 IMT, but was independent from the Type 1 IMT and remained under CSFD leadership. This Structure Protection Branch remained separate from the Type 1 IMT due to its relative distance from the fire, as it was not a priority for the Type 1 IMT at the time. The Branch Director was Deputy Chief (DC) Dubai and the Deputy Director was Battalion Chief (BC) Collas. These CSFD Chiefs were also identified as Agency Representatives (AREPs) from the City of Colorado Springs to the Type 1 IMT. As AREPs, the Chiefs provided a morning briefing, to the Policy Group, EOC and then to the FDOC, providing the most recent IMT information, to include the Type 1 IMT’s daily objectives and fire and weather conditions and forecasts.

The Colorado Springs Policy Group had been meeting in an ad-hoc fashion since Saturday. The Policy Group began holding formal meetings each day prior to the 0800 Press Conference. These meetings involved select City Department Heads and included a briefing by the CSFD Type 1 IMT AREPs. After the meetings concluded and Policy Group members departed for the 0800 Press Conference, the

CSFD Type 1 AREPs provided a briefing to the staff at the EOC and the FDOC.

A press conference was held at 0800 and an update was provided on the fire and overnight actions. The lead for each press conference was the Type 1 IMT Incident Commander, Rich Harvey. Individuals representing government, public safety agencies and elected officials followed IMT updates. Each individual took a few moments to provide his or her input and then reporters and community members were given an opportunity to ask questions.

The City mobilized volunteers from the Community Advancing Public Safety (CAPS) and would use their services throughout the duration of the incident. Approximately 20 volunteers were requested to assist with community-outreach efforts. CSPD contacted neighborhood watch captains to enlist their support as well. CAPS volunteers were also stationed at the City EOC to provide support and to ensure proper sign-in/sign out procedures were followed.

CSPD Command was notified by incoming CSFD personnel at Station 9 that there would not be enough room within the building to adequately support law enforcement activities. Station 9 personnel assisted CSPD with arrangements to move Command to Station 18. As CSPD began the process of moving, CSPD officers, who were not already assigned to existing TCPs, and security patrols were assigned to southern Mountain Shadows to conduct re-checks to look for residents who were not yet evacuated and had not been contacted the day before. Officers spent the majority of the day in the neighborhood going door-to-door. CSPD requested all operational personnel to bring their uniforms to work in the event that specialized units and teams might need to be diverted to response assignments requiring a uniform.

CSFD personnel continued to model the fire behavior based on the existing, and predicted, weather conditions and fire fuels. Focusing on the remaining westernmost evacuation area of Zone 3 (northern Mountain Shadows, Peregrine, Oak Valley), the fire behavior model predicted that, once the fire reached the identified MAP for the area, the top of the ridge line above the quarry, it would take four hours before the fire reached any structures.

The CS CART team, located at the CMHS shelter, began to take overflow of non-companion animals from the HSPPR, which was at capacity. CS CART was able to increase the capacity at CMHS by 25 animals.

CSPD moved its Command location to CSFD Station 18. The wireless and cellular service at this location proved problematic for CSPD personnel. A portable cellular tower, Cellular on Wheels (COW), was requested to provide capacity. City IT personnel also assisted at this location with setting up laptops and connections for Internet connectivity. Many factors involved caused this to be a time-intensive process that lasted into the afternoon of the following day.

The EOC received a large influx of resource requests to support the many locations and personnel who were actively working the fire. Numerous locations were routing food requests through the EOC (FDOC, CSPD Command, Staging Area, CSFD Operations personnel in the field, fuel personnel in the

field, CSPD officers at TCPs, backfill for personnel who were staffing stations). Additional requests were made for various equipment, supplies, maps, etc. These requests came from all locations at various times and frequencies. Due to closures at various City parks and on the Pikes Peak Highway, there were City staff members who were unable to go to their assigned work site beginning on Monday. The EOC utilized staff from the Pikes Peak Highway and Parks, Recreation and Cultural Services to assist with the logistics requests. Each staff member was equipped with a City Visa card and a City vehicle.

By mid-morning, agreements with Discover Goodwill of Southern and Western Colorado (Goodwill) were in place, and retail locations began to accept all non-food donations. Care and Share continued to be the point of contact for all non-perishable food. Care and Share worked directly with the EOC to provide food donations to first responders and agencies that were in need. Community members continued to show their generosity by dropping off food and hydration items at Coronado High School, as well as at locations throughout the City (fire stations, police stations, etc.). Personnel at Coronado High School were not equipped to manage this and public messages were sent out requesting the public to refrain from dropping off donations at this location, and take them to Care and Share or Goodwill.

Regularly scheduled City Council meetings were cancelled for Monday and Tuesday. Additional events, such as Bike-to-Work Day, were also cancelled. The City closed additional parks, trails, and open spaces and at least one pool before the end of the day. Numerous reports of closures, postponed sporting events, and community meetings, both City- and community-sponsored, were reported through www.springsgov.com and on television station news tickers.

A press conference was held at 1600 with much of the same information-sharing process as the 0800 press conference. There were no additional evacuations on Monday, so the information was mostly focused on the fire behavior during the day and what the overnight operations would entail.

A community meeting was held at CMHS at 1900 with leadership from the City, El Paso County, and the Type 1 IMT. The goal of the meeting was to provide timely information to all evacuated residents regarding the fire activity and existing evacuations. Evacuated residents expressed concern at this meeting about not being allowed back into their homes since the initial evacuation on Saturday, 23 June.

26 JUNE 2012 (TUESDAY)⁶

OVERVIEW:

The Red Flag Warning continued for a fourth day in a row. The fire maintained its southern and western border and continued to grow toward the north. The temperature in Colorado Springs reached an all-time high of 101 degrees.

A pre-evacuation order was given just after 1330 for the northern Mountain Shadows, Oak Valley, and Peregrine area.

Shortly after 1600, the fire reached the top of Queen's Canyon. This fire activity was the MAP for mandatory evacuation and, therefore, Mayor Bach issued a mandatory evacuation of northern Mountain Shadows/Peregrine at 1621 during the afternoon press conference. At this time, the weather was becoming more problematic as a large thunderstorm column was developing to the west of northern Mountain Shadows. Winds were becoming strong and gusting hard. Between 1707 and 1717⁷, the thunderstorm column collapsed and 65 mph winds drove the fire rapidly east and downhill into Colorado Springs.

Active fire within the northern Mountain Shadows/Peregrine area led to additional mandatory evacuations of several adjacent neighborhoods. Two additional shelters were opened in the Colorado Springs vicinity. Mutual-aid arrived from numerous agencies to assist with firefighting and law enforcement response. CSPD maintained security patrols inside the evacuated area and changed the security perimeter and TCPs to contain the entire evacuated zone.

The fire grew from 4,500 acres to 15,622 acres, with 1,516 acres within the Colorado Springs City limits. The number of City evacuees grew to 28,770 by the end of the day.

COLORADO SPRINGS RESPONSE**0000-1300**

First responders continued to monitor and address fire behavior throughout the early morning hours.

The weather forecast received at the morning briefing from the Type 1 IMT Incident Action Plan (IAP) noted, "Mostly sunny with late morning cumulus forming. A slight chance of high-based thunderstorms in the afternoon with little rain and gusty outflow winds up to 40 mph. Northwest half of fire - west 5-8 mph with gusts to 12 until 0900, becoming southwest 9-12 mph with gusts to 20 mph until 1800, some gusts as high as 25 mph. Southeast half of the fire – west 5-7 mph until 0800, upslope/valley 5 – 8 with gusts to 12 mph until 1000, then southeast winds increasing to 8 – 10 mph gusting 20 – 25 mph by afternoon." Using the Type 1 IMT and National Weather Service (NWS)-

⁶ A more detailed timeline for 26 June 2012 can be found in Appendix E.

⁷ This time range is based on numerous accounts from CSFD firefighters on the ground and resources in the air who reported the collapse.

projected forecasts for the day, the fire modeling continued at the FDOC. Based on this information, the modeling showed that the fire would be moving at an approximate rate of one-quarter mile per hour.

As in previous days, CSFD maintained two lookouts while also remaining in constant contact with the Type 1 IMT lookout. The CSFD lookouts were located in Crystal Park (Crystal Park lookout) and south of Highway 24 directly south of the Crystal Park lookout on the ridge (Ute lookout). The IMT lookout was located on Rampart Range Road, near the Navigators and Cedar Heights Water Tower.

The Policy Group convened at 0700.

A joint press conference was held at 0800 at Coronado High School. Coronado continued to be used as the media and first-responder staging areas. At this time, reports were provided that the fire had reached 5% containment. The TYPE 1 IMT continued to explain its plans regarding a continued focus on maintaining fire lines and critical infrastructure protection. The areas of concern for the City, based on the fire activity, were Cedar Heights to the south and ensuring that the fire did not cross Rampart Range Road to the north. City officials at the press conference announced that residents would be allowed to return, escorted, to the evacuated neighborhoods to retrieve emergency items.

Based largely on feedback received from the residents at the community meeting the night before, CSPD EOC staff developed plans to escort residents into the evacuated neighborhoods of Cedar Heights and southern Mountain Shadows. These efforts began in the early morning hours and were closely coordinated between CSPD and CSFD. CSFD personnel had been stationed in both neighborhoods, monitoring fire conditions and conducting structure protection, as needed.

Twitter posts were sent throughout the early morning after the press conference, noting that plans were under development to allow residents to return and retrieve emergency-essential items. Residents were very anxious to return home, but there were many factors that required close consideration before allowing access into the evacuated areas. Twitter messages provided updates as events throughout the morning changed for the personnel developing the plans for re-entry.

At 0900, CSPD noted that they were going to allow residents from Cedar Heights to return with escorts, while southern Mountain Shadows residents would not require an escort. As further consultation occurred between CSPD and CSFD personnel, it was determined, by 1000, that Cedar Heights' residents would not be allowed to return, due to the fire behavior to the north and west of the neighborhood. By 1052, CSPD began allowing evacuees from Mountain Shadows to return to their homes for 30 minutes to retrieve emergency items, after checking in with an officer at a TCP. At 1132, CSPD suspended the escorted returns into southern Mountain Shadows for emergency items due to fire behavior. The fire behavior was becoming erratic to the immediate west of the southern Mountain Shadows neighborhood and north of Cedar Heights. Earlier in the day, CSPD staff directed non-uniformed officers to wear their uniform to work should there be a need for additional staff to respond for evacuations and/or security.

The City's volunteer CAPS program provided significant resources to assist with public communications. Approximately 100 volunteers arrived at 0900 at the Type 1 IMT ICP, to obtain up-to-date reference material regarding the fire and then deployed to locations throughout the community. Each team of volunteers had an assigned lead.

The Pikes Peak Amateur Radio Emergency Service (PP ARES) is a group of trained amateur radio (HAM) operators who are also EOC volunteers. PP ARES members were utilized at the CMHS shelter, and in days to come at other area shelters, to provide real-time situational updates to the EOC.

The EOC worked closely with CSFD personnel at Station 9 on Garden of the Gods Road to establish a rehydration/feeding area for all first responder personnel. The Pikes Peak Fire Fighter's Association, Fire Rehab Services was requested to re-locate to Station 9 to continue feeding services for fire, law enforcement, emergency medical services, and other response personnel. Pikes Peak Fire Rehab is a regional support unit that was contracted by the City. Station 9 is located on a busy roadway and, so specific instructions were received by CSFD personnel regarding locations for first response personnel to park and how to access the Station parking lot. Notices were sent out via Dispatch, and through verbal communications, letting response personnel know that they could go to this location to receive food and hydration.

At 1228, an ENS message was sent to residents in Zone 2 (southern Mountain Shadows) reminding them that the area was still under mandatory evacuation and that they needed to leave immediately. At this time, as a precaution, pre-evacuation notices were under development for Zone 3 (northern Mountain Shadows, Peregrine, Oak Valley).

1301-1800

The pre-evacuation notice was issued, via ENS, for Zone 3 (northern Mountain Shadows, Peregrine, Oak Valley) at 1340. A press release was issued at the same time. Additional City Parks were also closed. Notifications of closures were immediately updated on the www.springsgov.com website.

Throughout the early afternoon, CSFD lookouts continued to provide weather updates. These lookouts also kept in close contact with the Type 1 IMT weather spotter. At 1426, the Ute lookout provided the following weather report: relative humidity 10.2%, wind speed of 5-6 mph with gusts up to 15mph, coming out of the S/SE.

At 1426, the Ute lookout reported fire activity in the Quarry above Cedar Heights that was starting to drop down into Williams Canyon. This information was then verified by the Crystal Park lookout, who also noted seeing flare-ups on the west side of Williams Canyon at 1429.

Approximately 30 minutes later, converging winds combined with continued low humidity caused the fire to develop a large column with a pyro-cumulus cloud on top. Eventually, the fire changed direction and made a substantial and rapid run to the east, toward the west border of USAFA. At this time, the fire had not breached the bottom of Queens Canyon or crested the eastern ridge above the

Pike View Quarry.

At approximately 1530, the lookouts reported increased fire activity in Queen's Canyon, moving toward the easternmost ridge, which was the MAP to initiate mandatory evacuation of Zone 3. At 1532, the Crystal Park lookout reported seeing fire on the northern ridge of Queens Canyon's western side. At 1535, Air Attack reported spotting the fire approximately 350 feet from the bottom of Queens Canyon. At 1605, the Ute lookout provided the following weather report: 96 degrees, relative humidity of 11.8, wind speed of 8 mph with gusts up to 18 mph, coming out of the south/southeast.

At 1604, the afternoon press conference was held at Coronado High School. The smoke from the fire could clearly be seen behind those that were providing updates, but the discussion at the press conference was much the same as those held on previous days. The Type 1 IC provided information on the firefighting efforts for the day and then each City and County official provided an update.

At 1608, fire was reported, via CSFD radio, on the east side of the most east-facing ridge of Queen's Canyon. Captain Steve Riker was located west of Wilson Tank and called BC Collas to confirm the evacuation order for Zone 3 (northern Mountain Shadows, Peregrine, Oak Valley). BC Collas acknowledged and stated that he would confirm. At 1610, BC Collas called the FDOC and requested the mandatory evacuation of Zone 3. The FDOC contacted the EOC and relayed the request for the evacuation order. At the time that the evacuation order request was received in the EOC, the four City personnel who have the authority to issue a mandatory evacuation order were at the live press conference.

The EOC notified CSPD and CSFD personnel who immediately activated evacuation plans for Zone 3. As a result of the previous CSPD directive, the Police Operations Center (POC) was staffed with approximately 40 uniformed officers ready to engage in evacuation efforts. With the EOC located inside the POC, this resulted in quick coordination and immediate action. At the same time, Dispatch personnel were building the ENS message for Zone 3, while the PIO in the EOC drafted the appropriate language for the written press release.

Simultaneously, personnel in the EOC were attempting to contact Chief Carey, Chief Brown, Director Waters, and Mayor Bach to relay information regarding the request for mandatory evacuation. At approximately 1617, Chief Carey was contacted. The formal request for mandatory evacuation was then verbally approved. The Chiefs and Director Waters contacted Mayor Bach while the live press conference was still ongoing. At 1621, Mayor Bach interrupted the afternoon press conference to announce the mandatory evacuation of Zone 3. At this time, City leadership departed from the press conference and returned to the EOC to work the situation.

Meanwhile, at 1611, the FDOC requested outside resources and assigned additional CSFD personnel to work in northern Mountain Shadows and Peregrine. At 1620, CSFD radio transmissions from personnel west of the Wilson Tank in northern Mountain Shadows noted that fire had moved approximately 1/3 of the way down the eastern ridge of Queen's Canyon. At 1623, CSFD radio

transmissions from personnel west of the Wilson Tank in northern Mountain Shadows noted that the fire had jumped over two peaks and started to run to the northeast. CSFD personnel in northern Mountain Shadows were mobilized in the field just east of the Wilson Tank, preparing to take a stand against the fire. Shortly before 1630 hours, the fire began working over the east ridge of Queen's Canyon, and down towards Mountain Shadows in the valley just west of the Chamberlain Trail approximately 300-400 yards west of the Wilson water tank. Personnel noted that the fire was moving slowly down the mountainside as they prepared to stop the fire before it reached the neighborhood. A lookout was assigned at the Wilson Tank to provide updates as the fire continued down the hillside.

At the same time, CSPD officers were mobilized in the northern Mountain Shadows neighborhood by 1617. Evacuation and traffic control teams had previously been established and worked to immediately execute their plans. Within the neighborhood, PA announcements and door-to-door evacuation notifications were used. During the initial evacuation efforts, officers encountered numerous individuals who were requesting access back into the neighborhood to retrieve children and/or animals that were at home. Officers allowed these individuals entry with very strong instruction to leave as soon as they accomplished what they needed to.

At 1624, the official mandatory evacuation notice was given for Zone 3 via the ENS. At 1636, over the radio, CSFD "Task Force 1" requested confirmation that the evacuation had been ordered and stated that there were still a lot of homeowners in Peregrine. DC Dubay confirmed that the evacuation order went out approximately 15 minutes prior. At 1652, CSPD responded to numerous calls for service, requesting assistance with the evacuation of elderly, disabled and/or young children who had been left home alone. These requests continued throughout the rest of the night and were acted upon, as they were received.

At approximately 1700 hours, personnel in the EOC and FDOC began to develop additional evacuation zones and MAPs; as a result Zones 6–9 were built.

Shortly after 1700, CSPD assigned 5 officers to assist 17 American Medical Response (AMR) vehicles to evacuate 103 patients from the Mount Saint Francis Nursing Center. Additionally, two CSFD buses were assigned to assist. CSFD Station 9 was established as the fire Staging Area for incoming agencies and apparatus and used by the CSFD medical Lieutenant to coordinate the evacuation of the Mount Saint Francis Nursing Center and to offer/conduct medical clearance/Rehab of CSFD personnel coming off the fire.

CSFD firefighters in the area west of Wilson Tank watched a water-suppression helicopter making water drops on the fire front just west of the tank. At 1707, the helicopter made its final water drop, and the pilot made a hand motion to firefighters to "get out" of the area. CSFD personnel immediately moved to hard pavement east of the Wilson Tank and joined arriving CSFD apparatus and personnel. A number of personnel and apparatus were located throughout the northern Mountain Shadows area at this time. Personnel were assisting with structure protection efforts, such as removing brush, taking apart wood deck areas, and laying hose lines.

At 1711, hours Air Attack reported that the thunderstorm column had collapsed. As a result of this collapse, coupled with the subsequent 65 mph winds, the fire spread very rapidly east and swiftly downhill into the western portion of northern Colorado Springs. The fire front created adverse working conditions for both CSFD and CSPD. Personnel from both agencies worked in deteriorating conditions as they continued evacuation efforts within the neighborhood.

As the fire front was entering Mountain Shadows, CSU shut off gas service to approximately 4,200 homes. This complete service shut-off was necessary to protect personnel in the area. This included Peregrine, Mountain Shadows and Oak Valley Ranch. Electric service was also shut off for approximately 200 homes.

At 1723, winds began to blow from west to east, carrying heavy smoke and embers into the neighborhood. CSFD ordered all personnel to retreat to Chipeta Elementary School due to the aggressive fire entering the area, 15 minutes later, the flame front was heading directly toward Chipeta Elementary School and all CSFD personnel were required to retreat to the Verizon building on Garden of the Gods Road and Centennial Boulevard. This location was used as CSFD Incident Command for the remainder of the night and into the following day. At approximately the same time, CSPD evacuated their Incident Command from Station 18 and moved it to the CSPD Falcon Division.

1801-2400

After the flame front passed, at approximately 1800, CSFD resources re-entered the northern Mountain Shadows neighborhood to commence firefighting efforts. CSFD Command at the Verizon building positioned resources throughout Mountain Shadows to combat the numerous structure fires. During this time, additional fire personnel from outside the City were located within the neighborhood and many additional resources from outside the area arrived on scene. CSFD personnel who were working in the neighborhood made the best effort possible to engage all resources into a unified fire-fighting response.

Additional mandatory evacuation orders continued via the ENS. At 1822, Zone 4 (north Rockrimmon) residents were given mandatory evacuation orders. At 1937, the order for Zone 7 (southeast Rockrimmon) was given and at 1950, the mandatory evacuation notice was given for Zone 6 (south Pope's Valley, Woodmen Valley, Pinon Valley, Pine Cliff). The final mandatory evacuation notice was issued at 2146 for Zone 8 (Kissing Camels) via the ENS. These evacuation orders covered the western side of the City, west of I-25 and north of Garden of the Gods Road. Approximately 20,000 additional residents were included in this series of evacuations.

CSPD's evacuation plan included closing all west-bound lanes into the evacuated areas and closing I-25 north and south of the evacuated areas. No traffic was allowed onto I-25 at Interquest Parkway, Research Parkway, Briargate Parkway, and North Academy Boulevard. Evacuees were directed to travel east out of the area and onto I-25 North or South.

With the significant number of evacuations that had been announced within a very short period of time, the EOC coordinated efforts for additional sheltering and a meeting area for evacuees to obtain information. Shortly after 1800, the Springs Church in the former Phil Long Expo Center north of the Chapel Hills Mall was opened as an evacuation point. This was not a shelter, but a location where evacuees could receive information and obtain water and snacks while determining what to do next. The evacuation point was staffed with individuals from El Paso County Public Health (EPCPH) and from the Springs Church. The location was publicized widely on TV crawlers and via Twitter, but only a handful of evacuees visited this location. City buses and AMR were present in the immediate area to provide transportation from the evacuated neighborhood to and from the evacuation point at Springs Church, and to the shelter locations.

During this time, additional support efforts continued within the EOC. The Colorado Springs Information Technology (IT) Department recognized a need for additional bandwidth on the City's website to accommodate the increased traffic. The City's website is internal to the City network and, until this time, the website had proven capable for the increase in traffic as a result of the fire. Understanding that there would be a significant increase in public usage/access, as a result of the fire entering the City limits, and due to the increased usage of City staff accessing their remote Virtual Private Network (VPN), the City IT Department requested an immediate and emergent increase in bandwidth. This was accomplished within hours. At this time, City IT also provided staff, round the clock, in the EOC to provide technical support for all aspects of the incident.

With the increased bandwidth, the City developed a database on the springsgov.com website for evacuees who were in the fire-affected neighborhood. The information for this website was published widely with the intent for evacuees to register to receive announcements and updates specific to their personal experience in their neighborhoods. Over the course of the next few days, the City received more than 8,000 registrations on this website.

Local agencies from the Pikes Peak Region responded to the dramatic increase in evacuees by opening additional shelters for both people and their pets. At 1853, the ARC opened a second shelter in Colorado Springs at the Southeast YMCA and, at 2002, the ARC opened a third shelter in Monument at Lewis Palmer High School. These two shelters were opened in strategic locations at the north and southeast sides of town to accommodate the incoming evacuees. At 1909, the HSPPR opened a second shelter for small animals at the Freedom Financial Services Expo Center.

At approximately 2000, the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), immediately north of the City limits, evacuated two of the living quarters on base and limited all other access and activities. The alternate housing for USAFA was Fort Carson, which is on the southeast outskirts on the City limits.

The media and CSFD staging locations were in the evacuated area at Coronado High School. After the evacuations were ordered, CSFD Staging was moved to Station 9 on Garden of the Gods Road, just west of I-25. Media staging was relocated to the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs (UCCS) Recreation Center Parking Lot and would remain at this location for the duration of the incident.

A press conference was held after 2030 at UCCS. During this media briefing it was evident - and many news stations broadcasted live images - that numerous structures were engulfed in active fire. During the press conference, noted by CSFD Chief Brown, firefighters were engaged in extreme firefighting efforts at the time, and the true extent of the fire would not be known for days.

Governor Hickenlooper flew over the affected area and joined City leadership to provide his insights and condolences at the press conference. He provided an overview of his experiences earlier in the day at the High Park Fire and his view of the Waldo Canyon Fire as he flew over the Mountain Shadows area.

Prior to, during, and after this live press conference, local, state and national news media provided non-stop coverage of the fire. Images of homes burning in the Mountain Shadows and Peregrine neighborhoods were displayed live throughout the night and into the next day. These images were readily accessible from areas outside the evacuation zone.

The final evacuation order for the evening was issued at 2146 for Zone 8 (Kissing Camels). Shortly after this, the CART animal shelter at the CMHS location reached capacity and announced that no additional animals would be accepted. The EOC requested national resources to assist with animal sheltering and those resources were on the way.

The parking lot at Tiffany Square, just off of I-25 and Woodmen Road, was used as the “rally” area for all law enforcement personnel, AMR, and some incoming fire resources. Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) Officers joined CSPD at approximately 2200 with 20 officers to assist with security and TCPs. AMR was onsite to conduct general health reviews of first responder personnel and to accept any patients that may have been picked up by law enforcement within the evacuation area. Face masks, lip balm, and eye drops were distributed at this location for personnel who were working in the smoke-filled evacuation zone. AMR later moved to the Costco parking lot on North Nevada to join law enforcement resources needing to drop off patients and/or receive medical checks. The City Transit Division staged buses at the Kmart parking lot at Fillmore Street and North Nevada Avenue and used this location for individuals and/or first responders to drop off evacuees. From this location, evacuees could be transported to a shelter.

At approximately 2200, southbound I-25 opened to the general public. Westbound roads off I-25 were closed throughout the evacuated area with law enforcement staffing TCPs. Only emergency personnel were allowed in the area at this time.

CSPD Investigations personnel began a process to determine if residents within the evacuation area could be accounted for and had been safely evacuated. Through this process, detectives were able to determine that no one had been in contact with occupants of 2910 Rossmere Street. An initial investigation ensued that would later determine that the couple who lived at this address were deceased.

The JIC and public communications staff continuously provided updates. Information was relayed in an attempt to relive some systems that were inundated (i.e., cell phone service). Information was also verified and published repeatedly to ensure that incorrect messages were corrected and that the correct messages were endorsed. The JIC eventually closed overnight, but PIOs remained at the City EOC overnight to ensure that accurate information was released as it became available.

In summary, the fire grew from 4,500 acres to 15,622 acres, with 1,516 acres within the City limits. A total of approximately 26,500 residents were evacuated from the City limits between 1600 and midnight.

27 JUNE 2012 (WEDNESDAY)

OVERVIEW:

Temperatures remained high for a fifth day and a Red Flag Warning was still in effect. Some cooler weather and rain were predicted, but only light rain fell in some areas. The fire grew approximately 1,000 acres on this day, and flare-ups continued along all edges on the fire and on “islands” that were created within the active fire zone. A thunderstorm column, similar to the previous day, developed in the afternoon and weather conditions became more erratic west of Peregrine and the USAFA. This prompted additional pre-evacuation notices within the City limits for part of Holland Park and Pleasant Valley.

El Paso County also issued pre-evacuation notices for the areas north of USAFA and south of the Douglas County Line Road and west of I-25. The fire behavior on the southwestern border continued to grow, prompting further mandatory evacuations in western El Paso and Teller counties.

No additional mandatory evacuations were ordered in the City, although pre-evacuation notices were issued. City evacuees remained at 28,770, and the total acres involved grew from 15,622 to a total of approximately 16,622 acres.

COLORADO SPRINGS RESPONSE

The early morning hours of 27 June brought many challenges to the first responders working in the Mountain Shadows area where active fire continued to be problematic into the daylight hours. Firefighters battled hundreds of house fires, while incorporating resources from many responding agencies. The Type 1 IMT provided firefighting resources to Mountain Shadows, while also continuing to work the active fire to the south, west, and north.

As the immediate response activity from supporting City departments/divisions in the EOC subsided in the early morning hours, personnel began to regroup and organize services for the day. Shortly after midnight, the CS CART animal shelter personnel at CMHS secured arrangements at the facility to increase the capacity for animals. The Springs Church evacuation point closed at 0100 after evacuees were re-located to alternate sheltering locations. Needs for fuel support were identified and a 24/7 schedule was implemented to support response personnel from all agencies. EOC and FDOC worked with CSU to review and develop plans for critical infrastructure protection in and around the burn area, and plans to reinstate utility services shut off during the evacuations. Mountain Metropolitan Transit announced, at 0136, that all fixed route and Front Range Express (FREX) service would not operate regular service. Metro Mobility was scheduled only to provide transport to scheduled medical appointments.

During the early morning hours, the Tiffany Square “rally point” began to demobilize. As previously noted, AMR moved to the North Nevada Costco, CSFD continued all staging operations at Station 9 on Garden of the Gods, and CSPD operated Command from the CSPD Falcon Division.

Morning papers and online media outlets published overhead photographs of the destroyed homes and devastated areas in their early morning editions. These pictures were obtained by individual(s) who flew over the fire area prior to the daytime institution of flight restrictions. At this time, the City was still actively engaged in firefighting and security protection efforts in these areas. The area was not yet safe for initial damage-assessment teams to enter; moreover, the City did not have reliable information as to the extent of the homes damaged and destroyed. Initial reports of the potential destruction were obtained by reviewing El Paso County Assessor's Office and City GIS data. At initial review, up to 700 structures were noted as potentially impacted. 614 properties were affected by heat signature, but these signatures did not necessarily correlate to destroyed homes. Heat could be picked up from ash or other material.

In Peregrine, a significant run of fire took place at 0700 hours between the backside of the subdivision and USAFA. Fifteen engines were ordered and positioned for structure protection in the upper Peregrine neighborhood. During the morning hours, CSFD transferred Command from the Verizon building where they had been operating all night, to the FDC – a fixed facility.

The City's Policy Group officially convened in the morning prior to the 0800 press conference. The Policy Group remained in meetings for the next several days, discussing detailed plans for informing the evacuees of their losses, re-entry into the evacuated areas, beginning recovery efforts, etc. During the 0800 press conference, it was announced that multiple structures were burned. Due to the active fire situation in the neighborhood, the City was in the very initial stages of identifying the homes that were damaged or destroyed. At this point, most information had been provided by on-scene firefighters who had been battling the active structure fires throughout the night and into the early morning hours.

Fire hot spots continued to require extinguishing throughout the morning and into the afternoon in the Mountain Shadows neighborhood. The afternoon weather was predicted to be problematic, causing further concerns for structure protection and access into the most affected areas of the fire.

CDOC officers continued to assist CSPD with security and TCPs. One hundred 800 MHz radios were requested from the state to provide to these incoming officers and other first responders from outside areas. CSPD requested help from the Colorado National Guard to provide assistance by securing checkpoints and perimeter security.

CAPS volunteers continued to obtain current information and maps from the Type 1 IMT in the morning. The volunteers were dispersed throughout the community and provided information to community members. CAPS volunteers expanded community-outreach efforts into the three shelters in the area. A team of two volunteers went to each shelter to provide updated information and answer questions from residents. CAPS volunteers continued to staff the check in/out table at the EOC, ensuring that all individuals who entered/exited the EOC signed in and out each shift.

Additional City Parks and Recreation events were cancelled throughout the City. Virtually all sporting

events, camps, community centers, fountains, pools, and parks within the City were closed.

The EOC continued to develop additional evacuation plans and added two more zones to the evacuation map: Zones 10 & 11. At 1142, pre-evacuation orders were given for Zone 9 (Holland Park) subsequently followed by pre-evacuation orders for Zone 5 (Pleasant Valley). These messages were sent via the ENS and later reiterated via City press releases. No further pre-evacuations or mandatory evacuations were announced within the City limits. No mandatory evacuations were lifted.

As the number of first responders in the City grew, the need for logistic support increased dramatically. While the Type 1 IMT was responsible for the 1,000 or more personnel assigned to the Waldo Canyon Fire, the City was responsible for supporting all the mutual-aid responders working within the City limits. This number rose overnight to more than 500. The City EOC Logistics Section staff arranged for continued food, fuel, supply and equipment support for this growing number of response personnel, geographically dispersed throughout the City limits.

The EOC requested additional staff from the State and neighboring jurisdictions to assist with the growing responsibilities for managing citywide coordination of response and the mounting task of re-entry and recovery. These requests were to assist with multiple facets of the EOC, to include general staff support, as well as support for the City communications functions at the City EOC, in conjunction with the JIC.

The City maintained the previously established feeding/rehabilitation area at CSFD Station 9 for all personnel. Access became easier for personnel due to road closures, but the increase in personnel to be fed became challenging for Pikes Peak Rehab Services, a local organization staffed by volunteers. Additional complications arose with agencies requesting food deliveries to personnel who were working at locations that could not be relieved. Some of these individuals were working in fire “hot zones” and food delivery individuals were required to have proper Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to enter the locations.

CSPD personnel, and mutual-aid partners, managed TCPs and conducted security checks in the evacuated areas. Additionally, CSPD and CSFD escorted personnel from outside agencies into the fire-affected area to conduct mitigation and/or restore critical infrastructure. Some examples include CSU and cellular service providers.

CSPD remained on modified dispatch, responding to priority-one cases only. As a result, CSPD staffed all patrol cars with two officers. This was done for the safety of officers working in the fire-affected area, as a standard procedure for sending two officers to a priority-one call. CSPD continued to run Command from the Falcon Division and continued medical checks with AMR at the end of each shift. After consultation with City Safety, officers working in the fire area were required to fill out smoke-exposure forms at the end of each shift.

The City Policy Group met throughout the day to discuss a wide range of issues related to: the active

fire; existing and anticipated evacuations; obtaining accurate information related to the destroyed and damaged homes; notifying residents about the status of their homes; managing the public information related to the neighborhoods and homes; and procedures for re-entry into the evacuated areas. The Policy Group's goal was to provide the most accurate information possible, and as soon as possible to residents in the affected area. The Policy Group requested immediate accounts of the damage assessment from the CSFD Division of the Fire Marshall (DFM), by the afternoon. When contact was made with the DFM, staff explained that they had not yet been able to enter the area due to continuing extreme fire conditions. This would become a DFM priority as soon as fire and weather conditions would allow.

At 1330, the www.springsgov.com website database was in operation. A message was developed requesting those concerned about their home or business to fill out the online form; the City would make contact when additional information was known. Most affected areas were still too dangerous for initial assessment teams to enter and collect information.

Beginning in the early afternoon, CSFD DFM personnel entered the Mountain Shadows neighborhood and began conducting the initial damage assessment process. Two teams traveled by truck throughout the neighborhood. These personnel were "Red Card"-certified and carried necessary PPE and safety equipment for the active fire that still existed in the neighborhood. Several GIS and address databases were used to assist in identifying the impacted properties.

Due to the hot spots within the neighborhood and, in many cases, in the destroyed homes, DFM staff was able to assess only the "shell" of the structures. Most assessments took place from the street. Many of the destroyed homes were burned to the foundation, with little to no residual identifying marks. Many homes in the neighborhood had wood mailboxes. As expected, these burned in the conflagration, leaving no address identifiers. Staff made notes during this initial assessment that were taken back to the FDC to compare with database and GIS data. Staff reviewed and compared these data, noting areas and homes that would need to be revisited the next day to verify there was a loss.

At 1400, a flame front blew through the Peregrine neighborhood near Blodgett Peak. Fire crews were forced to retreat for a short time before re-entering the neighborhood. CSFD and mutual-aid fire departments continued to fight the fire along Blodgett Peak alongside the USFS Strike Team, and monitor the interior City burn site for flare-ups. The continuing thunderstorm behavior pushed the fire from Blodgett Peak into the residential area west of the Mount Saint Francis Nursing Center. This thunderstorm acted much like the previous day's event, albeit smaller, causing the fire to blow into the Peregrine area. This was quickly contained and managed by the multiple fire task forces working the area. Several homes were affected by this firestorm, but crews on scene were able to extinguish these fires after the fire front passed.

President Obama contacted Governor Hickenlooper and Mayor Bach to offer his support and to inform them that he would arrive on Friday, 29 June 2012, to visit the area and thank firefighters and first responders for their hard work and dedication. The CSPD and mutual-aid partners were focused

on the security related to the evacuated areas and asked the EPSO to lead planning the President's motorcade.

As the day progressed, the Policy Group continued to meet and review initial information regarding the destroyed/damaged homes. DFM staff explained their concerns with the data collected thus far and the necessity to accurately depict information about each house. DFM staff explained that they would have to return to the neighborhood the next day to re-evaluate the data.

The daily press conference was held at 1600. Updates were provided, but no new information was released to the public at this time. Fire personnel were busy battling spot fires and flare-ups along Blodgett Peak. Law enforcement personnel from several agencies were providing security at TCPs and within neighborhoods. Policy Group personnel were working to devise a plan to personally notify those who lost their homes.

Governor Hickenlooper signed Executive Order D2012-020 later in the day declaring the Waldo Canyon Fire a disaster emergency.

In the evening, the Colorado Springs Fire Marshall announced that all commercial fireworks displays within Colorado Springs for the 4th of July would be cancelled. At the time of the cancellation, nine fireworks displays were denied permits due to extreme weather conditions and the lack of resources to provide public-safety services at these events.

Throughout the day and into the night, CSPD sent officers to the Mountain Shadows area to re-check homes that were initially noted as evacuation refusals. Officers checked these homes to verify the status of the structure and to determine if there were any concerns regarding residents who had not evacuated.

28 JUNE 2012 (THURSDAY)

OVERVIEW:

Weather conditions were a little more favorable on this day, with no Red Flag Warning. Containment of the fire within the City burn area was maintained as “hot spots” were monitored and controlled.

First responders continued to conduct structure protection in the Mountain Shadows and Peregrine neighborhoods. The Cedar Heights neighborhood also remained a concern with the Type 1 IMT, Division Zulu.

No additional evacuations were ordered in the City. City evacuees remained at 28,770 and the total acres involved grew from 16,622 to 16,750 total acres.

COLORADO SPRINGS RESPONSE

During the early morning hours, CSFD responded to several areas in the Mountain Shadows and Peregrine areas where embers were blowing into the neighborhood and endangering homes. Crews quickly extinguished these flames.

The HSPPR notified the EOC that it was at capacity with 314 animals. City CART at the CMHS shelter was able to accept additional non-companion pets to assist with this overflow. Meanwhile, the American Humane Association volunteers made contact with CS CART to announce that they were in Colorado Springs, but their large truck broke down, and it would take additional time before they would be operationally ready to shelter pets.

At the 0800 Press Conference, Mayor Bach announced that “hundreds” of homes were destroyed and that staff was working on confirming the data and determining how the information would be relayed to those affected.

DFM staff returned to Mountain Shadows on several occasions, beginning early in the morning to verify the information that had been already documented and to address discrepancies identified throughout the process. DFM was notified that residents would be told later in the day about their homes, and quick and accurate data were extremely important.

The EOC reached a new peak of activity. City officials in the EOC continued to develop plans for lifting evacuations in coordination with CSU, CSFD, CSPD, and EPCPH. Plans for recovery began in tandem with the existing response efforts, bringing in numerous officials from local, state and federal agencies. The EOC also became a “hub” for partner agencies that would arrive in the morning to observe the updates during the 0800 briefing by the Type 1 IMT AREPs. At peak times, approximately 85-100 people were present during the day in the EOC. Most individuals had a valid reason to be present, whether it was an operational position in the EOC or waiting for a meeting with someone from the EOC. Space, noise level, providing logistical support (i.e., food), and tracking individuals

became more difficult.

With key decisions regarding re-entry and recovery operations a primary focus for City leadership, along with the active fire still burning adjacent to the City, decisions were made rapidly on a variety of issues, but were not, or could not, be immediately communicated to all of the EOC personnel and to those in other locations throughout the City. At times, City personnel responsible for taking action on the decisions were made aware of them during the regularly scheduled press conferences.

The Policy Group continued to meet and review the preliminary DFM data. By early morning, the Policy Group had information related to streets where there were multiple homes destroyed, and it was apparent that there were some areas where multiple homes were affected and other areas where only one home in the vicinity was damaged or destroyed. Initial reports indicated that 30-35 streets were impacted. The Policy Group continued to plan for how to provide this information to residents in the most accurate and personal method possible.

The Policy Group members focused on a priority to provide information, in person, to those impacted and make themselves available to answer questions. Even with an initial list of the damaged and destroyed homes, accurate contact data did not exist for residents in these homes. A review was conducted of existing public data sources, and it was quickly determined that there would be no way to reach out directly to the residents of the affected homes. Incomplete contact data exists in a variety of data sets for this type of notification. Some databases included the El Paso County Assessor's Office, the Emergency Notification List, and the self-registration database posted the day before on www.springsgov.com.

After further review and consideration, the decision was made to hold a public meeting. The destruction in the neighborhood was inconsistent in some areas and on some streets, while entire blocks of homes were destroyed in other areas. After much consideration, the Policy Group made plans to hold a public meeting for residents who lived on the affected streets. The process for notifications was extremely important to the Policy Group who spent several hours working on how the meeting would be facilitated in order to impart the least impact on the affected residents.

The DFM staff continued to review the initial lists and surveyed the neighborhood using all means possible to verify existing information and ensure that the most accurate list of damaged and destroyed homes would be made available to the residents at the evening meeting.

During the mid-morning hours, based on the fire activity and outlook, CSPD and CSFD developed plans to lift some of the mandatory evacuations later in the evening. Plans were made to ensure that there was accurate staffing for the TCPs and to maintain security within the evacuated areas. CSFD personnel continued to assess the areas directly impacted by the fire, and those adjacent, to determine when neighborhoods would be safe for re-entry.

At 1526, a press release was issued announcing the details of the "Waldo Canyon Fire Impact Meeting." The meeting was scheduled to begin at 2000 at UCCS in the Gallogly Events Center. The

UCCS events center was chosen because it was large enough to hold thousands of people. The meeting was intended for “residents only” of the impacted streets. The initial meeting announcement contained a list of 34 impacted streets. About an hour later, an additional street name was provided, bringing the total number of streets to 35. The check-in process for the meeting was scheduled to begin at 1800. City Metro Transit was arranged to pick-up evacuees from each shelter location at 1800. Residents were required to provide identification to attend, and the media was asked to respect their privacy and wait until after the meeting to contact anyone. To help facilitate this, a press conference was scheduled at 2100 at the UCCS media staging area so residents could attend the press conference and provide interviews after the meeting, if they were so inclined.

Mayor Bach announced at the 1600 press conference that initial reports indicated that 346⁸ homes were destroyed on 26 June in the Mountain Shadows neighborhood. Mayor Bach further explained that a meeting was scheduled at 2000 at UCCS for residents who lived on streets where a house was severely damaged or destroyed and reiterated the information contained in the press release.

A detailed plan was devised for the community fire-impact meeting. More than 100 City and UCCS employees and volunteers were on site to assist residents with check-in and to route the residents to the correct location. These individuals guided residents from the parking lot into the buildings, while answering questions and providing information. Care and Share provided boxes of non-perishable food and other items to residents. A large spontaneous food donation was made to Station 9 earlier in the evening for first responders, but this could not be used at this location and was diverted to UCCS for the residents. CSPD Victim Advocates were on site, along with Chaplains from CSPD and CSFD, ARC and Aspen Pointe mental health professionals to provide assistance.

As residents arrived, they completed a form requesting contact information. Identification was used to verify residence. Some evacuees did not have identification and, in other cases, friends and family arrived to receive information for evacuees who were no longer in town or unavailable to attend. These exceptions were considered on a case-by-case basis, and entry was generally allowed. Approximately 4,000 individuals attended this meeting that began at 2000. Mayor Bach and his immediate leadership staff spoke to the residents, providing background information and an overview of the evening’s meeting. The group was divided into several breakout groups assigned to each Policy Group member.

As the breakout groups convened, a list of the destroyed and damaged homes was provided and City staff answered questions. There were several instances where a resident was provided information about his/her home and thought that the information was incorrect. City staff noted these exceptions and would later send DFM, CSPD, or CSFD staff into the neighborhood to check on the address in question. Residents had many questions about next steps in the process, to include when they would be able to gain access to their properties, steps in the recovery process, rebuilding, and more.

⁸ This was the initial number reported to the public, and as noted previously, has changed.

A press conference was held after the community meeting at approximately 2100. Updates were provided regarding the number of homes destroyed. City officials announced that there were a few potential inaccuracies that needed to be verified before releasing the list to the public. Additionally, City staff announced its commitment to attempt personal contact with all residents who were not at the community meeting, prior to publically releasing the list of damaged or destroyed homes. A target to release the list by mid-morning the following day was announced. At the end of the press conference CSPD Chief Carey announced the discovery of remains of one person on Rossmere Street. Residents who wanted to talk to the press conducted on-camera interviews after the official press conference.

At about the time that the community meeting began at UCCS, the first mandatory evacuations were lifted at 2000. These areas included the southeast area of Rockrimmon, including Golden Hills and Tamaron subdivisions, Pine Cliff, Kissing Camels east of 30th street from Gateway Road to Garden of the Gods, Holland Park, and the apartment complex at Garden of the Gods and 30th Street. All other areas remained under mandatory evacuation: Cedar Heights; West of 30th from Gateway Road to Garden of the Gods Road; Pinon Valley; Mountain Shadows; Peregrine; and the balance of Rockrimmon - northwest of Woodmen Road/Rockrimmon Boulevard and Vindicator Drive.

A Presidential Disaster Declaration was announced in the late evening for El Paso and Larimer Counties. The Presidential Declaration activated an array of Federal programs to assist in the response and recovery effort.

Throughout the early evening, CSPD and mutual-aid agencies at TCPs and within the evacuated areas started allowing business owners to return and residents to retrieve items. Officers at the TCPs handled these requests on a case-by-case basis.

Late in the evening and into the early morning hours, CSFD personnel entered the Mountain Shadows neighborhood to verify information on specific homes that were brought to the attention of City personnel during the community meeting. Some discrepancies were noted and these changes were reflected in the master list of affected addresses.

29 JUNE 2012 (FRIDAY)

OVERVIEW:

The fire containment remained steady. CSPD confirmed that there were two fatalities in the evacuated area. The mandatory evacuation for the first affected neighborhood, Cedar Heights, was lifted later in the evening.

Fire growth again was minimal, with most of the activity being isolated to the interior “islands.” Threats of thunderstorms were still present throughout the day. All other evacuations remained in place; total acres involved grew minimally from 16,750 to 17,073.

No additional evacuations were ordered in the City.

COLORADO SPRINGS RESPONSE

Beginning at approximately 0700, uniformed officers from the HSPPR were available to enter evacuated areas in pairs to pick up animals that were left behind during evacuations. Residents were directed to contact the HSPPR main number to make arrangements.

At the 0800 press conference, a question/answer session at Station 9 with first responders was announced for later in the day. During the press conference, City officials stated that they would post a map and a list of the damaged and destroyed addresses by mid-morning. The public asked questions regarding re-entry into the fire-affected area. In response, City officials related that the neighborhood still had active fire present, making re-entry very difficult, if not impossible, at the time. CSFD was still engaged in monitoring and responding to hot spots and fire flare-ups in the neighborhood.

Another factor affecting re-entry was safety concerns related to utilities service. On the evening of 26 June, gas service was shut off to approximately 4,200 homes in the Peregrine, Mountain Shadows and Oak Valley Ranch neighborhoods. In order to render the homes safe, CSU was required to go throughout the neighborhood and fix any leaks in the gas pipes before returning to each individual home to reconnect the gas and pressurize the lines. CSU announced that crews were able to get in during the previous afternoon to begin assessments. CSU also announced that it was investigating the possibility of allowing residents back into their homes without active gas service. CSU was exploring possible mutual-aid help from XCEL Energy to speed up the repair process.

During the early morning hours, City leadership reviewed the list of attendees from the community meeting and attempted personal contact with those who experienced a total loss, but who were unable to attend the meeting. The list of affected homes was again checked in the morning against the discrepancies that were identified during the community meeting and compared with the “ground truth” available in the neighborhoods. The list of addresses was constantly revised for accuracy.

Channel 5 KOAA completed a live broadcast with the CAPS Coordinator and a few volunteers and, as a result, CAPS received a flood of new volunteers. Also, the community started delivering large quantities of donations to Holmes Middle School. A group of volunteers was designated to receive and sort these donations and redistribute them to first responders or to Care and Share, Goodwill, etc. After sorting, donations for first responders were delivered daily to Station 9. This was the last day that CAPS volunteers went into the community to conduct outreach. Volunteers continued to provide staff assistance in the EOC.

At 0930, Commerce City Drive from East Woodmen Road to Pine Creek Drive was opened to residents and businesses.

At 1000, CSPD Victim Advocates staffed a hotline to talk with anyone who had lost a home. The intent was to have a trained professional available to speak with those who had not yet been personally contacted regarding the status of their home. City leadership made steady progress during the day in contacting individual residents and the release of the maps/addresses was delayed.

At 1030, fire conditions in Mountain Shadows and Peregrine became problematic for a period of time. CSU, HSPPR Officers, and other workers were told by fire personnel to retreat from the area. They would be allowed to re-enter after a few hours to continue their work.

President Obama arrived in Colorado Springs shortly after noon. The EPSO took the lead on planning the President's motorcade, but CSPD and a select number of key officials accompanied the President on his visit. During the latter part of his visit, President Obama was taken into the Mountain Shadows neighborhood, with fire personnel, to view the destruction.

The Policy Group met throughout the day to determine the safest and fastest way to allow residents back into their neighborhood to view their homes. The Policy Group discussed the fact that the destroyed homes were unstable with smoldering ash, steel, broken concrete, downed fences, broken furniture and hardware strewn about. Additionally, there was the concern that active fire was still burning immediately adjacent to the neighborhood. This concern was so great that firefighters evacuated CSU and HSPPR personnel mid-morning. Security in the area was also a concern as it would be very difficult to provide accountability for individuals entering and exiting the neighborhood.

After considering all options, the Policy Group decided that safety of the residents was of the upmost importance and developed a plan to bring in residents by bus to view their homes/home sites. Initial plans for this viewing included staggering residents into multiple small groups. To accomplish this, it was understood that multiple buses and routes would be required. Staff in the EOC finalized this plan, working with the intention of making the event as non-intrusive as possible for the residents.

The concept of this initial site visit by bus was announced at the 1600 Press Conference.

A late evening press briefing was held at 2000 to discuss further evacuations that were lifted. These evacuations were based on the safety inspections conducted throughout the day by CSU and were not specific to areas or zones. A press conference was held to show a detailed map of which streets were cleared for return. Most areas were allowed to return, with the exception of a few streets outside Mountain Shadows, Oak Valley, and Peregrine.

The official press release regarding damaged homes, to include the list of addresses and the map was released at 2006.

At 2035, Cedar Heights' residents were allowed to return home after being evacuated six days earlier.

The first email was sent at 2224 to approximately 8,600 residents who registered for information on the www.springsgov.com website. This email provided the recipients with similar information to the public press release, urging anyone who had not personally been contacted regarding the status of their home to call for additional information.

30 JUNE 2012 (SATURDAY)

OVERVIEW:

There was limited growth in the fire for a fourth day. Mandatory evacuation of the Woodmen Valley neighborhood was lifted in the evening. Colorado National Guard deployed and assisted with traffic control and security in the evacuated areas.

Growth of fire was again very limited. Only 586 additional acres were involved, all within the interior islands. Total acres grew from 17,073 to 17,659.

COLORADO SPRINGS RESPONSE

The Colorado National Guard deployed more than 150 soldiers with vehicles to augment CSPD in security and checkpoint staffing.

The 0800 Press Conference was held with few major updates.

Staff in the EOC finalized plans for the site visit by bus scheduled for the following day. Facilities and equipment were secured and detailed plans were made to ensure that security and behavioral health support personnel would ride on each bus with residents. Streets were broken down into manageable numbers of homes, and a schedule was devised to accommodate entry into the neighborhood. In order to ensure that small groups were taken on each visit, it became apparent that the process might take more than one day.

A joint City-El Paso County Disaster Recovery Center opened at 0900 to provide a “one-stop” location for residents who lost their homes to receive relevant recovery information from local, state, and federal agencies.

The Policy Group met throughout the morning and discussed initial feedback regarding the home visits by bus. Policy Group members were concerned that the bus visits would not be a sufficient method to allow residents to view their property and it may create more issues that it would resolve. One of the greatest concerns for the Policy Group was safety of the returning residents. The cause of concern came from the potential need to re-evacuate the area if the fire were to become a problem, and especially in the neighborhoods with smoldering ash and debris. The other primary concern was for the protection of evacuated properties. Opening up the neighborhood might invite unwanted persons into the neighborhood where homes were vulnerable. City leadership consulted legal counsel regarding these concerns and discussed developing a waiver. Ultimately, the decision was made to control access into the neighborhood, but to allow residents to spend the day in the area.

A press conference was scheduled for 1400 to discuss the details of the bus tours for residents. At this conference, Officials instead released information related to the altered re-entry day activities being planned.

At 1345, a press release was issued with new guidance for residents to enter the neighborhood unattended during the hours of 1000 - 1800. Two check-in locations were established, a north division and a south division. Residents were required to bring identification and proof of residency. A safety sheet was prepared to inform residents of the hazardous conditions they would likely encounter and residents were encouraged to wear protective clothing and shoes. The press release also announced that entry into destroyed homes would not be allowed; residents with intact homes would be allowed to enter and clean out their refrigerators, obtain items needed for the near future, secure their homes, etc.

Based on this new guidance, planning for the day was revised. The two entry locations were established with multiple “drive-through” lanes for residents to check in. A registration form was created for residents to download, print, and fill out prior to their arrival. A plan was devised to have numerous behavioral health volunteers and City personnel staff multiple check-in lanes to make entry as fast as possible.

Planning for the re-entry day continued into the night to ensure that proper reference material, support supplies, staff, and PPE were available and provided to residents and staff working the event.

The 1600 press conference divulged additional details for residents who would be entering the Mountain Shadows neighborhood for the day. Additional updates were provided regarding the fire behavior, progress and outlook.

As the fire behavior continued to improve, the EOC and FDOC locations developed a schedule to close overnight.

1 JULY 2012 (SUNDAY)

OVERVIEW:

Residents of the hardest hit Mountain Shadows neighborhood were allowed to return for the day to visit their homes/home sites. First responders, City and County Officials, Salvation Army mobile canteens, ARC Emergency Response Vehicles, and behavioral health workers conducted roving patrols within the impacted area to provide support and security to the more than 4,000 individuals who entered.

Additional evacuation orders were lifted later in the evening for Oak Valley Ranch, Pinon Valley, Peregrine, and the Grand Centennial Apartments.

Progress on containment of the fire continued to be positive, with only minimal creeping occurring along the northern perimeter.

COLORADO SPRINGS RESPONSE

City personnel, behavioral health specialists, public health staff, and volunteers arrived at 0530 at the two checkpoints, Eagleview Middle School and the Verizon Building. At this time, residents had already arrived for the 0800 check-in and were waiting in their cars for entry into the area. Each entry point was set up with multiple lanes for residents to drive through and check in. Each lane was staffed with two individuals who had lists of the affected addresses/streets in the neighborhood, safety handouts, trash bags, and gloves.

TCPs were maintained around the perimeter of the neighborhood, and additional stationary and roving CSPD and National Guard patrols were located within the neighborhood. Each vehicle entering the neighborhood was issued a dashboard placard with information on the residence being visited. Security patrols were instructed to challenge any vehicle that did not have a visible placard.

Within the neighborhood, numerous Colorado Springs and partner-agency personnel were present and provided "roving patrols." CSPD police officers in both marked and unmarked vehicles drove through the neighborhood focusing on security. CSFD provided crews on apparatus and individuals in Command vehicles to drive through the neighborhoods, specifically those that were hardest hit, to contact residents and to provide assistance, as needed. CSFD and CSPD Chaplains drove through the neighborhood to provide emotional support. Behavioral health specialists from Aspen Pointe were located at the check-in/-out locations and were mobile within the neighborhood, stopping to talk with residents. The ARC provided mobile Emergency Response Vehicles stocked with snacks and hydration.

In addition to mobile patrols and resources, two dumping stations were established within the neighborhood. Salvation Army volunteers staffed these locations throughout the day and provided snacks and hydration to residents dropping off their trash.

Residents were allowed to enter the neighborhood at approximately 0730. Each car completed a registration form and was provided with a filled-out placard, safety information, trash bags and gloves. Residents were allowed to drive into the neighborhood unescorted for the day. They were allowed to come and go and could exit only at one of the two designated checkpoints. All cars were cleared of the entry lines by 1000.

Beginning at 1700, CSPD officers and National Guard personnel moved through the neighborhood asking the few remaining residents to depart the area no later than 1800. Care and Share positioned vehicles at each exit location and provided non-perishable food and supplies to those in need. Aspen Pointe behavioral health specialists collected placards from each vehicle as it departed and “checked out” the residents.

At 1815, a news release was issued, lifting mandatory evacuations for several areas effective at 2000. These neighborhoods included: Oak Valley Ranch; Pinon Valley; Peregrine; Grand Centennial Apartments; all business along Centennial Boulevard and 30th Street. Centennial Boulevard also opened at 2000. Many of these returning residents were notified that they would have electricity and water, but no gas service, at their homes.

2 JULY 2012 – 10 JULY 2012 (MONDAY – TUESDAY)

OVERVIEW:

Containment of the fire continued and weather conditions became more favorable. Restoration of vital utility services was a key priority. As critical utility service was restored in the affected neighborhoods, residents were allowed to re-enter their neighborhoods and homes. The re-entry was announced on a street-by-street basis throughout the affected neighborhoods, until all streets were released from the mandatory evacuation on Sunday, 8 July 2012.

COLORADO SPRINGS RESPONSE

The following eight days signified the end of the fire response, while recovery efforts were underway in earnest. This section, as with the rest of this document, contains information related only to the conclusion of the fire activities – to include resident re-entry – and does not include information regarding the numerous aspects of recovery being addressed during this time frame.

2 July

The fire continued to burn in the interior islands. Minimal rain did not produce much moisture for the burn area. Winds, although gusty and erratic at times, posed little problem, and the fire-relief efforts were not hampered.

At noon, mandatory evacuation was lifted for a limited number of homes on Eileen Court, Centauri Road, Boardwalk Drive, and Corporate Plaza Drive, along with homes between 4510 and 4795 Granby Circle. Full utilities service had been restored to these homes.

A press conference was held at 0800 and 1600.

3 July

Numerous thunderstorms continued to build in and around the fire area. This increase in weather activity had a positive impact and added significant moisture. Containment was now over 60%.

The City issued a press release lifting evacuation orders for an additional 331 residents south of Champagne Drive and Capra Way. Residents in homes located on Champagne Drive, Flying W Ranch Road (south of Champagne Drive), Hearthstone Lane, Alderstone Way, Stoneridge Drive, Capra Way, Ramsgate Terrace, Fieldstone Road, Braeburn Way, Cameo Way, Denby Way, Ellery Lane, Alpine Meadows Lane, Granby Circle and portions of Lions Gate Lane were allowed to return as of 1800 hours. These residents were also returning to homes with no gas service.

CSPD and National Guard continued to monitor the activities within the evacuation and re-entry areas.

A press conference was held at 0800 and 1600.

4 July

Fire activity dropped significantly due to the previous day's moisture. Weather conditions remained the same. Due to fire and weather conditions, all fireworks demonstrations in the City of Colorado Springs were cancelled and the ban on fireworks remained in place. Additional police were assigned to patrol the City, and CSFD officers were authorized to issue summons to violators of the fireworks ban.

By 1700, 256 more homes were released for re-entry. Mountain Shadow residents on Ashton Park Place, Chambrey Court, Charing Court, Chase Point Circle, Darien Way, Green Valley Heights, Huffman Court, Kirby Court, Regal View Court, Regal View Road, 2305-2395 Rossmere Street, Twin Harbor Heights, Vanreen Drive, Vantage Ridge Court, Vantage Vista Drive, Via Verona View, Wilson Road (limited), and Wolf Ranch Road, were all allowed to return home.

These, and all prior areas released, were cautioned that a pre-evacuation status was still in place.

Total acres involved from 30 June to 4 July, grew from 17,659 to 18,247.

No media briefings occurred with the Type 1 IMT.

5 July

The last press conference was held at 0800 with members from the Type 1 IMT. 95% containment was announced at this time with only a few areas of smoke visible throughout the City. Rain showers from the previous couple of days helped to dampen the fire. The forecast included continued rain. This forecast made it unlikely that any significant fire activity would occur over the next few days, but firefighters remained vigilant and alert.

A second re-entry day was held for residents of Mountain Shadows to assist with access for critical needs and to assist with the recovery process.

Colorado Springs began to move into its "Monsoon Season" and rain activity was predicted to pick up beginning Friday, 6 July, and continue at least through 9 July. This raised concern for flooding in and around the burn area and the City initiated the first of many flood mitigation meetings with City personnel.

At 1700, the City released the mandatory evacuation orders for additional streets and homes located on Alabasater Way, Aubrey Way, Brogans Bluff Drive (west of Rossmere Street), Flying W Ranch Road, Lanagan Street, Linger Way, Rossmere Street, Sandray Court, Sceptor Way, Tallesen Court, Trevor Lane, and Wilson Road (west of Rossmere Street).

6 July

Fire activity continued to be low. The transition from a Type 1 IMT to a Type 3 IMT was scheduled for

the following day. Monsoon seasonal rains began in the evening, but without great effect on the burn area.

76 additional homes were released for re-entry. Residents returned to homes on Wilson Road, Jenner Court, Brogans Bluffs Drive, Karamy Court, Tamora Way, Ravina Court, at 1700.

7 July

Fire activity remained very low. Sporadic rains continued, but without any impact on residents within the burn area.

The City released 20 additional homes for re-entry. Residents residing on Majestic Drive, south of Hot Springs Court, and 2515-2549 Hot Springs Court were allowed in at 1700.

8 July

Reports from the Type 3 IMT indicated that 100% containment of fire should occur within the next couple of days. Fire activity remained low, and rain continued.

The City allowed residents of Courtney Drive and Harbor Pine to re-enter by 1430. Two homes on Harbor Pine Street were not yet ready for habitation due to water and gas line issues. These were the final two homes to be released for re-entry.

9 July

No significant fire activity was reported on 9 July. Flash-flood warnings continued throughout the day.

10 July

The CSFD lifted the City burn ban at approximately 1700 on 10 July, citing recent precipitation that increased moisture levels. While the burn ban was lifted, it was also noted that the City would enter into fire restrictions beginning the next morning.

At 2000, the Waldo Canyon Fire was declared 100 % contained.

SECTION 2: CAPABILITY REVIEW

This section offers a review of findings related to the City of Colorado Springs' response to the Waldo Canyon Fire, as provided in the Colorado Springs Initial AAR. Further information and documentation review has resulted in the addition of more strengths and recommendations. The City is committed to implementing these recommendations to become better prepared, should another disaster strike our community in the future. It cannot be overstated that the information included in this report is specific to the City of Colorado Springs and does not include an analysis of the many interactions and interconnectivities of all the agencies that worked on this massive fire spanning two counties.

This section is organized using the Target and Core Capability frameworks described in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Preparedness Guidelines.⁹ The capability review, published in the Initial AAR, is included in this section. An analysis of each Initial AAR finding has been provided for more context as it pertains to the strength or the recommendation. Each capability section also includes a review of strengths and recommendations identified during the final analysis of the City's response to the fire. This review provides more detail than the strengths and accomplishments described generally in the Initial AAR.

Further review was not provided on the following capability areas:

- Capability 6: Volunteer and Donations Management;
- Capability 12: Emergency Public Warning;
- Capability 13: Medical Surge;
- Capability 14: Medical Supplies Management and Distribution; and
- Capability 15: Mass Care.

These five capabilities are not included in the City's Final AAR because (1) they are not examined in greater detail than the initial AAR and (2) they fall outside of the direct purview of the City. The City plays a role in some aspects of these capabilities, but is generally not the lead agency responsible for enacting recommendations and therefore they are not covered in this report.

⁹ <http://www.dhs.gov/national-preparedness-guidelines>

CAPABILITY 1: COMMUNICATIONS

Definition: Communications interoperability is the ability of public safety agencies (police, fire, EMS) and service agencies (public works, transportation, hospitals) to talk within and across agencies and jurisdictions via radio and associated communications systems, exchanging voice, data and/or video with one another on demand, in real time, when needed, and when authorize. Source: DHS Target Capability List version 2.0.

The City of Colorado Springs is a member of the Pikes Peak Regional Communications Network (PPRCN), which maintains the key infrastructure of the 800 MHz radio system throughout the City. PPRCN recently integrated into the Colorado Statewide Digital Trunked Radio System (DTRS), enabling PPRCN radios to operate on the Statewide DTRS network. This integration enables first responders and other agencies traveling outside the PPRCN to bring their radios to the PPRCN area and communicate instantly. Cellular phones are also commonly used by public safety and service agencies to communicate during an incident.

STRENGTHS OF COMMUNICATIONS:

Initial AAR Strengths: Communications

Item	Strength / Analysis
1.1	<p>Radio training, workshops, and exercises related to interoperable communications have been conducted in a focused manner over the past two years, furthering the knowledge and abilities of first responders in the City.</p> <p>Colorado Springs personnel have been active participants in the South Central Region (SCR) Communications Capability Working Group (CWG). The SCR CWG used grant funding over the last two years to update and revise plans and conduct training and exercises related to multi-jurisdictional interoperable communications. Additionally, a radio operations training video was produced and widely distributed to all PPRCN users.</p>
1.2	<p>One-hundred 800 MHz portable radios were requested, received, programmed, and distributed to mutual-aid first responders during the early stages of the incident, allowing for immediate interoperability.</p> <p>When the fire entered the City on Tuesday afternoon, it was apparent that mutual-aid resources from around the state would be needed for fire and law enforcement support. Not all mutual-aid agencies have the same channels on their radios. In anticipation of the mutual-aid arrivals, 800 MHz radios were requested from the State of Colorado cache. These radios were delivered within one operational period and programmed by the City's radio shop to match the local PPRCN channels.</p>
1.3	<p>The PPRCN infrastructure did not suffer a significant loss of integrity during the incident, even with a significant increase in radio traffic.</p> <p>The PPRCN system is very robust and handled radio traffic with very few "busy" tones, compared to the overall amount of information. When there were busy tones, they were</p>

Item	Strength / Analysis
	cleared in seconds and had very little impact on the overall incident.
1.4	<p>VHF radio caches were available for use and proved beneficial in communicating with the IMT.</p> <p>The CSFD Wildfire Suppression Program maintains a cache of VHF radios that are compatible with the National Fire Interagency Cache (NFIC). These radios are compatible with other fire agencies and are used during deployments and/or when mutual-aid responds to the City. These radios were used by CSFD to communicate with members of the Type 1 IMT.</p>

Final AAR Strengths and Analysis: Communications

Item	Strength / Analysis
1.a	<p>Radio infrastructure was not compromised and redundancy existed.</p> <p>PPRCN radio towers were in the direct path of the fire beginning on Saturday, 23 June. Resources were immediately directed to mitigate the area surrounding the towers and actions were taken throughout the course of the fire to ensure that the infrastructure was protected.</p>
1.b	<p>PP ARES personnel provided a direct communications link between the EOC and the shelters.</p> <p>PP ARES was used to provide situational awareness at the ARC shelters. Onsite PP ARES personnel, with radios, allowed for immediate requests for information to be filled. This became especially beneficial on the evening of 26 June when two additional shelters were opened and there was a swift influx of evacuees into the shelters.</p>

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMUNICATIONS:

Initial AAR Recommendations: Communications¹⁰

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
1.5	<p><u>Issue</u> A Communications Unit Leader (COML) was not utilized each operational period.</p> <p><u>Analysis</u> A COML on an incident provides coordination for many different aspects of the incident's interoperable communications. The COML manages radios, phone systems, computers, and networks. During the incident, CSFD provided a COML for two operational periods. This position facilitated the connection of radio systems and patches for incoming agencies. Once this position was dissolved, issues occurred where radio communications problems were not immediately resolved.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 1</u>) A COML should be assigned under the ICS to ensure that an incident-wide Communications Plan is developed distributed, and maintained throughout the incident.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 2</u>) Conduct training to ensure that there are personnel able to fulfill the COML position for multiple operational periods.</p>

¹⁰ Initial AAR recommendations are noted in bold. All new recommendations will be in regular font.

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
1.6	<p>Issue) Cellular and wireless service in the WUI area of Colorado Springs has sporadic connectivity.</p> <p>Analysis) As noted in 1.d, the cellular and wireless connectivity in the WUI area is sporadic, based on terrain and the service provider. This lack of connectivity resulted in significant concerns at the Type 1 IMT location. This is also a concern for other areas of the WUI where an incident could occur.</p> <p>Recommendation) Work with cellular providers to improve long-term service along the WUI.</p>
1.7	<p>Issue) A large incident, multi-agency communications plan template (ICS 205) has not been developed.</p> <p>Analysis) An ICS 205 provides a template for how radio communications will be used during an incident. An ICS 205 identifies each agency, radio frequency, and mode of use during an incident. Developing a pre-plan, including likely mutual-aid partners, assists in the rapid integration of agency communications during a complex incident. Pre-planning will also determine equipment needs prior to an incident.</p> <p>Recommendation) Develop a large incident, multi-agency communications plan (ICS 205) incorporating VHF and 800 MHz radio systems that can be easily adapted during a future incident.</p>

Final AAR Recommendations: Communications

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
1.c	<p>Issue) Immediate and direct communications with City employees, to include first responders in the field did not always occur.</p> <p>Analysis) City employees were geographically dispersed throughout the area. Some employees were assigned to the incident directly in support functions and/or in the field, others were managing day-to-day operations at their work location; and some could not work because their work site was in an evacuation zone. Regardless of location, information related to the incident, specifically the City's direct involvement, was not provided at regular intervals and in a manner that could be accessed by all employees from their disparate locations. While the City did produce, distribute, and post letters to employees, these could not be accessed by all employees in the field and did not provide the tactical information that many employees needed. Most City employees do not have Department-issued smart phones to access their City email accounts for updates and information at remote locations and/or on the weekends and evenings.</p> <p>Recommendation) Develop a system to notify City employees of critical incident updates using both personal and work-issued equipment and varied methods (i.e., text messages and email to personal email accounts).</p>
1.d	<p>Issue) Lack of cellular service on the west side of Colorado Springs, specifically at Holmes Middle School and CSFD Station 18, resulted in a loss of service for City personnel.</p> <p>Analysis) Holmes Middle School was selected as the ICP location for the Type 1 IMT due to its proximity and access to the fire, its building capabilities, and the adjacent property that could be used to house large equipment personnel. Wireless service was poor to non-existent in this area. As a result, staff working in and around this location could not communicate via existing</p>

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
	<p>City-issued equipment (both cell phones and data cards). CSFD and CSPD attempted to establish MCPs at this location in order to have immediate access to the Type 1 IMT but, ultimately, were forced to re-locate due to these service issues. A COW was ordered and established in the area later during the incident, but this did not assist with boosting the signals for all carriers.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 1)</u> Review existing City cellular contract and the associated coverage in the WUI area.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 2)</u> Review coverage maps and contact vendors, as needed, to discuss deficiencies in cellular service in the WUI area.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 3)</u> Establish contacts and/or contracts with vendors to provide immediate emergency services and equipment during an incident. Test these services for coverage prior to an incident.</p>
1.e	<p><u>Issue)</u> Communications to the EOC became problematic after the fire entered the City on the afternoon of 26 June.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> Phones in the EOC were not programmed to roll over to other phones and, therefore, created problems related to reaching staff in the EOC. If an individual was on the phone and could not answer an incoming call and/or if someone stepped away from his or her phone, it would ring continuously. This created many challenges for external personnel who were trying to contact the EOC and were unable to talk to someone.</p> <p><u>Recommendation)</u> Create an incoming phone number to the EOC that can roll over to multiple lines.</p>

CAPABILITY 2: PLANNING

Definition: Planning is the mechanism through which federal, state, local and tribal governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector develop, validate, and maintain plans, policies, and procedures describing how they will prioritize, coordinate, manage, and support personnel, information, equipment, and resources to prevent, protect and mitigate against, respond to, and recover from catastrophic events. Source: DHS Target Capability List version 2.0.

The City of Colorado Springs has invested significant time and effort in developing a variety of emergency response plans. These plans are:

1. Colorado Springs Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)
2. Colorado Springs Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Activation Plan
3. Colorado Springs Wildland Urban Interface Evacuation (WUI) Appendix to the EOP
4. Colorado Springs Catastrophic Incident Annex to the EOP
5. Colorado Springs Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)
6. Colorado Springs Resource Management Plan

STRENGTHS OF PLANNING:

Initial AAR Strengths: Planning

Item	Strength / Analysis
2.1	<p>A comprehensive WUI Appendix to the Colorado Springs EOP was developed in 2008 and revised in June 2012, prior to the Waldo Canyon Fire.</p> <p>The WUI Appendix was developed as a collaborative effort of several City departments. The plan includes detailed information regarding messaging to the public, transportation, evacuation, and re-entry. This plan was used heavily during the Waldo Canyon Fire.</p>
2.2	<p>Training and exercise are learning opportunities in which plans are developed and/or significantly revised.</p> <p>Throughout the last several years, the CSOEM has developed emergency management plans and provided training on the plans. As the plans are revised, subsequent training has occurred. Plan management and training and exercise are a continuous process that CSOEM manages.</p>
2.3	<p>Contracted Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) have worked closely with the City on the development of several plans and facilitated training and exercises on the plans. The addition of external expertise assisted in the creation of very comprehensive plans.</p> <p>The CSOEM leveraged grant funding and other in-kind opportunities to develop comprehensive emergency management plans for the City. These plans are adaptable and will continue to be updated with lessons learned from this incident and others.</p>

Final AAR Strengths and Analysis: Planning

Item	Strength / Analysis
2.a	<p>Public Safety collaboration and coordination.</p> <p>Leadership from the City's Public Safety agencies, CSFD and CSPD, has worked diligently over the recent years to collaborate and coordinate. Training and exercise events, as well planning meetings, have occurred regularly among the agencies. This history of collaboration was evident during the initial response on the first day of the fire with excellent coordination of evacuations and the immediate fire response.</p>
2.b	<p>Evacuation Zones and Management Action Points (MAPs) were developed at the initiation of the EOC/FDOC activation.</p> <p>Using weather conditions and fire behavior predictions, EOC staff developed evacuation zones and corresponding MAPs. MAPs signified the "trigger" points for the evacuation of the corresponding zone. Fire "lookouts" were established to monitor these MAPs and communicate with the ICP, which then initiated evacuations of the established zones. Through early identification, GIS personnel in the EOC developed and printed detailed maps early in the incident.</p>
2.c	<p>Critical infrastructure sites were identified, mitigation and response was swiftly conducted when the fire threatened this infrastructure.</p> <p>Early identification of critical infrastructure sites (water and radio towers) near the Cedar Heights neighborhood proved beneficial in allowing personnel adequate time to conduct mitigation efforts surrounding these locations and to watch these sites during immediate response efforts.</p>
2.d	<p>Personnel were rotated in many areas/departments using the same individuals. <i>Note: this strength was also noted as a recommendation for some areas of the incident where it took multiple days before the same personnel were used. This is an example of a strength and subsequent recommendation that was implemented during the course of the incident.</i></p> <p>As staffing patterns were established, City departments maintained the same personnel for each operational period. Rotating the same personnel in positions during opposite operational periods created consistency and institutional knowledge of the event. This also created consistency in personnel working in positions assigned to other locations and functions throughout the incident.</p>

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PLANNING:**Initial AAR Recommendations: Planning**

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
2.4	<p>Issue) Emergency management plans require continuous updating.</p> <p>Analysis) Emergency management plans require continuous updating as conditions change in the environment and as lessons are learned after events. It is imperative that plans be reviewed and updated on a regular basis to ensure their relevance. After each large incident and/or exercise that tests the plan, revisions, where applicable, must be made to the plan to</p>

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
	reflect all lessons learned. <u>Recommendation</u>) Plans need to be revised to reflect the significant lessons learned from this incident.
2.5	<u>Issue</u>) Training and exercise are necessary to learn and test plans. <u>Analysis</u>) As plans are revised, important information and guidance in the plan changes, and this information needs to be provided to all employees and partner agencies that are affected. To ensure that the changes are communicated, training needs to occur first so that all affected individuals are aware of the changes. After training has occurred, the plans need to be tested. Testing the plan will determine if the plan is valid and/or that additional change is warranted. <u>Recommendation</u>) Once plans are revised, training and exercises need to occur to validate the revised plans.
2.6	<u>Issue</u>) Job checklists/aids were not widely used during the Waldo Canyon Fire. <u>Analysis</u>) Job checklists/aides exist for EOC positions and other ICS positions that were active during the Waldo Canyon incident response. However, checklists and aides were not widely distributed and used. <u>Recommendation 1</u>) Create job checklists/aides to be used in conjunction with the plans. <u>Recommendation 2</u>) Revise existing job checklists/aides. <u>Recommendation 3</u>) Conduct training and exercises on the job checklists/aides.
2.7	<u>Issue</u>) Plans need to be developed and reviewed in coordination with key partner agencies. <u>Analysis</u>) It is imperative that community and government agencies be included in the development of all emergency management plans. The interdependencies that exist among CSOEM and community and government partner agencies are instrumental in an effective response to an incident of this magnitude. <u>Recommendation</u>) Ensure that all plans are developed and exercised in conjunction with key community and governmental partner agencies.

Final AAR Recommendations: Planning

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
2.e	<u>Issue</u>) Accurate, detailed documentation was not captured throughout the City's response to this incident, beginning on the first day and lasting throughout. <u>Analysis</u>) City responders focused on the immediate needs related to fighting the fire, evacuating residents, protecting property, and informing the public. During this initial response, and for the duration of the incident, real-time detailed, accurate documentation was not always recorded. On most incidents, documentation can be completed immediately following an individual's response but in this incident, multiple operation periods spanning 18 days prevented responders from "catching up" on documentation at the end of each shift/operational period. This type of documentation is important to ensure that tracking decisions and responses is recorded in an accurate and timely fashion. <u>Recommendation 1</u>) Through the City's CAPS volunteer program, train volunteers to work as scribes for key personnel during the incident. These scribes can document and share information, as necessary, in real time with other agencies and personnel. <i>Note: This recommendation is linked with recommendation 1.c regarding providing real-time</i>

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
	<p><i>communication with City employees.</i></p> <p><u>Recommendation 2)</u> Provide additional training to first responders on the use of ICS forms. ICS forms assist the facilitation of information flow during events such as this.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 3)</u> Ensure that ICS forms are readily available to personnel during an incident.</p>
2.f	<p><u>Issue)</u> Long-term staffing rotation was not planned for on the first day of the incident.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> During this first day/operational period, City agencies working all aspects of the fire focused on initial response. This initial response included identifying and calling in mutual-aid resources to backfill personnel engaged in working the incident. A detailed staffing and rotation plan was not conceived during the first day for the anticipated long-term potential of this incident.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 1)</u> In accordance with ICS, develop a multi-operational period staffing plan for each City Department to ensure that there is adequate rest and coverage for personnel for the duration of the incident.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 2)</u> To the extent necessary, conduct ICS training for individuals to ensure that there is coverage in key positions for multiple operational periods.</p>
2.g	<p><u>Issue)</u> There was an under-utilization of existing plans and procedures during the Waldo Canyon Fire.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> During emergencies there are never circumstances that allow all plans to be utilized, as the event dictates modifications and changes in response actions. However, emergency management plans were underutilized, at times, during this event.</p> <p><u>Recommendation)</u> As previously noted, conduct more frequent training on all CSOEM plans and provide continued exercises in order to test the plans and practice activating the plans.</p>

CAPABILITY 3: COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND PARTICIPATION

Definition: Community Preparedness and Participation is the capability that ensures community members are aware, trained, and practiced on how to prevent, protect/mitigate, prepare for, and respond to all threats and hazards Source: DHS Target Capability List version 2.0.

The City of Colorado Springs has engaged in community preparedness activities by:

1. Engaging community members in training and education (i.e., public speaking events, preparedness training, and wildfire safety and mitigation);
2. Partnering with residents to conduct wildfire mitigation work on their properties;
3. Developing and distributing written educational materials;
4. Engaging the media with preparedness messaging; and
5. Involving residents in emergency response evacuation drills and exercises.

STRENGTHS OF COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND PARTICIPATION:

Initial AAR Strengths: Community Preparedness and Participation

Item	Strength / Analysis
3.1	WUI evacuation drills were conducted in Cedar Heights (2009), Discovery/Comstock, Mountain Shadows, and Broadmoor Bluffs neighborhoods during calendar year 2011. CSOEM, CSFD, and CSPD partnered with Homeowner Associations (HOAs) in the above-mentioned neighborhoods to conduct evacuation drills. These evacuation drills involved sending ENS messages to the participants, providing evacuation information, real-time evacuation for residents with CSPD and CSFD personnel conducting mock response procedures and, ultimately, a debrief with the residents, in conjunction with first responders.
3.2	Wildfire education and mitigation efforts have been conducted for several years with residents along the WUI. The CSFD Wildfire Mitigation Section works in stewardship with 86 homeowner associations and neighborhood organizations. This project exemplifies how neighborhoods can reduce their wildfire risk without clear-cutting their property. These projects have been successful in balancing the existing environmental characteristics of property, while reducing the fuel loading in order to modify fire behavior.
3.3	Training is conducted approximately four times per year for community members, providing information related to preparedness education for incidents such as a wildfire. CSOEM and the DFM have a demonstrated history of providing preparedness education to residents through a variety of programs. CSOEM has conducted Citizen Emergency Response training (CERT) for the past several years. Unlike traditional CERT “team” training, this training focused on how residents can prepare themselves, their families, neighbors, and/or community to take care of themselves during an emergency. Additionally, CSOEM has presented preparedness information at a variety of public speaking events, when requested. The DFM provides fire safety and wildfire mitigation information through a variety of means,

Item	Strength / Analysis
	to include public meetings and school presentations throughout the year.
3.4	<p>Colorado Springs designed and distributed approximately 33,000 copies of a comprehensive Emergency Preparedness and Safety Guide. This guide can also be found online at: http://www.springsgov.com/Files/Preparedness%20Guide10_web.pdf.</p> <p>The Colorado Springs Emergency Preparedness and Safety Guide contain pre-incident emergency preparedness information related to evacuation and specific hazards that exist in Colorado Springs, to include wildfire in the WUI.</p>

Final AAR Strengths and Analysis: Community Preparedness and Participation

Item	Strength / Analysis
3.a	<p>Cedar Heights and Mountain Shadows residents previously participated in an evacuation drill with first responders.</p> <p>First responders noted that the Cedar Heights and southern Mountain Shadows evacuations were conducted in an efficient manner and noted that the evacuation drills conducted in 2008 and 2011 were helpful in preparing both residents and first responders. These drills provided all participants with a point of reference when the evacuations were executed.</p>
3.b	<p>Mobilizing CAPS community volunteers.</p> <p>CAPS volunteers played a key role in supporting public communications outreach and staff support in the EOC. Volunteers increased their capacity each day throughout the incident, growing in numbers and adding responsibilities as they were identified.</p>

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND PARTICIPATION:

Initial AAR Recommendations: Community Preparedness and Participation

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
3.5	<p><u>Issue)</u> Community preparedness training is an ongoing initiative.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> Community preparedness training and messaging is an ongoing project that requires continuous updating and adjustment to meet the needs of a potential incident and a diverse audience. While the City has a history of providing training and education related to emergency preparedness, this needs to be revisited on a regular basis and adjusted, as needed, to ensure that all potentially affected community members are reached.</p> <p><u>Recommendation)</u> Develop additional methods to deliver community preparedness training/messaging throughout the community in order to reach a broad and diverse audience.</p>
3.6	<p><u>Issue)</u> Community volunteers have not historically been used to assist with community preparedness activities in the City.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> CAPS volunteers were mobilized on Monday, 25 June, to assist with community-education efforts related to the fire. As the CAPS programs grows, there are numerous</p>

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
	volunteers who possess the skills to assist with pre-incident community preparedness training and education. <u>Recommendation</u>) Utilize community volunteers to develop and conduct community preparedness activities.

Final AAR Recommendations: Community Preparedness and Participation

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
3.c	<p><u>Issue</u>) Community requests to volunteer were overwhelming at times.</p> <p><u>Analysis</u>) The Colorado Springs community demonstrated overwhelming support for local government and first responders beginning on the first day of the Waldo Canyon Fire. Personnel assigned to work the incident were not in a position to manage the influx of donations and/or volunteers at their various work sites, while still focusing on their response efforts. Community volunteers are essential to providing a surge capacity during an incident such as this and could have been utilized in a variety of locations. In many circumstances, training is required before a volunteer can provide meaningful service during an incident; after an incident begins, is not the time to provide this training. In other cases, “just in time” training can be provided to the volunteer to fulfill many support functions. In this case, there is still a need to provide oversight and organization for the volunteer(s).</p> <p><u>Recommendation 1</u>) Work with the CAPS program to identify and train volunteers who would be able to engage in pre-incident training and fulfill specific roles during an emergency response.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 2</u>) Develop a local Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters (VOAD) chapter that can mobilize community organizations during a disaster. These organizations can be the conduit for volunteer mobilization during an incident.</p>

CAPABILITY 4: OPERATIONAL COORDINATION¹¹

(INCLUDES BOTH EOC MANAGEMENT AND ON SITE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT)

Definition: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a no-notice event. EOC management includes EOC activation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, state, and federal EOCs; coordination of public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and recovery activities.

Definition: Onsite Incident Management is the capability to effectively direct and control incident activities by using the Incident Command System (ICS) consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS).” Source: DHS Target Capability List version 2.0.

The Colorado Springs EOC was activated at approximately noon on Saturday, 23 June 2012, after the fire was first reported. Multi-agency personnel in the EOC began to immediately organize and support response activities, such as developing the evacuation zones, coordinating incident logistics, developing public information messages, tracking finances, etc. The EOC remained operational throughout the duration of the wildfire incident, scaling services as necessary to accommodate the support requests.

Onsite Incident Management/ICS is a systematic tool that can be used for the command, control, and coordination of emergency response. ICS is flexible and scalable, providing for a common response framework for people from similar or different organizations to work together on an incident of any size. City of Colorado Springs employees have been receiving formal training on ICS for many years. Most first responders use ICS on a daily basis. Onsite Incident Management for the Waldo Canyon fire, in the Colorado Springs vicinity, took place in two district structures: the Type 1 IMT and the City of Colorado Springs.

STRENGTHS OF OPERATIONAL COORDINATION:

Initial AAR Strengths: Operational Coordination

Item	Strength / Analysis
4.1	<p>The EOC was activated during the onset of the fire and existing policies and procedures were followed to include calling in key positions; determining the need for evacuations; developing maps of the fire/evacuation areas; providing logistical support to first responders; and coding time and labor for finance.</p> <p>The EOC provided a critical support mechanism to first responder personnel who were</p>

¹¹ Changed this capability from the Initial AAR to include On Site Incident Management.

Item	Strength / Analysis
	actively engaged in working the incident from the beginning. Evacuation orders and messaging were initiated and disseminated directly from the EOC.
4.2	<p>Geographic Information Systems (GIS) staff in the EOC provided excellent, up-to-date mapping services throughout the incident.</p> <p>City GIS provided critical support to all personnel working the incident by developing maps, as requested. Maps were created to depict fire progression and evacuation areas, as well as to first responders, with detailed information regarding specific neighborhoods and evacuation areas. These maps were printed in the EOC on plotter-sized paper and distributed to locations throughout the incident area and were saved as PDF files that could be emailed.</p>
4.3	<p>The EOC provided staffing, albeit limited in depth, from each key City organization and non-profit and/or local government agency, a “one stop shop” resource for those working the incident.</p> <p>The EOC staffing included personnel from all agencies who were actively working the incident. If an agency was not present in the EOC, contact information was generally available and personnel were available to respond, as needed.</p>

Final AAR Strengths and Analysis: Operational Coordination

Item	Strength / Analysis
4.a	<p>The FDOC was activated immediately.</p> <p>The FDOC provided support to ensure that CSFD stations were backfilled with additional resources and mutual-aid when personnel were diverted to assignments related to the fire.</p>
4.b	<p>A time-reporting code was established at the onset of the incident for City personnel.</p> <p>A time reporting code was established with instructions for City personnel to code their time to the “Waldo Canyon Fire.” Initiating this process on the first day of the incident proved invaluable for capturing accurate data later for the Finance Section to match the Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG).</p>
4.c	<p>Immediate activation of the Red Cross shelter at Cheyenne Mountain High School (CMHS), the El Paso County Animal Response Team (EP CART), the Colorado Springs Community Animal Response Team (CS CART), and the Humane Society of the Pikes Peak Region (HSPPR).</p> <p>Activating these shelters for residents and their pets created an immediate option for evacuees. Existing relationships and coordination among these organizations proved to be very beneficial in establishing a division of duties and staffing multiple locations. The EP CART at the Penrose Equestrian Center accepted large animals, and the CS CART managed the shelter for companion animals at CMHS. The HSPPR accepted animals from evacuees who chose not to stay at the shelter. Location and jurisdiction did not impact which service an evacuee was able to access.</p>
4.d	<p>Co-location of the CSFD and CSPD Command Posts at Holmes Middle School with the Type 1 IMT. Note: The physical co-location of the two command posts is a considered strength.</p>

Item	Strength / Analysis
	<p><i>As noted in the Communications Capability, cellular and wireless connectivity was a significant concern.</i></p> <p>While brief, the co-location of the CSFD and CSPD Command Posts at Holmes Middle School was an ideal situation for sharing information and resources. CSFD and CSPD were able to engage in seamless communications between the two operations, while having direct access to the Type 1 IMT. This co-location was also beneficial to the EOC in providing logistical support to one location for these two operations. This reduced the number of locations needing maps, food, supplies, etc.</p>
4.e	<p>Utilizing City staff from Departments that were closed/impacted by the response to the fire.</p> <p>Staff members from the Pikes Peak Highway and Parks, Recreation and Cultural Services were diverted to the EOC to assist with logistics. Diverting these staff to the EOC proved very beneficial because duty assignments were paid to these hourly employees who did not have a work location to go to for multiple days. These staff also provided a significant benefit to the logistics section, because they arrived with City vehicles and Visa cards allowing them to make purchases and deliver supplies, maps, etc., to offsite locations.</p>
4.f	<p>Requesting Mutual-Aid for personnel in the EOC.</p> <p>The nature of this geographically-dispersed incident drew trained personnel to a variety of locations and work sites. Mutual-aid staff were requested to augment and backfill key roles in the EOC. This mutual-aid solution provided much needed relief for EOC staff, while adding expertise from jurisdictions around the state.</p>

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OPERATIONAL COORDINATION:

Initial AAR Recommendations: Operational Coordination

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
4.4	<p>Issue) Detailed organization charts were not developed and used as part of the incident response and depth in positions was not identified early. <i>Note: This information is also noted for Section 8: Public Safety and Security Response and Section 9 Fire Incident Response Support.</i></p> <p>Analysis) ICS organization charts exist for the EOC and for the ICP, but these were not formally developed during the incident response. Roles and responsibilities were generally followed during the response, but a formal organizational chart did not designate personnel for the various functions they were assigned. Having a designated organization chart, with established roles and responsibilities for personnel, would help others to know which specific roles are active in the incident response. Moreover, it would aid individuals to know what his or her role is in relation to the greater incident. Once roles are identified, it is imperative to ensure that personnel redundancy exists for key positions.</p> <p>Recommendation 1) Develop a comprehensive organization chart early during the incident to ensure that span of control in positions is appropriate for the incident and is adequate for</p>

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
	<p>effective incident management.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 2)</u> Early in the incident develop staff depth in key positions.</p>
4.5	<p><u>Issue)</u> A staffing rotation plan was not in place for several City departments/divisions at the onset of the fire.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> The duration of the fire created a need for staff to work for multiple days and operational periods at a time. Personnel who had been trained were sent to respond to their location and it was not known how long they would be assigned. By Sunday, 24 June, it became apparent that City employees would be working this incident for multiple days/operational periods and that relief staff would need to be called in. This staffing plan needs to be identified early in the incident to ensure that relief staff have sufficient notice and are trained to perform their assigned functions.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 1)</u> Develop an immediate staffing rotation plan to ensure rest times for staff during extended incidents.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 2)</u> Provide training to City personnel and volunteers to ensure that they are equipped to provide the necessary staff relief/support.</p>
4.6	<p><u>Issue)</u> The EOC was not always used in the capacity for which it was designed.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> The EOC is designed to provide a support and resource management function to first responders and other personnel working an incident. Finance, logistics, operations, and planning support for an incident should be coordinated by the EOC. In several circumstances, individuals called whom they knew to get what they needed. This process directly conflicted with the principles of ICS and the intent of the EOC.</p> <p><u>Recommendation)</u> Provide further comprehensive training to staff on their respective roles in the EOC and on the interface with the Incident Command Post (ICP).</p>
4.7	<p><u>Issue)</u> Equipment in the EOC is outdated and slow, which resulted in a degradation/delay of service.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> The Colorado Springs EOC was located in the community room of the Police Operations Center (POC) during this incident. During the EOC activation, computers performed poorly, requiring significant IT support. The slow nature of the computers hampered the ability to produce and rapidly share GIS maps.</p> <p><u>Recommendation)</u> Replace all computer equipment in the EOC and ensure that is updated regularly.</p>
4.8	<p><u>Issue)</u> Information sharing between the EOC and dispersed locations was problematic.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> Information sharing between the Colorado Springs EOC and other locations required personal contact to share relevant information. Regular contact was established during the early days of the fire with key locations, such as the IMT and the local EOCs, but communications among locations became difficult once the fire entered the City on the afternoon of 26 June. EOC personnel were focused on the multiple tasks at hand and were often not readily available to provide information and updates to other locations.</p> <p><u>Recommendation)</u> Ensure that the EOC has liaison personnel for all geographically disparate areas of the incident (partner agency EOCs, IMT, ICP, etc.) and conduct regular liaison briefings to ensure that EOC staff has the most recent information from the field and vice</p>

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
	versa.

Final AAR Recommendations: Operational Coordination

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
4.g	<p>Issue) First responder personnel did not always have full situational awareness regarding the incident and the response. <i>Note: At times, this was a noted success and on other occasions a deficiency. The Waldo Canyon Fire lasted for multiple operational periods and because the lack of IAPs was noted on numerous occasions, it is listed here as a recommendation, but there are other locations involved when an IAP was considered a success.</i></p> <p>Analysis 1) In accordance with NIMS, an IAP is developed for all incidents that span more than one operational period. IAPs were developed for each operational period at the IMT level and at the City for the Waldo Canyon Fire response. These IAPs were presented at a variety of locations to include the EOC, FDOC, Fire and Police Command and the Type 1 and/or 3 IMT locations. IAPs were also shared between the IMT and the City. IAPs were not consistently shared between these locations and the first responders in the field.</p> <p>Analysis 2) Due to the multi-jurisdictional nature of this incident, managing the dissemination of multiple IAPs became problematic. It was not necessary for all personnel to be briefed on the content of each IAP, but information in each IAP was relevant for specific locations and did not pertain to all responders within the City. As an example, the IMT IAP contained information related to firefighting efforts in Teller County.</p> <p>Recommendation) Ensure that a mechanism is in place to deliver current IAPs, to include maps, to each staging location and ensure that personnel at those locations are trained in how to read and present a prepared IAP, extracting relevant information out of multiple IAPs for the intended audience.</p>
4.h	<p>Issue) Separating the physical locations of the CSFD and CSPD Command Posts caused a lack of seamless communications between police and fire Command operations.</p> <p>Analysis) As a result of connectivity issues, CSFD moved its ICP to the FDC, and CSPD moved its ICP to Fire Station 9. Each moved the Command functions indoors where they could readily access landlines and other equipment (copy machines, printers, email) to assist their operations. This separation of ICPs resulted in a variety of difficulties. An additional location where information, supplies, food, etc., was needed and it made seamless communications between the two Commands problematic.</p> <p>Recommendation) Predetermine locations near the WUI that could accommodate both CSFD and CSPD Command. Ensure that these locations have adequate connectivity, equipment, and facility space to conduct joint operations.</p>

CAPABILITY 5: CRITICAL RESOURCE LOGISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION

Definition: Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution is the capability to identify, inventory, dispatch, mobilize, transport, recover, and demobilize, and to accurately track and record available human and material critical resources throughout all incident management phases. Source: DHS Target Capability List version 2.0.

The EOC handled the majority of resource and logistics requests for Colorado Springs' response to the Waldo Canyon Fire. Logistics requests were made by, and through, a variety of field locations. The bulk of the logistics requested during the incident was related to feeding operations and resource supply requests for first responders and EOC staff members.

STRENGTHS OF CRITICAL LOGISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION:

Initial AAR Strengths: Critical Logistics and Distribution

Item	Strength / Analysis
5.1	<p>The Logistics Section of the EOC was able to successfully provide critical resource logistics support, as requested by responders, by using existing contracts, developing new contracts/relationships, and leveraging donations.</p> <p>When requested, the Logistics Section fulfilled many of the necessary requests for supplies and/or assistance during the incident. When practical and manageable, donations were managed and distributed to all the incident locations. <i>Note: This is also listed as a recommendation below, because the EOC was not aware of all donations made to the various locations involved in the incident.</i></p>
5.2	<p>The City has capacity to use P-Cards (Visa) to make large purchases, as necessary, and can make changes to credit limits, in order to manage the ever-changing financial aspect of logistics.</p> <p>The City contracting staff was available and assisted with increasing Visa credit limits, as needed, for EOC logistics personnel who were making purchases throughout the duration of this incident.</p>

Final AAR Strengths and Analysis: Critical Logistics and Distribution

Item	Strength / Analysis
5.a	<p>CAPS Volunteers assisted with sorting and distributing donations, toward the end of the incident, at the Type 1 IMT.</p> <p>The community outreach efforts of the CAPS volunteers were spotlighted in the local media and, as a result, the Type 1 IMT received an immediate influx of donations at Holmes Middle School. Each morning CAPS volunteers would arrive at the IMT and sort the donations left at the front doors. Many items were intended for first responders, such as rehydration, snacks, sunscreen, lip balm, etc. Volunteers dropped off items to first responders at Station 9. If this</p>

Item	Strength / Analysis
	was not practical, the donations were taken to agencies that were responsible for redistribution of donations (e.g., Goodwill and Care and Share).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CRITICAL LOGISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION:

Initial AAR Recommendations for Change: Critical Logistics and Distribution

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
5.3	<p>Issue) After the fire entered the City limits on Tuesday afternoon, the logistical support required for the Colorado Springs response to the incident grew exponentially.</p> <p>Analysis) Beginning on the evening of 26 June, numerous mutual-aid partners joined Colorado Springs in various aspects of response. These responders required food, hydration lodging, and equipment from the Colorado Springs EOC. Staff were not pre-identified and trained to meet this influx of required support.</p> <p>Recommendation) The EOC Logistics Section should be staffed, and organized from the beginning of the incident to ensure that all requests can be met promptly.</p>
5.4	<p>Issue) Trained volunteers were not available to fulfill logistics support positions in the EOC.</p> <p>Analysis) CAPS volunteers were utilized to provide staffing at the check-in point for the EOC beginning on 25 June and performed admirably. CAPS volunteers were used in a limited function in the EOC because they had not received prior training. Their training in advance of an incident will ensure that they can be utilized in pre-planned support roles at the beginning of an incident.</p> <p>Recommendation) CAPS volunteers should be organized and trained to provide logistics support for future events.</p>
5.5	<p>Issue) Food/rehydration was not always adequate and available to all personnel, especially those who were working in active fire areas. <i>Note: This issue was at times considered a strength and varied depending on the location of the personnel requiring food/rehydration.</i></p> <p>Analysis) Providing adequate feeding and rehydration for personnel at a variety of locations was challenging for many reasons. Numerous locations within the City, some in fixed locations (EOC, FDOC, Fire Command) and others in the field (Cedar Heights, Mountain Shadows, CSPD Command) and the number of responders and times were ever-changing daily.</p> <p>Recommendation 1) The Food Unit is responsible for feeding all mutual-aid and first responders. Plans need to be developed to ensure that food with adequate caloric content is provided to first responders at all hours and can be delivered to those working on fire lines, at TCPs, and to those on roving security patrols.</p> <p>Recommendation 2) Ensure that personnel have provisions, especially rehydration, on apparatus sufficient for a 24-hour period.</p> <p>Recommendation 3) Coordinate early with the Salvation Army to develop a feeding plan for all areas and locations of the incident. This plan needs to include timelines and a process for reporting how many personnel in the field and at each location require food.</p>

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
	<u>Recommendation 4)</u> Develop a plan for delivering food to personnel working in active fire zones. Delivery personnel need appropriate PPE and vehicles.

Final AAR Recommendations: Critical Logistics and Distribution

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
5.b	<p><u>Issue)</u> Vendor and internal City requests were duplicated at times.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> During activation, the EOC is responsible for coordinating and fulfilling all resource requests related to the incident. There were many instances during this incident when internal departments and external vendors received duplicate requests from multiple individuals in different locations. As an example, fuel trucks were requested directly from the field and through the EOC. This creates confusion for all parties and is an unnecessary drain on resources.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 1)</u> Provide training and resource materials (e.g., flow charts) that document the resource ordering process during EOC activation.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 2)</u> Ensure, to the extent possible, that all vendors and/or City departments are aware of this process and redirect resource requests to the EOC that are not from the EOC.</p>
5.c	<p><u>Issue)</u> Spontaneous donation management was an unmanageable task at times.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> Coordinated management of donations became unmanageable as they were dropped off at many active locations throughout the incident. The donations were of a variety that may/may not be used immediately by first-responder personnel. Personnel working on the incident did not have the ability to sort donations to determine what could be used and which items would need to be redistributed. Many restaurants and community members provided generous donations of all kinds, but they were not always immediately used at the location where they were dropped off. Coordinated donations were much more effectively utilized and distributed.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 1)</u> Update the CSOEM donations management plan.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 2)</u> Utilize trained CAPS volunteers to assist with the donations management process.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 3)</u> See 3.7 preceding. Develop a local VOAD chapter that can mobilize community organizations during a disaster. These organizations can become the conduit for donations management, and volunteer mobilization during an incident.</p>

CAPABILITY 7: RESPONDER SAFETY AND HEALTH

Definition: Responder Safety and Health is the capability that ensures adequate trained and equipped personnel and resources are available at the time of an incident to protect the safety and health of on scene first responders, first receivers¹², and skilled support personnel. This capability is a critical component of safe overall emergency management. Source: DHS Target Capability List version 2.0.

Responder Safety and Health is a capability that transcends many areas of a wildfire response. This capability is applicable to all personnel working to support efforts related to the fire response. Key to the success of this capability is ensuring that personnel are trained and equipped to work in the environment in which they will be operating. Additionally, there is the issue of behavioral health of the personnel who are most often working extraordinary hours to complete required tasks to support the emergency.

STRENGTHS OF RESPONDER SAFETY AND HEALTH:

Initial AAR Strengths: Responder Safety and Health

Item	Strength / Analysis
7.1	<p>No major injuries were sustained by first responders, first receivers, and support personnel during the incident.</p> <p>Considering the duration, complexity, long hours, strenuous labor, and extreme weather conditions, it is a testament to the health, commitment, training, and adherence to safety procedures that no injuries occurred.</p>
7.2	<p>Law enforcement officers were medically checked at the conclusion of each shift when working directly in the active fire/evacuation zone.</p> <p>Beginning on the evening of 26 June, and continuing for the duration of the incident, law enforcement officers were medically checked by AMR at the conclusion of each shift. Additionally, officers were directed to complete a City Safety incident report for each completed shift. These forms are standard for employees to fill out when exposed to a hazard in the workplace and they provide the necessary documentation should a worker's compensation case be filed.</p>
7.3	<p>Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), specifically masks for first responders, was cached and immediately available for use.</p> <p>Masks for first responders had been purchased and cached for personnel to ensure immediate access during an incident. While the caches existed and were made available to first responders, it was not widely known where and how to access them.</p>

¹² Acute care providers, including surgeons, anesthesiologists, emergency medicine physicians, prehospital providers, and nurses with emergency, operating room, critical care, and trauma backgrounds possess the skills and experiences best suited to serve as first receivers who provide the initial care to disaster victims.

7.4	<p>A long history of training, with an emphasis on safety, helped ensure personnel recognized hazards and prevented significant injury or death.</p> <p>Pre-incident, ongoing City departmental training has included a focus on safety. Fire personnel used tools such as LCES (Lookouts - Communications - Escape - Routes) and the Incident Response Pocket Guide (IRPG) to communicate identified hazards and take appropriate actions to mitigate threats.</p>
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Final AAR Strengths and Analysis: Responder Safety and Health

No additional strengths are noted in this report for Responder Safety and Health.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONDER SAFETY AND HEALTH:

Initial AAR Recommendations: Responder Safety and Health

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
7.5	<p><u>Issue)</u> PPE caches of masks were not readily available for all responders that needed them and only a few individuals knew the quantity and location of the caches.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> Despite the fact that masks for law enforcement officers and support personnel (e.g., fuel truck drivers) were stored in caches throughout the City, knowledge of the location and quantity of masks in the caches was known to only a few individuals. These caches were depleted during the incident response and should be rotated and replaced, as needed.</p> <p><u>Recommendation)</u> Update information regarding PPE caches and ensure that the caches are readily available in a time of need.</p>
7.6	<p><u>Issue)</u> Working personnel did not receive appropriate rest between operational periods and breaks/rehabilitation.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> For CSFD, the existing three-platoon shift schedule was in place until Wednesday, June 27, and when coupled with a mandatory call-back, caused many personnel to work multiple consecutive 24-hour shifts, often with little, if any, rest.</p> <p><u>Recommendation)</u> Develop a plan to ensure that emergency response personnel receive adequate rest, work consistent shifts, and receive breaks and rehabilitation (food and supplies).</p> <p><u>Fire Recommendation:</u> During significant incidents covering multiple operational periods, assign dedicated personnel to the incident and apply an alternative work schedule for them. Depending on the incident type, this alternative work schedule could be consistent with what is used for both wildfire deployments and by federal IMTs incorporating a 2:1 (16:8 hour) work/rest ratio.</p> <p><u>Rehabilitation:</u> See Capability 5: Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution.</p>
7.7	<p><u>Issue)</u> The Waldo Canyon Fire conflagration was an incident that may have created psychological stress for some first responders.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> The fire conflagration that occurred on 26 June and the subsequent structure fires is an event that most first responder personnel have not previously experienced. There are many opportunities for an incident such as this to leave lasting images and impressions.</p>

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
	<p>After incidents of this significance, a critical stress de-brief and/or peer support can often help personnel to identify any lingering trouble that they may be experiencing and seek the relevant assistance.</p> <p><u>Recommendation</u>) Evaluate the need for post-incident critical stress debrief and/or peer support for first responders and support personnel.</p>
7.8	<p><u>Issue</u>) Two key safety positions, Incident Safety Officer (ISO) and Accountability Officer (AO), were not assigned during this incident.</p> <p><u>Analysis</u>) As a result of no designated AO for fire response, overhead personnel were not always aware of which personnel and apparatus were under their authority. Without a specific individual or group identified for the ISO and AO roles, the responsibility fell to the Incident Commander, Structure Protection Branch Director and Group/Division Supervisors. An AO and ISO should have been assigned; relying on others to simultaneously perform this along with their other duties is problematic.</p> <p><u>Recommendation</u>) An ICS Organization Chart needs to be developed for the incident to ensure that there is an ISO and an AO assigned. These two positions will account for all safety needs for personnel who are working the incident.</p>

Final AAR Recommendations: Responder Safety and Health

No additional recommendations are noted in this report for Responder Safety and Health.

CAPABILITY 8: EMERGENCY PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY

Definition: Emergency Public Safety and Security Response is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations and properties, and sustaining operations from response through recovery.

Source: DHS Target Capability List version 2.0.

The CSPD led law enforcement and public safety and security response aspects of the Waldo Canyon Fire within the City limits. CSPD provided security at TCPs for all evacuated areas, roving security patrols within evacuated areas, crime scene investigation, and security during re-entry.

STRENGTHS OF EMERGENCY PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY:

Initial AAR Strengths: Emergency Public Safety and Security

Item	Strength / Analysis
8.1	<p>Moving to 12-hours shifts and using the online special event sign-up proved to be extremely beneficial in organizing personnel.</p> <p>Beginning on 25 June, CSPD moved from 8-hour shifts to mandatory 12-hour shifts for all personnel. This was beneficial in that it provided two shift changes each day, rather than three and allowed personnel to remain in their assignments. The special event sign-up was implemented several days into the event after numerous CSPD personnel requested to work additional hours to support the incident. Utilizing the special event sign-up process served as a centralized database.</p>
8.2	<p>The WUI Appendix was beneficial in that it provided information on areas of concern, evacuation decision points, traffic management, messaging, available resources, legal authorizations, etc.</p> <p>As previously discussed in item 2.1, the WUI Appendix included detailed information related to transportation, evacuation, and re-entry. This plan was used extensively during the Waldo Canyon fire.</p>
8.3	<p>Law enforcement received Mutual-Aid (MA) resources from a variety of agencies as support and as a surge capability.</p> <p>Once the evacuation expanded on Tuesday afternoon, CSPD required immediate public safety MA to assist all the TCPs, roving security patrols, and return visits to check on evacuated homes. MA was provided by local, state and federal agencies.</p>

Final AAR Strengths and Analysis: Emergency Public Safety and Security

Item	Strength / Analysis
8.a	<p>CSPD executed evacuations, using multiple methods of notification, for two neighborhoods, without incident.</p> <p>During the first day of the fire, CSPD officers formed teams and traveled throughout</p>

	neighborhoods conducting notifications door-to-door and via PA systems. Any refusals to evacuate were noted and provided to dispatch. The early evacuations and notifications were good practice for officers who would later conduct the mass evacuations on Tuesday afternoon.
8.b	All CSPD sworn personnel were required to wear uniforms to work and be operationally ready to deploy for evacuations. Beginning Tuesday, 26 June, sworn personnel were required to wear their uniforms to work. Being prepared, in uniform, allowed sworn personnel to immediately deploy to assist with evacuation efforts on Tuesday afternoon.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EMERGENCY PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY:

Initial AAR Recommendations: Emergency Public Safety and Security

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
8.4	<p>Issue) Residents were not always confident that security patrols were being conducted in the evacuated areas.</p> <p>Analysis) CSPD provided 24/7 security patrols in the evacuated, and pre-evacuated, areas. In many circumstances, officers checked individual homes and secured the homes when doors and windows were found open. It is important to inform the public that these patrols are in place so that the residents feel comfortable leaving their homes when an evacuation is ordered.</p> <p>Recommendation) Advise the public that CSPD is providing security in the evacuated and pre-evacuated areas 24 hours a day.</p>
8.5	<p>Issue) Personnel were not always rotated consistently with regard to position and operational period.</p> <p>Analysis) When personnel were rotated in the same position/assignment during the incident, they developed an institutional knowledge that carried from shift to shift. This proved beneficial at the locations where this occurred. At times, this was not the practice, and it took longer for the personnel to gain the operational awareness necessary to progress with their shift.</p> <p>Recommendation) Ensure that consistency in personnel can be maintained throughout the incident as this builds event-specific institutional knowledge that assists with each operational period.</p>
8.6	<p>Issue) There were not a sufficient number of public safety personnel to staff every road block and intersection during the mass evacuations of Tuesday afternoon.</p> <p>Analysis) CSPD was able to immediately deploy more than 75 uniformed officers to assist with the mass evacuations of Tuesday afternoon, but this was not enough to staff each TCP and intersection. Non-sworn City personnel were immediately available to support the CSPD response. Legal determinations need to be made as to what functions and roles non-sworn City personnel can assume during a mass evacuation.</p> <p>Recommendation) Explore the possibility of training and utilizing additional City staff to</p>

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
	provide support to law enforcement officers working on the safety and security aspects (i.e. Streets Division assisting with road blocks, traffic direction).
8.7	<p>Issue) Detailed organization charts were not developed and used as part of the incident response and depth in positions was not identified.</p> <p>Analysis) Refer to Capability 4: EOC Operations, item 4.4.</p> <p>Recommendation) Refer to Capability 4: EOC Operations, item 4.4.</p>
8.8	<p>Issue) Advanced ICS training will assist first responders with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to engage in advanced concepts of incident command, such as building the detailed organization charts previously noted. <i>Note: This is also covered in Section 9: Fire Incident Response Support</i></p> <p>Analysis) First responders have taken required ICS courses and have trained in real-world and training/exercise events. Advanced ICS courses provide training on more complex incidents. Understanding the complex nature of these events and how ICS organizes personnel is much more relevant with the recent exposure to the Waldo Canyon incident. Providing advanced ICS training at this time will give personnel an opportunity to receive the training and apply the knowledge of their recent experiences.</p> <p>Recommendation) Conduct advanced ICS training for first responders and Command and General staff.</p>

Final AAR Recommendations: Emergency Public Safety and Security

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
8.c	<p>Issue) CSPD Command was moved to six locations during the incident.</p> <p>Analysis) CSPD was forced to move its Command location six times during the incident as a result of multiple issues related to space, connectivity and proximity to other command operations. This continuous movement resulted in a significant loss of time for personnel organizing command and control of the law enforcement aspects of the incident.</p> <p>Recommendation) Pre-determine locations that can be used, preferably along with CSFD, for CSPD command. These locations must have existing infrastructure to support the needs of a command center.</p>
8.c	<p>Issue) Burglaries to homes and vehicles occurred in the evacuated areas.</p> <p>Analysis) Emphasis was placed early on for traffic control and securing the perimeter of the evacuated areas, but the same emphasis was not always placed on providing roving security patrols within the perimeter. More roving security patrols may have deterred or prevented some of the criminal activity in the evacuated zones.</p> <p>Recommendation) Deploy more resources to provide inter-perimeter patrol at the onset of the evacuation order to include voluntary, pre-evacuation, and mandatory evacuation notices. These roving patrol resources would be deployed along with evacuation traffic control.</p>

CAPABILITY 9: FIRE INCIDENT RESPONSE SUPPORT

Definition: The Fire Incident Response Support capability provides coordination and implementation of fire suppression operations, which include the following tasks: assessing the scene, assigning resources, establishing ICS, communicating the status of the situation, requesting additional resources, establishing a safe perimeter, evacuating persons in danger, rescuing trapped victims, conducting fire suppression, determining the cause of the fire(s), and ensuring the area is left in a safe condition.

Source: DHS Target Capability List version 2.0.

The CSFD was the lead agency for Fire Incident Response in the Waldo Canyon Fire. While the CSFD provided resources to the Type I IMT, the CSFD Structure Protection Branch resources remained under the CSFD Structure Protection Branch Director. Numerous agencies assisted CSFD with mutual-aid through backfilling fire stations and in fire suppression efforts.

STRENGTHS OF FIRE INCIDENT RESPONSE SUPPORT:

Initial AAR Strengths: Fire Incident Response Support

Item	Agency	Strength / Analysis
9.1		Personnel operated in adverse conditions amidst an urban conflagration for many hours/days, saving many homes, and no serious injuries occurred. <i>Note: This is also covered in Capability 7: Responder Safety and Health</i> Considering the duration, complexity, long hours, strenuous labor, and extreme weather conditions, it is a testament to the health, commitment, training, and adherence to safety procedures that no injuries occurred.
9.2		While there was a large loss of structures, the aggressive firefighting resulting from the CSFD's culture, training, experience, and equipment prevented the loss of many more. After reviewing data for the total number of residences directly affected and those that were destroyed, the average "save" rate is estimated at more than 80%. This is a direct result of the efforts of the CSFD and the mutual-aid partners that assisted in fighting this fire.
9.3		The urban conflagration covered a vast geographic area which posed a tremendous challenge for resources during the initial attack phase. Despite this unique and previously un-experienced situation, all fire companies aggressively engaged the fire throughout the Mountain Shadows neighborhood without the usual resource support available at a typical structure fire. Dedicated personnel are one of the primary strengths in this incident. This strength is reflected in many areas, where personnel were forced to work in unprecedented conditions while using their extensive training and experience.
9.4		Recently the CSFD re-aligned the reporting relationships for the two fire stations that are primarily responsible for the Wildfire Suppression Program. This resulted in a single chain of command, reporting to one District Chief, and accountability for all aspects of the

Item	Agency	Strength / Analysis
		<p>program.</p> <p>The re-alignment of the Wildfire Suppression Program resulted in a streamlined focus on training. In recent years, the CSFD Wildfire Suppression Program has focused its training plan for the department on structure protection. These tactics were employed throughout this incident.</p>

Final AAR Strengths: Fire Incident Response Support

No additional strengths are noted in this report for Fire Incident Response Support.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FIRE INCIDENT RESPONSE SUPPORT:

Initial AAR Recommendations: Fire Incident Response Support

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
9.5	<p><u>Issue)</u> Coordination of arriving resources through an established staging area with the on-scene IC was often ineffective or non-existent which prevented accurate accountability of all crews/personnel operating in the area that was Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH).</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> Personnel accountability is a critical function and a standard practice at all working incidents. This incident, however, created unforeseen challenges in tracking personnel and assignments, due to the incident's scope, the number of work sites, functional groups, and confusion of having all CSFD personnel on duty.</p> <p><u>Recommendation)</u> Develop a comprehensive personnel accountability tracking system for large-scale incidents and mandatory recall situations.</p>
9.6	<p><u>Issue)</u> Detailed organization charts were not developed and used as part of the incident response and depth in positions was not identified.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> Refer to Capability 4: EOC Operations, item 4.4.</p> <p><u>Recommendation)</u> Refer to Capability 4: EOC Operations, item 4.4.</p>
9.7	<p><u>Issue)</u> Advanced ICS training will assist first responders with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to engage in advanced concepts of incident command, such as building the detailed organization charts previously noted.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> Refer to Capability 8: Public Safety Security Response, item 8.8.</p> <p><u>Recommendation)</u> Refer to Capability 8: Public Safety Security Response, item 8.8.</p>

Final AAR Recommendations: Fire Incident Response Support

No additional recommendations are noted in this report for Fire Incident Response Support.

CAPABILITY 10: EVACUATION AND RE-ENTRY

Definition: Evacuation is the capability to prepare for, ensure communication of, and immediately execute the organized and managed evacuation of the at-risk population (and companion animals) to areas of safe refuge in response to a potentially or actually dangerous environment. In addition, this capability involves the safe re-entry of the population. Source: DHS Target Capability List version 2.0.

Colorado Springs developed a WUI Evacuation Appendix to the Colorado Springs Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) in 2008. This plan was reviewed and revised in June 2012, prior to the Waldo Canyon Fire.

STRENGTHS OF EVACUATION AND RE-ENTRY:

Initial AAR Strengths: Evacuation and Re-Entry

Item	Strength / Analysis
10.1	Evacuation zones and Management Action Points (MAPs) were identified early in the incident based on fire behavior and subsequently modified throughout the incident. Developing MAPs and evacuation zones allowed for pre-planning to occur for each evacuation zone, in advance of the evacuation order.
10.2	Resident evacuation drills provided a beneficial opportunity for response personnel and residents to test their response to an evacuation prior to this incident. As discussed under Capability 3: Community Preparedness and Participation, resident participation in community evacuation drills was critical training for first responder personnel and community members.
10.3	Flexibility and dedication of all personnel conducting, and assisting with, evacuations were pivotal in executing the orders and successfully controlling the movement of evacuees. Personnel assigned to execute the mass evacuations on Tuesday afternoon were faced with an unprecedented situation. The evacuation plan that had been developed allowed for four hours to evacuate the northern Mountain Shadows/Peregrine neighborhood. The collapse of the thunderstorm column abbreviated this response time frame by three hours. Regardless, personnel demonstrated unfaltering resolve as they executed the evacuation plan under these unforeseen and indescribable conditions.
10.4	Allowing the Humane Society of the Pikes Peak Region (HSPPR) into the evacuated zone to retrieve animals relieved stress for evacuees and potentially saved the lives of companion animals. HSPPR officers returned to homes, on request, beginning on 29 June to retrieve animals left behind during the evacuation. There were numerous success stories where officers were able to reunite animals with their owners.
10.5	Allowing residents to return to the Mountain Shadows area quickly and spend the day with their homes, with neighbors and first responder personnel, was much appreciated by those affected.

Item	Strength / Analysis
	Residents were allowed entry into the fire-affected neighborhood on 1 July. This day was the absolute earliest that first responders, specifically fire personnel, deemed the neighborhood safe for entry for residents. First responders and other personnel were available as roving patrols in the neighborhood to provide assistance. Much discussion took place before allowing residents to self-enter the neighborhood, but in the end there were no reported safety issues and residents reported being very happy to have the opportunity to return, even for one day.

Final AAR Strengths and Analysis: Evacuation and Re-Entry

Item	Strength / Analysis
10.a	<p>Closing of City Parks and Open Space locations.</p> <p>The early closure of City Parks and Open Space in the fire-affected areas and in other areas of the City resulted in reducing potential hazards and the number of individuals in public areas. Reducing this hazard allowed City personnel to focus on the response to the fire.</p>
10.b	<p>Allowing residents to bypass TCPs to return home to get children and other emergency items during the mass evacuations on 26 June.</p> <p>During the mass evacuation on Tuesday afternoon, TCPs were set up to block re-entry into the evacuated neighborhood. During the evacuation, numerous residents stopped at the TCPs and expressed a need to return home (e.g., to retrieve children who were home alone, medications, pets). A spontaneous decision was made by the CSPD Command to allow these residents entry into the neighborhood. It is believed that this decision resulted in saving responders from additional work that would have come from residents trying to return when the area was less stable.</p>
10.d	<p>Several strengths related to the initial re-entry day are noted:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conducting “drive-through” check-in. 2. Providing masks, trash bags, snacks, and hydration to residents. 3. Providing roving patrols of behavioral health specialists, CSFD and CSPD chaplains, law enforcement officers, and fire personnel for the entire day. <p>The initial re-entry day planning took into consideration many factors related to safety, security, public health and mental health. The neighborhood was not yet completely stable with the fire burning to the west, utility shut-offs, smoldering ash and debris. Drive through check-in points were used to move the greatest number of individuals into the area in the least amount of time. Trash bags and other items were provided to residents, along with information sheets, to give the most education and resources possible regarding potential dangers that would be encountered. Probably the most successful aspect of the day was the roving police and fire patrols, many of whom worked on the evening of 26 June. These personnel provided educational information and emotional support to those in need on this initial re-entry day.</p>

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EVACUATION AND RE-ENTRY:

Initial AAR Recommendations: Evacuation and Re-Entry

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
10.6	<p>Issue) Evacuation boundaries were not always clear.</p> <p>Analysis) Evacuation boundaries were not always readily identifiable based on the cross-streets and borders of the evacuation zone. This was even more problematic during re-entry when there were often no definitive boundaries, only street names. Residents tend to identify with their neighborhood name more than the boundaries that support it.</p> <p>Recommendation 1) Consider using street names as borders as well as using the names of neighborhoods.</p> <p>Recommendation 2) Ensure that maps of the evacuated areas are made available immediately through a variety of methods and modes (e.g., media, handouts at public locations, etc.).</p>
10.7	<p>Issue) First responders in the field responsible for enforcing the mandatory evacuations did not always know the exact boundaries and did not always receive the information immediately.</p> <p>Analysis) Decisions related to evacuation were made quickly once the fire breached a MAP. Personnel were geographically dispersed, creating a need to provide information rapidly to remote locations.</p> <p>Recommendation) Ensure that first responders have immediate access to maps and decisions regarding evacuations. Information sharing can be achieved by the recommendations suggested under item 1.c in Capability 1: Communications. Explore the ability to provide evacuation maps to smart phones and other portable devices.</p>
10.8	<p>Issue) Business owners and residents made numerous valid, emergency-related requests to enter the evacuated area.</p> <p>Analysis) Requests to enter the evacuated area were presented in a variety of locations and to a variety of individuals. Many re-entry requests were short-term to gather items necessary to business continuity or emergency items in residences. These requests were often fielded at TCPs and officers had to contact their chain of command to seek permission. The lack of a clearing-house/task force to field these requests created additional work for all the officers staffing TCPs in the field.</p> <p>Recommendation) Establish a re-entry task force early in the incident after the initial evacuations are ordered. This task force would be the single point of contact to assess the need for anyone wishing to gain entry during the mandatory evacuation and once the evacuation has been lifted.</p>
10.9	<p>Issue) Residents who attended the community meeting on 28 June at UCCS were not grouped by neighborhood when they were provided the information regarding the status of their homes.</p> <p>Analysis) Residents who attended the community meeting at UCCS were assembled in a large group and then divided into sub-groups. The group divisions did not allow for neighborhood residents to remain together for the notification of their homes' status. Feedback from the</p>

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
	<p>attendees noted that they would like to be grouped with their neighbors, regardless of the status of their homes. Peer support was the most important aspect of this interaction.</p> <p>Recommendation) When separating individuals for large meetings and/or announcements (such as the UCCS community meeting on 28 June), divide the attendees by geographical neighborhood.</p>

Final AAR Recommendations: Evacuation and Re-Entry

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
10.e	<p>Issue) Documentation of rapid door-to-door evacuations and refusals is extremely difficult to track during mass evacuations.</p> <p>Analysis) When CSPD conducted evacuations on Saturday, 23 June, there was adequate time to document each home contacted and/or any irregularity at the address (e.g., refusal, special needs). This process became more problematic on the afternoon of 26 June. Easy-to-use applications exist for hand-held devices that can be used in the field by law enforcement officers to quickly note the status of each house visited during an evacuation order. This accurate documentation will result in a reduction of duplication for officers who may need to revisit homes to check on the status of residents.</p> <p>Recommendation) Review the capabilities of evacuation software applications designed for public safety and implement relevant solutions for law enforcement.</p>
10.f	<p>Issue) Aerial photographs provided information related to the damaged and destroyed homes prior to the City being able to confirm the information on the ground.</p> <p>Analysis) City leadership was dedicated to providing personally delivered, accurate information to residents directly impacted by the fire. The ongoing media coverage and close-up views of homes burning on the evening of 26 June provided residents with their first look at the destruction in the affected neighborhoods. The zoom lenses of media cameras provided immediate and identifiable information for some. The following morning brought aerial before-and-after-photos of the devastated areas. Residents could look at these photos and determine if their homes were affected. For City officials, the identification process was cumbersome and tedious with personnel conducting damage assessment throughout the neighborhood, attempting to assemble the addresses affected in a neighborhood that, in some areas, was left with little to no identifying markers (e.g., street signs, house numbers on mailboxes, houses that were a total loss).</p> <p>Recommendation) Review the available options for gathering data as soon as possible on an affected area. This may include contracting flight services to take aerial photos and/or overlaying this information on existing data layers.</p>

CAPABILITY 11: EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION

Definition: The Emergency Public Information and Warning capability includes public information, alert/warning and notification. It involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, coordinating officials, and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions. Source: DHS Target Capability List version 2.0.

At the onset of the Waldo Canyon Fire, a Joint Information System (JIS) of agency Public Information Officers (PIOs) was established to deliver accurate and timely information to the public. The JIS was located at a Joint Information Center (JIC) housed at the El Paso County Sheriff's Office (EPSO). As the fire moved into Colorado Springs, the City Communications Office shared the lead in the JIC with the Type 1 IMT PIOs to disseminate information to the public.

STRENGTHS:

Initial AAR Strengths: Emergency Public Information¹³

Item	Strength / Analysis
11.1	<p>Conducting the press conferences at established times each day provided a reliable source of information.</p> <p>Holding the press conferences at consistent times throughout the fire provided for a reliable source of information for the public. The Policy Group met before each press conference and was able to provide relevant and timely updates.</p>
11.2	<p>The public information phone numbers that were answered in the JIC provided a good opportunity for immediate response and customer service to community members. <i>Note: The establishment of a phone bank was a positive action, but there are recommendations noted in the section below as to how this can be improved upon in future incidents.</i></p> <p>The JIC established, and staffed, a phone bank throughout the incident for the public to call when asking questions. Communications staff and local PIOs who volunteered through the Crisis Communications Network (CCN) answered phones in the JIC and spoke directly with residents and members of the community who had questions or concerns. This direct link to the public allowed for the provision of excellent direct customer service.</p>
11.3	<p>Twitter was effective in providing immediate information to the public and, through monitoring the PIOs in the JIC could easily correct any misinformation.</p> <p>PIOs in the JIC linked numerous Twitter accounts (@SpringsGov, @CSFDPIO, @CSPDPIO, @mayorstevebach, @EPCSheriff, @EPCPIO) and utilized a single hashtag #waldocanyonfire to ensure that one message was being sent during the fire. Twitter was also closely monitored to ensure that any incorrect information was immediately corrected. Twitter followers of CSFD and Colorado Springs rose exponentially during the fire.</p>

¹³ The information provided in this section is reflective of the City PIOs only, and is not reflective of the views of the many other agencies in the JIC.

Final AAR Strengths and Analysis: Emergency Public Information

Item	Date	Strength / Analysis
11.a		<p>Public information was provided at regular intervals early and throughout the day from the onset of the incident.</p> <p>The press conferences on the first day were flexible and continuously evolved, adding the appropriate key players from various agencies to ensure that the information provided was comprehensive and complete. Rapidly changing information was provided frequently at these press conferences, as well as through social media (Twitter) and by the ongoing coverage from local media outlets.</p>
11.b		<p>Activation of the JIS/JIC in the early morning. <i>Note: The establishment of a JIC was a positive action, but there are recommendations noted in the section below as to how this can be improved in future incidents.</i></p> <p>Managing public information during a fast-moving, multi-agency incident is extremely important. A multi-agency JIC was established the morning after the fire began with representatives from multiple agencies working the fire. Having representatives from multiple agencies resulted in the consolidation of information flow to and from the JIC to the public.</p>
11.c		<p>Creating a media staging area at Coronado High School and UCCS, away from incident operations.</p> <p>The media staging areas at Coronado High School and the UCCS provided a location where the media parked vehicles and awaited scheduled press conferences. This location was in close proximity to the ICP location(s) of City first responders allowing for operations to continue unimpeded, while providing access for the media to key officials at regularly scheduled times.</p>
11.d		<p>CAPS volunteers assisted with disseminating information to the community.</p> <p>Volunteers set up information tables at six grocery stores near evacuated areas where they provided daily updated information. This proved successful in getting information out to the community in various ways.</p>

RECOMMENDATIONS:**Initial AAR Recommendations: Emergency Public Information**

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
11.4	<p><u>Issue</u>) A JIC plan was not in place for the City prior to this incident.</p> <p><u>Analysis</u>) The absence of a pre-existing JIC plan resulted in internal confusion regarding the delineation of roles of each City PIO and how this relates to the overall functions of the JIC. Consistent information sharing between PIOs in the field, EOC and JIC was a challenge.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 1</u>) Develop a City Crisis Communications Team that works with the regional Crisis Communications Network (CCN) to refine public information plans and procedures.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 2</u>) Consolidate all public-information functions and personnel under the Colorado Springs Communications Department.</p>

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
	<p>Recommendation 3) Develop a JIC plan for the City, ensuring that this plan defines roles and responsibilities for all JIC functions and how City PIOs will organize under this structure.</p> <p>Recommendation 4) Work with regional CCN to help participants identify and receive PIO and JIC training as needed.</p>
11.5	<p>Issue) There were not enough trained PIOs to fulfill the functions of the JIC and the Communications section of the EOC.</p> <p>Analysis) Trained PIOs were recruited from the CCN and utilized in the JIC and in the EOC. The demand for individuals to assist with public information was so great that additional personnel were requested from around the state to assist in staffing positions.</p> <p>Recommendation) Coordinate the provision of PIO training with City staff to ensure that there is depth in this position and identify additional trained local PIOs to supplement City Communications staff as necessary.</p>
11.6	<p>Issue) Messages during the mass evacuation on Tuesday afternoon did not contain all relevant information related to the execution of the evacuation.</p> <p>Analysis) Additional information could have been provided to residents that would have resulted in more streamlined evacuation procedures, especially during the evacuations on Tuesday afternoon. Additional information that could have proved helpful for residents included items such as reducing cell phone use to ensure emergency service was available, when needed, and communicating traffic plans such as contra flow out of the affected neighborhoods.</p> <p>Recommendation) Develop pre-scripted evacuation messages and provide more detail in the messages, especially whether the evacuation is emergent or not. If the evacuation is emergent, reiterate pertinent information such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Traffic plan information such as contra flow out of a neighborhood or on main arteries. - Use text messaging instead of cell phones to allow for emergency calls. - Take one car to keep your family together and help reduce traffic and cell phone congestion
11.7	<p>Issue) Closed captioning was not available on all network stations during the incident.</p> <p>Analysis) Not everyone who is deaf or hard of hearing understands American Sign Language (ASL). The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) requires media outlets to provide closed captioning for networks.</p> <p>Recommendation) Work with local media and advocates for the deaf and hard of hearing community to provide closed captioning and interpreters during emergency incidents.</p>

Final AAR Recommendations: Emergency Public Information

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
11.e	<p>Issue) During this first day of the fire, early reports indicated four or more names for the fire (Pyramid Fire, Pyramid Mountain Fire, Waldo Fire, Waldo Canyon Fire).</p> <p>Analysis) This incident included an extremely fast-moving fire that immediately impacted two counties, multiple municipalities, and the USFS. Due to the nature of this event, the need to disseminate information to the public was a priority. As a result, agency-specific PIOs from</p>

Item	Issue / Analysis / Recommendation
	<p>Colorado Springs and El Paso County coordinated early messaging, but this was not confirmed with representatives from the USFS, the agency with ultimate jurisdiction over the fire.</p> <p><u>Recommendation)</u> This confusion was remedied within the day and the correct name of the fire, Waldo Canyon Fire, was quickly disseminated at press conferences, news tickers, and Twitter. In the future, the fire name will be confirmed with the agency responsible for the fire (in this event, the USFS) prior to releasing information referring to the incident name.</p>
11.f	<p><u>Issue)</u> The JIC location was not adequately equipped to handle the information requirements of this event.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> The conference room where the JIC was located contained a minimal number of landline phones, minimal televisions for media monitoring, no recording capabilities for the televisions, and no physical dividers for all the personnel in the room resulting in noise. These factors created several limitations for JIC staff.</p> <p><u>Recommendation)</u> Create a fixed-facility JIC location within a City building that has adequate equipment and connectivity for all organizations that may need to respond to a multi-agency incident. Of key importance for this facility is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Landline telephones with predetermined telephone numbers. - Capability to monitor multiple television stations simultaneously and to record press conferences and other key information reported by the media.
11.g	<p><u>Issue)</u> The JIC did not have the ability to record press conferences and replay critical information to ensure accuracy.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> The JIC did not have the technology to record the press conferences and/or other relevant media updates provided during the incident. Critical information was often relayed at the press conferences for the first time, and the JIC would immediately begin to receive phone calls requesting clarification. Without the ability to play back the press conference, JIC staff was put in a position of having to validate the information from other sources, taking more time away from their responsibilities.</p> <p><u>Recommendation)</u> Ensure that there are multiple televisions with the ability to record live television from multiple networks in the JIC.</p>
11.h	<p><u>Issue)</u> The JIC did not always have accurate maps, with neighborhood information included, when evacuations were announced.</p> <p><u>Analysis)</u> Accurate, detailed maps of the evacuation zones for evacuation and re-entry were critical for members in the JIC who were responding to information requests.</p> <p><u>Recommendation)</u> Devise a plan to ensure that plans can be immediately emailed to the JIC and provide the JIC facility with the equipment necessary to print the maps on plotter paper. For redundancy, develop a plan for hand-delivery of maps to the JIC facility that should be located in close proximity to the EOC.</p>

SECTION 3: CONTACT INFORMATION

For any further information related to this report or for information regarding ongoing Waldo Canyon recovery efforts, please contact the Colorado Springs Office of Emergency Management.

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
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719-385-7229 (office)

e-mail: bwaters@springsgov.com




APPENDIX A: FIRE PROGRESSION MAP




APPENDIX B: COLORADO SPRINGS EVACUATION ZONES

Initial Evacuation Zones developed on 23 June 2012 (1-3):



Evacuation Zones revised and developed on 24 June 2012 (1-5):



Department of
Information Technology
GIS Services Division
CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS

Waldo Canyon Fire Perimeter and Evacuation Areas

Map Date: 06/24/2012
Time: 9:14

Legend

Fireline -0100-0624

Colorado Springs City Limits

Evacuation Area 1


Evacuation Area 2

Evacuation Area 3


Evacuation Area 4

Evacuation Area 5

All Evacuation Zones (1-11):



APPENDIX C: FINAL COLORADO SPRINGS EVACUATION MAP



APPENDIX D: RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS

The organizations listed in the table below are representative of the preliminary assessment of organizations that supported the City of Colorado Springs' response to the Waldo Canyon Fire. Further assessment will likely find that there are additional agencies that should be added to this list.

Community Organizations	
American Red Cross	Goodwill
Care and Share	Humane Society of the Pikes Peak Region
Catholic Charities	Pikes Peak United Way
Colorado Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (COVOAD)	Salvation Army
Community Advancing Public Safety	Samaritan's Purse
Community Animal Response Team	The Navigators
Governmental Organizations	
Air Force Academy	El Paso Teller E-911 Authority
Civil Air Patrol	Fort Carson
Colorado Army and Air National Guard	Mountain Metropolitan Transit Bus Service
Colorado Department of Transportation	National Weather Service
Colorado National Guard	Natural Resource Conservation Service
Colorado Springs Utilities	Pikes Peak Community College
Colorado Water Conservation Board	Pueblo Chemical Depot
District 11 Transportation	Pikes Peak Regional Building Department
El Paso County Assessor's Office	Small Business Association
El Paso County GIS	United States Forest Service
El Paso County Public Health	United States Geological Society
Facilities	
Cheyenne Mountain High School	Lewis Palmer High School
Chipeta Elementary School	Penrose Equestrian Center
Coronado High School	Southeast YMCA
Eagleview Middle School	The Springs Church
Freedom Financial Services Expo Center	University of Colorado at Colorado Springs (UCCS)
Holmes Middle School	Verizon Wireless, Garden of the Gods
Emergency Management	
Colorado Department of Local Affairs	
Colorado Division of Emergency Management	
Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management	
Colorado Office of Emergency Management	
Colorado Springs Office of Emergency Management	
El Paso County Emergency Services Division	
Federal Emergency Management Agency	
Great Basin Type 1 Incident Management Team	

Fire	
Air Force Academy Fire Dept.	Golden Fire Dept.
Arvada West Fire Protection District	Green Mountain Falls Chipita Park Fire Dept.
Aurora Fire Dept.	Hanover Fire Protection District
Beulah Valley Volunteer Fire Dept.	Littleton Fire Department
Black Forest Fire/Rescue	Manitou Springs Fire Dept.
Boone County Fire Dept.	National Fire Protection Association
Broadmoor Fire Protection District	Northeast Teller County Fire Protection District
Calhan Fire Protection District	Palmer Lake Volunteer Fire Dept.
Cascade Volunteer Fire Dept.	Peterson Air Force Base Fire Department
Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station Fire Dept.	United States Army Pueblo Chemical Depot
Cimarron Hills Fire Dept.	Pueblo County Sheriff's Office
Colorado Center Metro District	Pueblo West Fire Dept.
Colorado Springs Fire Department Explorers	Rye Fire Protection District
Crystal Park Volunteer Fire Dept.	Security Fire Dept.
Colorado Springs Utilities Wildland Fire Team	South Metro Fire Rescue Authority
Denver Fire Dept.	Southwest Highway 115 Volunteer Fire Dept.
Donald Westcott Fire Protection District	Stratmoor Hills Fire Dept.
El Paso County Wildfire Suppression Team	Tri-Lakes Monument Fire Protection District
Falcon Fire Protection District	West Metro Fire Protection District
Fort Carson Fire and Emergency Services	West Park Fire Dept.
Fountain Fire Dept.	Wheat Ridge Fire Protection District
Law Enforcement	
Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)	El Paso County Sheriff's Office
Aurora Police Department	Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Colorado Department of Corrections	Fountain Police Department
Colorado State Patrol	Pueblo County Sheriff's Office
Department of Homeland Security Federal Police	Pueblo Police Department
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)	University of Colorado at Colorado Springs (UCCS)
El Paso County District Attorney's Office	Police Dept.
Medical/Behavioral	
Air Life Denver Ambulance	Memorial Hospital Transport Team
American Medical Response-Canon City	Mount St. Francis Nursing Center
American Medical Response-El Paso County	Rocky Mountain Mobile Medical
American Medical Response-Denver	Rural Metro Ambulance
American Medical Response-Pueblo	Silver Key Transportation
Aspen Pointe	Spanish Peaks
Calhan Ambulance Service	Mount St. Francis Transportation
Fountain Fire Department Ambulance	Stratmoor Hills Fire Department Ambulance
Hanover Fire Department Ambulance	Ute Pass Regional Ambulance District (UPRAD)
Medical Reserve Corps of El Paso County	Memorial Hospital Transport Team

APPENDIX E: 26 JUNE 2012 DETAILED TIMELINE

Time	Activity
7:00PM 25 June	The IMT Meteorologist issued the weather forecast for Tuesday, 26 June 2012: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mostly sunny with late morning cumulus forming. A slight chance of high-based thunderstorms in the afternoon with little rain and gusty outflow winds up to 40 mph. Northwest half of fire - west 5-8 mph with gusts to 12 until 0900, becoming southwest 9-12 mph with gusts to 20 mph until 1800, some gusts as high as 25 mph.
8:00AM	Morning press conference was held at Coronado High School.
9:00AM	Based on the National Weather Service (NWS) weather forecast, the Fire Department Operations Center (FDOC) created fire behavior modeling showing the fire moving at an approximate rate of ¼ mile per hour.
10:52AM	CSPD began allowing evacuees from Mountain Shadows to return to their homes for 30 minutes, after checking in with an officer at a checkpoint, to retrieve essential emergency items.
11:32AM	CSPD suspended the escorted returns into southern Mountain Shadows for emergency items due to fire behavior.
1:39PM	Pre-evacuation notice was issued for Zone 3 (northern Mountain Shadows, Peregrine, Oak Valley).
2:26PM	CSFD weather spotter in the Cedar Heights area provided the following weather report: relative humidity 10.2%, wind speed of 5-6 mph with gusts up to 15mph, coming out of the S/SE.
2:29PM	Crystal Park Lookout reported seeing flare-ups on the west side of Williams Canyon.
3:45PM	Air Attack reported spotting the fire approximately 350 feet from the bottom of Queens Canyon.
3:52PM	Crystal Park Lookout reported seeing fire on the northern ridge of Queens Canyon's western side.
4:04PM	Afternoon press conference began at Coronado High School.
4:05PM	CSFD weather spotter in the Cedar Heights area provided the following weather report: 96 degrees, relative humidity of 11.8, wind speed of 8 mph with gusts up to 18 mph, coming out of the S/SE.
4:08PM	Fire was reported on the east side of the most east facing ridge of Queen's Canyon. Captain Steve Riker was located east of Wilson Tank and called Battalion Chief (BC) Collas to confirm the evacuation order for Zone 3. BC Collas acknowledged and stated that he would confirm.
4:10PM	BC Collas requested the mandatory evacuation of Zone 3.
4:11PM	CSFD's FDOC began to request additional outside resources for northern Mountain Shadows and assigned additional CSFD personnel to work in northern Mountain Shadows and Peregrine.
4:20PM	CSFD radio transmissions from personnel west of the Wilson Tank in northern Mountain Shadows noted that fire had moved approximately 1/3 of the way down the eastern ridge of Queen's Canyon.

Time	Activity
4:21PM	Mayor Bach interrupted the afternoon press conference to announce the mandatory evacuation of Zone 3.
4:23PM	CSFD radio transmissions from personnel west of the Wilson Tank in northern Mountain Shadows noted that the fire had jumped to the top of the next ridge over (two peaks over and starting to run to the northeast).
4:24PM	The mandatory evacuation notice was given for Zone 3 (northern Mountain Shadows, Peregrine, Oak Valley) via the Emergency Notification System (ENS).
4:36PM	Task Force 1 requested confirmation that the evacuation had been ordered and stated that there were still a lot of homeowners in Peregrine. Chief Dubay confirmed that the evacuation order went out approximately 15 minutes prior.
5:00PM	Evacuation Zones 6, 7, 8, and 9 were developed and mapped.
5:07PM	A helicopter made its final water drop on the area west of northern Mountain Shadows/Peregrine.
5:08PM	CSFD personnel located near the Wilson Water Tank moved to hard pavement near the Wilson Tank.
5:11PM	Air Attack reported that the column had collapsed.
5:23PM	CSFD ordered all personnel to retreat to Chipeta Elementary School due to the aggressive fire entering the area.
5:38PM	CSFD ordered all personnel at Chipeta Elementary School to retreat to the MCI building on Garden of the Gods and Centennial due to the fire front that was raging through the neighborhood.
6:00PM	CSFD resources reentered the northern Mountain Shadows neighborhood to commence firefighting efforts.
6:22PM	The mandatory evacuation notice was given for Zone 4 (north Rockrimmon) via the ENS.
6:53PM	Pikes Peak American Red Cross (PPARC) opened a second shelter in Colorado Springs at the Southeast YMCA.
7:09PM	Freedom Financial opened to shelter pets.
7:37PM	The mandatory evacuation notice was given for Zone 7 (southeast Rockrimmon) via the ENS.
7:50PM	The mandatory evacuation notice was given for Zone 6 (south Pope's Valley, Woodman Valley, Pinon Valley, Pine Cliff) via the ENS.
8:02PM	PPARC opened a third shelter in Monument at Lewis Palmer High School.
8:30PM	An evening press conference was held at UCCS to provide information regarding the recent events of the column collapse and subsequent firestorm in northern Mountain Shadows.
9:46PM	The mandatory evacuation notice was given for Zone 8 (Kissing Camels) via the ENS.

APPENDIX F: DEFINITIONS

Alert: Alert refers to any text, voice, video, or means, whereby an authorized official provides situational awareness to the public about a potential or ongoing emergency situation. An alert does not necessarily require immediate actions, but typically issued in connection with immediate danger.

Agency Representative (AREP): This ICS position serves as the point of contact for an assisting or cooperating agency which has been delegated authority to make decisions on matters affecting that agency's participation at the incident.

Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES): The use of designated radio frequency spectrum for private recreation, non-commercial exchange of messages, wireless experimentation, self-training, and emergency communications. ARES consists of licensed amateurs who register their qualifications and equipment with local ARES leadership and volunteer for communications duty in public service when disaster strikes.

Cell on Wheels (COW): A mobile cell site that consists of a cellular antenna tower and electronic radio transceiver equipment on a truck or trailer, designed to be part of a cellular network.

Command: The act of directing, ordering or controlling by virtue of explicit statutory, regulatory or delegated authority.

Command Staff: An incident command component that consists of a Public Information Officer, Safety Officer, Liaison Officer and other positions as required, who report directly to the Incident Commander.

Community Advancing Public Safety Program (CAPS): CAPS provides opportunities for volunteers (18 and older) to take an active role in the community's public safety efforts. The CAPS program matches volunteers' interests, experience and skills with a meaningful and unique opportunity to contribute to the community. Opportunities are available at both internal operations and at field locations.

Community Animal Response Team (CART): Group of trained members who perform animal (pet and livestock) rescue, evacuation, and sheltering operations during emergencies and disasters.

Colorado Office of Emergency Management (COEM): Operating under the Department of Public Safety, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, COEM is responsible for the state's comprehensive emergency management program, which supports local and state agencies.

Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP): A CWPP identifies and prioritized areas for hazardous fuel reduction treatments and recommends the types and methods of treatment on

Crisis Communications Network (CCN): Multi-agency network of crisis communicators in the Colorado Springs area.

Delegation of Authority: The transfer of authority for suppression actions on a wildland fire is accomplished through the execution of a written delegation of authority from the agency administrator with responsibility for the land area involved to the incident commander who will be assigned responsibility for implementing the agency's strategic direction for management of the incident.

Disaster: A severe or prolonged incident which threatens life, property, environment or critical systems.

Disaster Recovery Center (DRC): A DRC is a readily accessible facility or mobile office where applicants may go for information about FEMA or other disaster assistance programs, or for questions related to his or her case.

Department of Local Affairs (DOLA): The Department of Local Affairs (DOLA) serves as the primary interface between the State and local communities. The department provides financial support to local communities and training and technical assistance to elected community leaders in the areas of governance, housing, property tax administration, and emergency management.

Emergency Notification System (ENS): A public safety communications system used to communicate with groups of people in a defined geographic area. The system uses a database of telephone numbers and associated addresses, which, when tied into geographic information systems (GIS), can be used to deliver recorded emergency notifications to a selected set of telephone service subscribers.

Emergency Operations Center (EOC): An EOC is a central coordination point for all policy decisions, resource allocation, operations, and public information dissemination, in coordination with the JIC – if established - during a large-scale incident. The EOC functions as the information collection point for maintaining situational awareness and a common operating picture for all agencies involved in the response to a large-scale incident. An EOC is responsible for the strategic overview, or "big picture", of the disaster, and does not normally directly control field assets, instead making operational decisions and leaving tactical decisions to lower commands.

Emergency Operations Plan (EOP): The EOP assigns responsibility to organizations and individuals for carrying out specific actions at projected times and places in an emergency that exceeds the capability or routine responsibility of any one agency. The EOP sets forth lines of authority and organizational relationships, and shows how all actions will be coordinated and describes how people and property will be protected in emergencies and disasters. The EOP identifies personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies, and other resources available - within the jurisdiction or by agreement with other jurisdictions - for use during response and recovery operations.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): FEMA is an agency of the United States Department of Homeland Security, initially created by Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 and implemented by two Executive Orders on April 1, 1979. The agency's primary purpose is to coordinate the response to a disaster that has occurred in the United States and that overwhelms the resources of local and state authorities. The governor of the state in which the disaster occurs must declare a state of emergency and formally request from the president that FEMA and the federal government respond to the disaster

Fire Department Operation Center (FDOC): When a single major incident or multiple large incidents are occurring, the CSFD FDOC will be activated to manage/coordinate uncommitted CSFD resources and mutual-aid requests. If activated, the EOC will provide resource support to the incident(s), coordinating with the FDOC, as needed.

Fire Management Assistance Grants (FMAG): FMAG is federal financial assistance available to States, local and tribal governments, for the mitigation, management, and control of fires on publicly or privately owned forests or grasslands. FMAG is requested by a local fire agency through the State Emergency Management Agency.

GEOCAST: Refers to the delivery of information to a group of destinations in a network identified by their geographical locations. It is a specialized form of multicast addressing used by some routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks.

Hazard: Something that has the potential to be the primary cause of an incident.

Human-caused: Incidents caused by human activity, which include but are not limited to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive and technological, including cyber, hazards, whether accidental or intentional.

Incident: An occurrence or event, natural or manmade, that requires a response to protect life or property. Incidents can, for example, include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, civil unrest, wildland and urban fires, floods, hazardous materials spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, tsunamis, war-related disasters, public health and medical emergencies and other occurrences requiring an emergency response.

Incident Action Plan (IAP): An oral or written plan containing general objectives reflecting the overall strategy for managing an incident. It may include the identification of operational resources and assignments. It may also include attachments that provide direction and important information for management of the incident during one or more operational periods.

Incident Command or Incident Commander (IC): The IC is the person responsible for all aspects of an emergency response; including quickly developing incident objectives, managing all incident operations, application of resources as well as responsibility for all persons involved. IC sets priorities

and defines the organization of the incident response teams and the overall IAP.

Incident Command Post (ICP): The ICP is a temporary facility that signifies the physical location of the tactical-level, on-scene incident command and management organization. It typically comprises the Incident Commander and immediate staff and may include other designated incident management officials and responders from Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies, as well as private sector, nongovernmental, and volunteer organizations. ICPs may be mobile, rather than temporary (see Mobile Command Post).

Incident Command System (ICS): ICS is "a systematic tool used for the command, control, and coordination of emergency response" according to the United States Federal Highway Administration. A more detailed definition of an ICS according to the United States Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance is "a set of personnel, policies, procedures, facilities, and equipment, integrated into a common organizational structure designed to improve emergency response operations of all types and complexities. ICS is a subcomponent of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), as released by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2004."

Incident Management System (IMS): An IMS is formalized and institutionalized and addresses the principles of command and basic functions of planning, operations, logistics, finance and administration. An IMS is modular, scalable, interactive and flexible; it includes common terminology, manageable span of control, unified command, consolidated action plans, multi-agency coordination and integrated communications. Examples include the National Incident Management System (NIMS), ICS, or a multi-agency coordination system.

Incident Management Team (IMT): An IMT is a comprehensive resource (a team) to either augment ongoing operations through provision of infrastructure support, or when requested, transition to an incident management function to include all components/functions of a Command and General Staff. An incident such as a wildland fire is initially managed by local fire departments or fire agencies, but if the fire becomes complex additional resources are called in to address the emergency, and higher levels of management training and capability are required. IMTs are "typed" according to the complexity of incidents they are capable of managing and are part of an Incident Command System.

- **Type 3 IMTs** are deployed as a team of 10-20 trained personnel, representing multiple disciplines who manage major and/or complex incidents requiring a significant number of local, state, or tribal resources. They manage incidents that extend into multiple operational periods. A Type 3 IMT may initially manage more complex incidents that later transition to a National Level IMT.
- **Type 1 IMTs** are a Federally or State-certified team. Type 1 is the most robust IMT with the most training and experience. Sixteen Type 1 IMTs are now in existence, and operate through interagency cooperation of federal, state and local land and emergency management agencies.

Job Aids: A checklist or other visual aid intended to ensure that specific steps for completing a task or assignment are accomplished.

Joint Information Center (JIC): The JIC is the facility whereby an incident, agency, or jurisdiction can support media representatives. Often co-located - even permanently designated - in a community or state EOC the JIC provides the location for interface between the media and the PIO. Most often the JIC also provides both space and technical assets (Internet, telephone, power) necessary for the media to perform their duties. A JIC very often becomes the "face" of an incident as it is where press releases are made available as well as where many broadcast media outlets interview incident staff. It is not uncommon for a permanently established JIC to have a window overlooking an EOC and/or a dedicated background showing agency logos or other symbols for televised interviews. The National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) at FEMA has both, for example, allowing televised interviews to show action in the NRCC behind the interviewer/interviewee while an illuminated "Department of Homeland Security" sign, prominently placed on the far wall of the NRCC, is thus visible during such interviews.

Joint Information System (JIS): Mechanisms that integrate information and public affairs into a cohesive organization designed to provide consistent, coordinated, accurate, accessible, timely, and complete information during a crisis or incident.

Jurisdiction: A state, territory, region, tribal government, county, parish or municipality. A range or sphere of authority. Public agencies have jurisdiction at an incident related to their legal responsibilities and authority.

Liaison: Person that liaises between two organizations to communicate and coordinate their activities. Generally, they are used to achieve the best utilization of resources or employment of services of one organization by another.

Logistics Section: Under ICS, the section responsible for providing facilities, services, and material support for the incident.

Lookouts – Communications – Escape Routes – Safety Zones (LCES): LCES is a system response to fire line safety.

Management Action Points (MAPs): Geographic points on the ground or specific points in time where an escalation or alternative of management actions is warranted. Timely implementation of the actions when the fire reaches the action point is generally critical to successful accomplishment of the objectives.

Mitigation: The activities designed to reduce or eliminate risks to persons or property or to lessen the actual or potential effects or consequences of a disaster. Mitigation measures may be implemented prior to, during or after a disaster. Mitigation measures are often informed by lessons learned from prior disasters. Mitigation involves ongoing actions to reduce exposure to, probability of, or potential loss from hazards.

Mobile Command Post (MCP): The MCP signifies the physical location of the tactical-level, on-scene incident command and management organization. It typically comprises the Incident Commander and immediate staff and may include other designated incident management officials and responders. Typically, the ICP is located at or in the immediate vicinity of the incident site and is the focus for the conduct of direct, on-scene control of tactical operations.

Multijurisdictional Incident: An incident requiring action from multiple agencies that each have jurisdiction to manage certain aspects of the incident.

Mutual-Aid: Assistance in firefighting or public safety operations by agencies, without regard for jurisdictional boundaries.

Mutual-Aid Agreement (MAA): An agreement among emergency responders to lend assistance across jurisdictional boundaries. This may occur due to an emergency response that exceeds local resources, such as a disaster or a multiple-alarm fire. Mutual-aid may be *ad hoc*, requested only when such an emergency occurs. It may also be a formal standing agreement for cooperative emergency management on a continuing basis, such as ensuring that resources are dispatched from the nearest fire station, regardless of which side of the jurisdictional boundary the incident is on. Agreements that send closest resources are regularly referred to as "automatic -aid agreements."

Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC): MAC is part of the standardized Incident Command System. MACs provides the basic architecture for facilitating the allocation of resources, incident prioritization, coordination and integration of multiple agencies for large-scale incidents and emergencies

National Incident Management System (NIMS): NIMS is a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, NGOs, and the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life and property and harm to the environment.

National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG): NWCG is an operational group designed to coordinate programs of the participating wildfire management agencies.

Non-Governmental Organization (NGO): NGOs are legally constituted organizations created by people who operate independent of government. The term refers to organizations that are not a part of a government and are not conventional for-profit businesses. In cases in which an NGO is funded totally or partially by governments, the NGO maintains its non-governmental status by excluding government representatives from membership in the organization.

Notification: Notification refers to any process where Federal, State, local, tribal, and NGOs, department, and/or agency employees and/or associates are informed of an emergency situation that may require a response from those notified.

Office of Emergency Management (OEM): The OEM is responsible for providing mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery, and coordination for large-scale emergencies and disasters, both natural and human-caused, for the purpose of saving lives and preventing property damage

Operational Period: A defined period of time in which a specific set of objectives are established for managing incident activities and for which specific resources and personnel are assigned to those activities, as determined by the IC.

Operations Section: Under ICS, responsible for all tactical incident operations and implementation of the IAP. The Operations Section normally includes subordinate Branches, Divisions, or Groups.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): PPE is protective clothing, helmets, goggles, or other garments or equipment designed to protect the wearer's body from injury. The hazards addressed by PPE include physical, electrical, heat, chemical, biohazard, and airborne particulate matter.

Policy Group: Elected and key officials having authority over the jurisdiction.

Preparedness: The range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, mitigate against, respond to and recover from disasters. Preparedness is a continuous process.

Presidential Disaster Declaration: The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (referred to as the Stafford Act - 42 U.S.C. 5721 et seq.) authorizes the President to issue “major disaster” or “emergency” declarations before or after catastrophes occur. Emergency declarations trigger aid that protects property, public health, and safety and lessens or averts the threat of an incident becoming a catastrophic event. The Governor of the affected state must request the Declaration.

Prevention: Actions to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from occurring. Prevention involves actions to protect lives and property. It involves identifying and applying intelligence and other information to a range of activities that may include such countermeasures as deterrence operations; heightened inspections; improved surveillance and security operations; investigations to determine the full nature and source of the threat; public health and agricultural surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation, or quarantine; and, as appropriate, specific law enforcement operations aimed at deterring, preempting, interdicting or disrupting illegal activity, and apprehending potential perpetrators.

Procedures: Detailed description of activities that support implementation of a plan(s).

Public Information: Public information refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official, including general information and crisis and emergency risk communication activities.

Public Information Officer (PIO): PIOs are the communications coordinators or spokespersons of certain governmental organizations (i.e. city, county, school district, state government and police/fire departments). The primary responsibility of a PIO is to provide information to the media and to the public, as required by law and according to the standards of their profession.

Recovery: Recovery programs are designed to assist victims and their families, restore institutions to suitable economic growth and confidence, rebuild destroyed property, and reconstitute government operations and services. Recovery actions often continue long after the incident. Recovery programs include mitigation components designed to avoid damage from future incidents.

Red Card: A card issued to persons showing their incident management and trainee qualifications to fill specified fire management positions in an incident management organization.

Red Flag Warning: The National Weather Service issues Red Flag Warnings & Fire Weather Watches to alert fire departments of the onset, or possible onset, of critical weather and dry conditions that could lead to rapid or dramatic increases in wildfire activity. A Red Flag Warning is issued for weather events which may result in extreme fire behavior that will occur within 24 hours.

Response: The response of an entity to a disaster or other significant event that might impact the entity. Activities, tasks, programs, and systems can include the preservation of life, meeting basic human needs, preserving business operations, and protecting property and the environment. An incident response can include evacuating a facility, initiating a disaster recovery plan, performing damage assessment, and any other measures necessary to bring an entity to a more stable status.

Staging Area: Temporary locations at an incident where personnel and equipment are kept while waiting for tactical assignments. The resources in the Staging Area are always in available status. There may be more than one Staging Area at an incident. Staging Areas should be located close enough to the incident for a timely response, but far enough away to be out of the immediate impact zone.

Structure Protection: The protection of homes or other structures from wildland fire.

Volunteer. A person who is a member of a volunteer organization and, in the event of a disaster, provides volunteer services through the organization.

Warning: Warning refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official to provide direction to the public about an ongoing emergency situation that requires immediate actions to protect life, health, and property. A warning requires immediate actions and is typically issued when there is a confirmed threat posing an immediate danger to the public.

APPENDIX G: COLORADO SPRINGS WALDO CANYON FIRE FAST FACTS

The following information is provided as a reference for information specific to the City of Colorado Springs. As with many other aspects of this document, this information does not take into account the larger

Total Evacuations:

Evac Zone	Neighborhood(s)	Evac Date	Return Date	Residents Affected	Buildings Affected	Notes
1	Cedar Heights	6/23	6/29	406	213	
2	Southern Mountain Shadows	6/23	Multiple	1,875	840	Streets in Mountain Shadows were released street by street, day by day, until 8 July.
3	Northern Mountain Shadows/Peregrine/Oak Valley	6/26	Multiple	7,090	2,565	Peregrine: 7/1 Oak Valley: 7/1 N. Mountain Shadows: See above.
4	Northern Rockrimmon	6/26	6/29	8,250	2,987	
5	Pleasant Valley	N/A	N/A	2,865	2,178	Pre-Evacuation Only
6	Woodmen Valley/Pinon Valley/Pine Cliff	6/26	Multiple	5,114	1,955	Pine Cliff: 6/28 Woodmen Valley: 6/29 Pinon Valley: 7/1
7	Southeast Rockrimmon	6/26	6/28	3,820	1,434	
8	Kissing Camels	6/26	6/28	2,215	1,314	
9	Holland Park	N/A	N/A	3,995	1,601	Pre-Evacuation Only
10	Old Colorado City	N/A	N/A	3,156	1,686	Pre-Evacuation Only
11	Mesa/Indian Heights	N/A	N/A	13,270	9,558	Pre-Evacuation Only
Total				52,056	26,331	

Total number of residents evacuated: 28,770

Total number of buildings in the evacuated areas: 11,308

Total Acreage Burned:

Jurisdiction	Acreage
National Forest Service	14,422
El Paso County	2,309
City of Colorado Springs	1,516
Total	18,247

Destroyed and Damaged Homes:

The initial number of destroyed homes announced to the public was 346. This number was later reduced by one due to a destroyed home with two driveways that were initially thought to be two homes. This reduced the official number of destroyed and damaged homes to 345. Two additional homes were initially categorized as “not livable”, but were later demolished and added to the count of destroyed homes. The final number of destroyed homes remains 347.

A total of 46 homes were damaged.

Financial Impact:


The following City expenditures were submitted for reimbursement for the Waldo Fire:

- Public Assistance (non-suppression activities) - \$1,432,126
- FMAG (suppression activities) - \$1,280,384


These figures are based on allowable actual expenditures. The figures do not include any regular salaries or other items (e.g., vehicle maintenance, video costs) that were paid during the incident since they are not considered an allowable expense.

City Personnel:

1,302 sworn and civilian staff members provided direct and indirect support, to the Waldo Canyon Fire response.

APPENDIX H: MAP OF DESTROYED/DAMAGED HOMES

APPENDIX I: MAP OF COLORADO KEY COMMAND/SUPPORT LOCATIONS



APPENDIX J: SENATORS BENNET AND UDALL LETTER TO SECRETARY VILSACK

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

October 11, 2012

The Honorable Tom Vilsack
Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture
1400 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, DC 20250

Dear Secretary Vilsack,

This was a historic wildfire year for Colorado; twice within three weeks we broke the previous record for the most destructive wildfire in state history. While large destructive fires like High Park and Waldo Canyon dominated the national news, there were fires burning in almost every area of the state, including the 14,000-acre Pine Ridge Fire in Mesa County, 10,000-acre Weber Fire in Montezuma County, and 45,000-acre Last Chance Fire in Washington County.

These Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) fires were unprecedented in size and impact. However, this was not the first time – nor will it be the last time – we face these kinds of fires. High Park and Waldo Canyon are unfortunately just the latest in a series of high-impact WUI fires in Colorado's Front Range since the late 1980s, some of which include Left Hand Canyon, Buffalo Creek, Hayman, Fourmile Canyon and Crystal.

Recent estimates indicate that 40 percent of Colorado's population lives in the WUI, even though less than 4 percent of the state's geographic area is WUI. Lives, communities and natural resources continue to be exposed to the impending risk of wildfire. The unprecedented nature and pattern of these fires call for a systematic and scientific analysis to learn how we as a society can do better. Our goal is to make sure that the lessons learned — positive and negative — are captured and acted upon appropriately. Reports from the incident management team have suggested that a combination of dry and windy conditions, steep rugged terrain and altered fuels all contributed to the extreme fire behavior witnessed during these fires.

We must examine the factors that led to the level of intensity and damage, and learn what we can do to reduce future risks.

The short- and long-term human and financial tolls of large, high-impact fires can create ripple effects that can impact local communities and regional economies for many years. Identifying and understanding those personal and economic costs can help target assistance and capacity-building efforts. Also, identifying and understanding human behaviors and trends can provide important guideposts for other WUI communities at impending risk of a wildfire and the organizations that assist those communities.

We are asking for a comprehensive and scientific review of several different elements of these fires, including, but not limited to, the following research questions:

- For the High Park Fire, what was the influence of beetle-kill trees on fire behavior and severity?
- For both the High Park and Waldo Canyon fires, where did forest and fuels treatments occur and what types of treatments were conducted? On lands in both fire areas, what was the effectiveness of various fuels treatments, including prescribed fire, in stopping or slowing the fire, reducing fire intensity and reducing soil damage?
- What influence did Community Wildfire Protection Plans play in the management and losses of this fire? What can be learned from the treatment program that can be applied to future treatment strategies in the WUI?
- What are the long-term ecological trajectories of areas burned in this fire event?
- What are the total direct and indirect costs that accrue over time from these fires? For example, the Western Forestry Leadership Coalition estimated that the ‘true’ cost of the Hayman Fire was estimated to exceed \$207 million while the direct fire suppression cost comprised only \$43 million.
- What can we learn about how burned areas are redeveloped? What are the costs of reinvesting in the burned areas, including property, infrastructure, natural resource values and ecosystem function?
- What role did fire brands and direct heating from the flame front play in structure loss during this fire?
- What are the motivations and incentives that cause homeowners to take action or not take action on their property to mitigate the risk of wildfire?
- What is the relative effectiveness of different forms of post-fire stabilization and restoration treatments – such as natural revegetation, plantings, seeding and mulching – on water quality, species diversity, impacts to soil, riparian areas? What influence will post-fire rehab have on vegetative and ecological trajectories?

This type of systematic, in-depth analysis to understand the social, economic, organizational and ecological impacts of these fires is essential to effectively addressing the future of fire management in the WUI and to mitigating the impact of these large catastrophic events.

We look forward to working with you on this focused program of work. We also ask that you consider working in partnership with some of our excellent Colorado-based research institutions, including the USDA Rocky Mountain Research Station, the Southern Rockies Fire Science Network, Colorado Forest Restoration Institute, the Western Fire Research Center, and the National Institute for Standards and Technology.

Sincerely,



Mark Udall
U.S. Senator



Michael Bennet
U.S. Senator